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COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Klump v. United States, 30 Fed. Appx. 958 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(upholding the Federal Claims Court decision to dismiss a Fourth
Amendment and state law claim for lack ofjurisdiction, granting
summary judgment for the government because the Fifth Amendment
taking claim was precluded, and holding that: (1) impoundment and
sale of trespassing cattle does not effect a Fifth Amendment taking;
and (2) the government acting in its proprietary capacity did not effect
a Fifth Amendment taking of water rights).
Luther Klump, an Arizona rancher, held a grazing permit for
48,000 acres of Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") land known as
the Badger Den Allotment. The permit restricted grazing in the HX
Dam Protection Area and allowed for seasonal grazing in the Ryan
Seeding Pasture. In 1990, the BLM cancelled the permit after Klump
In April 1993, the BLM
repeatedly ignored the restrictions.
impounded Klump's cattle and sold them at auction, and paid Klump
the proceeds minus costs in accordance with BLM regulations.
Klump challenged the cancellation of the grazing permit. Both
the administrative judge and the Interior Board of Land Appeals
("IBLA") sustained the permit cancellation. The IBLA decision was
appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona
and then to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Klump argued before both courts that the BLM restrictions on his
grazing permit were invalid because it violated his water and grazing
rights. Klump further argued that the BLM cancellation of his permit
was a Fifth Amendment taking of his property rights without due
process and just compensation.
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected Klump's arguments. The Ninth Circuit ruled that: (1) Klump
had no legally cognizable water or grazing rights in the HX Dam
Protection Area or in the Ryan Seeding Pasture; (2) the grazing
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permit's restrictions did not violate Klump's water or grazing rights;
and (3) in view of Klump's intentional violation of the grazing permits
restrictions, the BLM had properly canceled the permit.
In April 1995, Klump filed his action in the court of federal claims,
alleging the BLM impoundment and sale of his cattle violated the
Fourth Amendment and Arizona state law and that BLM had taken his
livestock, water rights, grazing permit, livelihood, and ranch in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. In his complaint, Klump sought
compensation and damages in excess of $176 million.
In its November 4, 1997 decision, the court of federal claims
dismissed the Fourth Amendment and state law claims for lack of
jurisdiction. In addressing the Fifth Amendment claim the court held
that the BLM did not affect a taking when it impounded and sold
Klump's cattle and granted summary judgment for the government.
The court concluded that the cancellation of the grazing permit
complaint was barred due to issue preclusion arising from the prior
litigation in federal district court in Arizona and the Ninth Circuit.
On July 13, 1998, the court of federal claims issued its decision on
Klump's claim that the BLM's actions amounted to a taking of his
entire ranch and fee lands.
The court determined that issue
preclusion barred this claim because it was rejected initially in Klump's
challenge of the grazing permit cancellation and in a subsequent
action by the United States to quiet title to the Badger Den Allotment.
The final decision of the federal claims court over Klump's claims
was made on June 8, 2001. The court granted summary judgment in
favor of the government on Klump's claim that the BLM's actions
amounted to a taking of his water rights. Klump appealed these
judgments to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.
The appellate court upheld the federal claims court decision that it
lacked jurisdiction to hear Klump's Fourth Amendment and state law
claims. The court of appeals held that monetary damages are not
available for Fourth Amendment claims and the federal claims court
only had jurisdiction over cases in which the Constitution or a federal
statute required the payment of monetary damages. Therefore, the
court lacked jurisdiction.
The appellate court turned next to Kump's Fifth Amendment
takings claims and upheld the federal claims court decision of
summary judgment for the government. Klump was precluded from
claiming the BLM's actions were a taking and that his lack of a permit
was not a bar to his cattle grazing rights. The court of appeals
reasoned that Klump had already litigated and lost both of these
claims, and their resolution was essential to the final judgment.
Therefore, Klump was precluded from relitigating the claim and
summary judgment for the government was proper.
The appellate court went on to note that if the grazing permit
claim were not precluded, the claim for damages would still fail
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because a grazing permit is not a compensable property right. The
appellate court stated that the Taylor Grazing Act, the express terms of
the lease, and relevant case law all affirm that a grazing permit is not a
compensable property interest.
Furthermore, the appellate court affirmed the holding that the
impoundment and sale of Klump's cattle was not a taking. Regulation
of property rights does not 'take' private property when an individual's
reasonable investment-backed expectations can continue to be
realized as long as he complies with reasonable regulatory restrictions.
The BLM's actions were consistent with Klump's reasonable
investment-backed expectations. The appellate court reasoned that
the BLM permit conditions and numerous warnings put Klump on
notice that the BLM would seize and sell his cattle. Accordingly,
Klump had no reasonable expectation that his cattle could trespass on
federal land.
The appellate court upheld the federal claims court decision that
the BLM had not affected a Fifth Amendment taking of Klump's water
rights and claims. The Appeals Court held that while sovereign acts
may give rise to a Fifth Amendment taking, mere assertions of a right
of property do not. In obtaining the water rights to the Badger Den
Allotment, the BLM acted in its proprietary capacity and received the
same treatment under state law as a private owner.
Jason Turner
Walcek v. United States, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding: (1)
the impact of a challenged regulatory taking must be evaluated in
terms of its effect on the landowner's parcel as a whole in
consideration of wetlands regulation; and (2) the determination of the
fair market value of property allegedly taken inherently factors in
inflation).
Dolores, Stanley, and Albert Walcek, and Regina Ammons
("Walceks") sued the United States, claiming the government's
regulation of their property constituted a taking. The United States
Court of Federal Claims dismissed the complaint on the merits. The
Walceks appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal District.
The Walceks purchased 14.5 acres of real property in 1971. In
1972, 13.2 acres of the property became subject to regulation under
section 404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") as federally regulated
wetlands. In 1988, the Walceks submitted a series of applications to
the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") for authority to fill and
develop the land pursuant to section 404 of the CWA. In 1993, the
Corps denied approval of the Walceks' development plans, and
proposed alternatives, which the Walceks considered economically
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unviable.
The Walceks filed a complaint before the Court of Federal Claims
in 1994. In the complaint, the Walceks alleged a permanent taking
based on the Corps's denial of their permit request, and also that the
decision rendered useless the economic value of their property. In
1996, after the Walceks filed their complaint, the Corps issued a
permit to the Walceks, which authorized the development of 2.2 acres
of the property. The Walceks were not satisfied with the conditioned
permit, whereby they were required to keep eleven acres undeveloped,
and persisted with the complaint.
The Court of Federal Claims limited the trial to the issue of
whether the 1996 permit affected a regulatory taking. Although the
Walceks never formally amended their complaint to address the 1996
permit, the trial court tried the issue by the implied consent of the
parties. The Walceks argued that the 13.2 acres of wetlands on their
property constituted the relevant parcel for reviewing a possible
categorical regulatory taking. Because the 1996 permit allowed 2.2
acres of development and did not deny the Walceks all economically
beneficial use of the land, the court held that no categorical taking
occurred. However, the court noted the Walceks could have shown
the regulation effected a taking according to the factors articulated in
Penn Central Transportation v. City of New York ("the Penn Central
Factors"). Absent a categorical taking, the Penn Central Factors
permit a property owner to prove that a regulation affected a taking
pursuant to specific factors. But, after comparing the Walceks' facts
with the Penn Central Factors, the court concluded the wetlands
regulations of the Walceks' land pursuant to the 1996 permit effected
no compensable taking.
On appeal, the Walceks maintained that a recent United States
Supreme Court decision provided grounds for treating the eleven
acres in question the Corps prohibited development on as the relevant
parcel for the regulatory takings analysis. The Walceks alternatively
argued that the Federal Court of Claims improperly applied the Penn
Central Factors, and therefore erred in concluding the 1996 permit
did not constitute a taking.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal District
declined to consider the Walceks' argument that the relevant parcel
for the takings analysis was the eleven acres the 1996 permit required
be left undeveloped. The court refused to consider this issue on the
grounds that it had not been raised in the court below. It also found
no error in the lower court's analysis of the Penn Central Factors, or in
the conclusion that the Walceks suffered no compensatory taking.
Further, the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's refusal to
adjust the value of the Walceks' property for inflation before
determining whether the Walceks would be able to realize a profit
under the 1996 permit. The court held that the proper determination
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of the fair market value of property inherently factors in inflation, and
any additional adjustments would be unreasonable. Thus, the court
affirmed the dismissal of the Walceks' complaint.
Mark Shea
SECOND CIRCUIT
Altman v. Town of Amherst, No. 01-7468, 2002 WL 31132139 (2nd Cir.
Sept. 26, 2002) (holding that a determination of whether a point
source discharge of properly used pesticides into waters of the United
States requires an NPDES or SPEDS permit will remain undecided
until the EPA interprets whether the Clean Water Act includes this
type of discharge).
Michael and Susan Altman ("Altmans"), residents of Amherst, New
York, commenced a suit against the Town of Amherst ("Amherst") in
the United States District Court for the Western District of New York
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, civil penalties, and attorney's
fees for violations of permit requirements of the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). The Altmans alleged that Amherst violated the CWA by
spraying pesticides for mosquito control in federal wetlands without a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit or
a State Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("SPDES") permit.
Amherst argued they only needed a permit from the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC") to spray
pesticides for mosquito control when the city discharged the pesticides
directly into United States' waters. After a failed settlement attempt,
Amherst filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted
Amherst's motion. It held that no issues of material fact existed and
that pesticides, when used for their intended purpose, do not
constitute a pollutant as defined by the CWA. Further, the court
decided that the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA") more aptly applied to this particular situation. Finally, it
granted Amherst's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
Amherst only needed a DEC freshwater permit to spray pesticides.
The Altmans appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit raising three issues: (1) FIFRA did not foreclose,
preempt, or supercede the permit requirements under section 402 of
the CWA; (2) state and federal acquiescence to Amherst's discharges
without a CWA permit was unlawful; and (3) good-faith use of
pesticides even for their intended purpose did not make the spray
something other than a pollutant according to the meaning of the
CWA. The appellate court vacated the decision and remanded the
case to the district court.
The CWA permit requirements apply when a party discharges a
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pollutant from a point source into waters of the United States. The
appellate court focused on the fact that the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") had not articulated a clear interpretation of current
law dealing with whether pesticides used properly and released over or
into waters of the United States triggered the requirement of an
NPDES or SPDES permit. It determined that the question would
remain open until the EPA decided the issue.
The district court acted with an incomplete record and failed to
consider threshold questions of law. The court suggested that the
Altmans amend their complaint to join federal and state agencies
necessary to resolve this issue. The appellate court also issued five
guidelines for the district court. First, the district court needed to
consider whether freshwater wetlands in New York are "waters of the
United States." Second, the district court should examine whether the
use of the particular pesticides in this case constituted the "deliberate
discharge" of pollutants into the waters of the United States. Third,
the district court must determine if Amherst properly used the
pesticides for their intended purpose. Fourth, the district court
needed to determine whether any of the pesticides applied,
discharged, or sprayed by Amherst were pollutants as defined by the
CWA. Fifth, the district court must use persuasive authority of recent
case law from the United States Supreme Court and the Second
Circuit.
Adriano Martinez

FOURTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Interstate Gen. Co., 39 Fed. Appx. 870 (4th Cir. 2002)
(holding that a Supreme Court decision subsequent to a plea
agreement and consent decree entered into by appellants and the
United States did not eliminate the federal government's jurisdiction
and did not legalize the conduct underlying appellant's criminal
conviction because the decision dealt with a provision of 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(a) (3) that the government had not used to assertjurisdiction for
the plea agreement or the consent decree).
This appeal arose out of a denial by the Maryland United States
District Court of Interstate General Company's ("IGC") petition for
writ of error coram nobis and motion to vacate. As grounds for its writ
and motion to vacate, IGC argued the Supreme Court's subsequent
decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC') legalized the conduct underlying
IGC's criminal conviction. Thus, appellants claimed they did not
violate the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by filling in certain wetlands
because SWANCC eliminated the federal government's jurisdiction
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over those wetlands. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
disagreed, affirming the district court's ruling and holding SWANCC
did not change the decisional law applicable to appellant's case.
In September 1995, the United States began parallel criminal and
civil proceedings against IGC, St. Charles Associates ("SCA"), and
James J. Wilson, chief executive officer of both companies ("IGC and
SCA"). The complaints charged IGC and SCA with violating the CWA
by discharging fill material onto four parcels of wetlands in St. Charles
without obtaining a permit from the United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps"). In February 1996, ajury convicted the IGC and
SCA on four felony counts of knowingly discharging fill material into
wetlands protected by the CWA.
Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit reversed IGC's convictions and
remanded the matter for a new trial because the district court, in
instructing the jury, had relied on 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (3) as a possible
basis for the Corps' jurisdiction. The court concluded that the Corps
had exceeded its congressional authorization under the CWA in
promulgating § 328.3(a)(3).
Consequently, the court held
§ 328.3(a) (3) was invalid and the district court's instruction based on
that regulation was erroneous.
After remand, the parties settled both the criminal and civil aspects
of the controversy. IGC pled guilty to a single felony count and paid
$1.5 million in fines. The parties also signed a consent decree, which
required IGC to pay a civil penalty of $400,000 and to implement a
wetland remediation plan. In return, the government dismissed all
charges against Wilson and SCA. The district court sentenced IGC
and entered the consent decree in November 1999.
Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court decided SWANCC, and IGC
filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis and a motion to vacate
the consent decree under Rule 60(b) (5) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The district court denied both applications, and IGC
appealed.
Federal courts have the power under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) to grant a
writ of error coram nobis vacating a conviction after completion of a
sentence. However, this extraordinary relief should be granted only if
an error "of the most fundamental character" has occurred, and no
other remedy is available. Although historically, this common law writ
was used to correct fundamental errors of fact, it may also be issued to
correct fundamental errors of law. Such an error may occur when
there is a significant change in the law following a conviction.
As with coram nobis, a threshold question under Rule 60(b) (5) is
whether there has been a significant change in the law since the
conviction in question. It is appropriate for a court to grant a Rule
60(b) (5) motion if the court is convinced that its prior decision was
clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. According to
the Supreme Court, this may occur when the party seeking relief from
an injunction or consent decree can show a significant change either
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in factual conditions or in law. Here, IGC argued that SWANCC
significantly changed the law applicable to its conduct.
The Fourth Circuit held that both IGC's guilty plea and the
consent decree assumed that the Corps had jurisdiction under the
CWA to regulate the St. Charles wetlands. The court next noted,
however, that the Corps no longer asserted jurisdiction under
§ 328.3(a) (3) because United States v. Wilson declared that subsection
of the regulation invalid. Instead, the court opined, the Corps
asserted jurisdiction over the wetlands because they were adjacent to
tributaries of traditional navigable waters. It noted that the parties
acknowledged the factual predicate for the Corps' jurisdictionspecifically, that the St. Charles wetlands were adjacent to tributaries of
traditionally navigable waters.
IGC argued that SWANCC eliminated jurisdiction over wetlands
adjacent to waters that were not traditionally navigable, even if those
waters eventually flowed into traditional navigable waters. According
to IGC, SWANCC limited the Corps' jurisdiction to: (1) traditional
navigable waters; and (2) wetlands immediately adjacent to traditional
navigable waters. Consequently, IGC argued that SWANCC eliminated
the Corps' jurisdiction over the disputed wetlands, so discharging fill
into them without a permit did not violate section 404(a) of the CWA.
The Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by IGC's contentions,
holding the only clear change in law made by SWANCC was a narrow
one. At issue in SWANCC was the Corps' jurisdiction over an isolated
intrastate body of water. The court further held that the Corps' in
SWANCC based its jurisdiction solely on § 328.3(a)(3), the only
subsection covering isolated bodies of water. Thus, the Supreme
Court declined to hold that isolated ponds wholly located within two
Illinois counties fell under section 404(a)'s definition of "navigable
waters" because they served as habitat for migratory birds.
The Fourth Circuit noted that the wetlands at issue were adjacent
to the headwaters of small streams that flowed into Port Tobacco
Creek, Piney Branch, or Mattawoman Creek, and concluded these
wetlands were adjacent to tributaries of traditional navigable waters.
In sum, because the Fourth Circuit had already invalidated
§ 328.3(a) (3) in its entirety in United States v. Wilson, an opinion issued
before either the plea or the consent decree, SWANCC effected no
Accordingly,
relevant change in decisional law in this circuit.
(3) and, in
of
§
328.3(a)
validity
only
the
SWANCCs holding addressed
the present case, the Corps' jurisdiction did not rest on subsection
(a) (3). Rather, the Fourth Circuit opined, the Corps' based its
jurisdiction on §§ 328.3(a) (1), (a) (5), and (a) (7) for purposes of the
guilty plea and the consent decree.
In denying IGC's writ of error coram nobis and motion to vacate, the
Fourth Circuit stated that IGC would have had to show there had been
a fundamental or significant change in the law governing the subject
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case. IGC failed to do so. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's order denying IGC's petition for writ of error coram
nobis and motion to vacate the consent decree.
Gloria M. Soto
SIXTH CIRCUIT
Hamilton v. Myers, 281 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that
individuals rightfully possessing prior property interests in lakes, now
held in public trust, own the submerged land beneath the lake and the
air above, to the low water mark point, as measured at the time the
lake transferred into public trust).
Jamie and Bonnie Hamilton ("Hamilton") filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee against the
Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency, its executive director, and
several employees in their official and individual capacities ("TWRA").
Hamilton sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the TWRA,
and compensatory and punitive damages against the employees, in
their individual capacities. Hamilton alleged that TWRA and its
employees violated Hamilton's due process rights by unlawfully
searching and seizing Hamilton's boat, duck blind, and decoys from
Reelfoot Lake at the orders of the TWRA regional office. Additionally,
Hamilton sought declaratory relief pronouncing that Hamilton owned
a property interest in Reelfoot Lake. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of TWRA, finding sovereign immunity
barred Hamilton's claims, and that in the alternative, Hamilton did
not own a property interest in Reelfoot Lake because the lake was held
in public trust. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling
that the employees in their individual capacities were immune from
suit because the employees' actions were reasonable and protected as a
discretionary function. However, the court reversed the district court's
judgment on the other claims. It held that Hamilton owned a
property interest in Reelfoot Lake under Tennessee law, and
remanded the case to determine whether the Hamiltons had standing
to enforce their property rights, and to resolve disputed issues
regarding the measurement of the property interest.
In 1788, the State of North Carolina granted Colonel Doherty,
Hamilton's predecessor in interest, a deed of real property. In 1810,
an earthquake caused the formation of Reelfoot Lake, thus
submerging part of the land included under the original 1788 grant.
Hamilton's deed extended to the ordinary low water mark of Reelfoot
Lake. Since the Doherty grant included the entire portion of land
described in the original 1788 deed, Hamilton asserted Doherty's
riparian rights over the lakebed, 200 yards past the shore of the Lake,
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and argued that this territory was outside the TWRA's management.
Hamilton marked this 200-yard territory by a light pole, and often
moored a boat to the pole for hunting purposes. On November 16,
1996, Hamilton moored a camouflaged boat, duck blind, and duck
decoys to the light pole. TWRA officers were on duty searching for
unregistered blinds, including blinds erected under asserted riparian
ownership. The TWRA officers inspected Hamilton's boat and blind,
and did not find a registration tag. Reporting the boat and blind to
their supervisors, the TWRA regional office ordered removal of the
boat and blind. The employers removed the items found at the pole
from the lake. Subsequent to removal of the items, TWRA discovered
registration numbers on the boat. The TWRA denied Hamilton's
requests for immediate return of the items, yet they returned them ten
days later.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed whether
sovereign immunity barred Hamilton's claims. The district court ruled
the claims were barred because the effect of Hamilton's claims of
ownership in a lake held in public trust would effectively shift control
and all benefits of that part of the lake to Hamilton. The district court
relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, which ruled that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe could
not assert a riparian property interest over an entire lake because it
effected Idaho's sovereignty. The court of appeals reversed the district
court and distinguished Idaho, holding that an individual possessing a
prior deed for land submerged under a lake may acquire riparian
rights over the water, above the land and obtain complete ownership
of the portion of a lake, provided the state retains ownership over part
of the lake. The court reasoned that because Hamilton was only
asserting control and ownership 200 yards off shore, the property
interest was not so broad that it would strip Tennessee of control over
Reelfoot Lake. Therefore, the TWRA was not immune from suit
because Hamilton asserted damages would not infringe upon
Tennessee's sovereignty.
The court of appeals then applied Tennessee state law to
determine whether Hamilton owned a riparian right in the lake. The
court held that individual property rights in Reelfoot Lake had already
been established in State ex. rel. Cates. In that case, the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that the public trust in the lake was only
applicable to the lakebed, waters, and air outside of the grants issued
to Doherty in 1788. Applying this precedent, the court determined
that Hamilton had standing to bring suit and enforce their property
rights established in the Doherty grant if the boundaries of Hamilton's
asserted property interest was reasonably identifiable. The court
examined Hamilton's deed and found that the property interest
extended to the ordinary low water mark of the lake. Consequently, it
found that the boundaries of the deed were reasonably identifiable
because the land conveyed by the deed was not completely submerged
currently, or at the time the lake was conveyed into public trust.
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Because the lands could be identified, the court held that Hamilton
owned the submerged lands below the low water mark at the time the
lake was conveyed into public trust in 1913. The court of appeals then
remanded this issue to the district court to determine the level of the
low water mark in 1913.
Holly Shook

EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Mo. Soybean Ass'n v. EPA, 289 F.3d 509 (8th Cir. 2002) (dismissing
Missouri Soybean Association's claims of potential harm to its
members resulting from the Environmental Protection Agency's
stricter controls of the use of challenged waters in Missouri because
the claims were too remote and speculative).
Plaintiff, Missouri Soybean Association ("MSA") sued the United
States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") under the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
MSA claimed the EPA should have disapproved Missouri's list of
pollution-impaired waters because some of the waters included lacked
documentation of pollution. MSA's complaint focused on potential
harm to its members resulting from stricter controls of the use of the
challenged waters. The court consolidated MSA's suit with the Sierra
Club, Ozark Chapter's and the American Canoe Association, Inc.'s
("environmental plaintiffs") earlier lawsuit also challenging the EPA's
approval of Missouri's 1998 list claiming such list was under inclusive.
The EPA and the environmental plaintiffs settled their dispute
through a consent decree approved by the district court.
MSA moved for partial summary judgment on the merits of the
challenged water classification dispute. The EPA filed a motion to
dismiss, claiming MSA lacked standing and ripeness, and, in the
alternative, moving for summary judgment on the merits of the
challenged water classification dispute. The court assumed MSA had
standing, but found MSA's suit was not ripe for adjudication. Thus, it
denied MSA's motion for partial summary judgment and granted
partial summary judgment in favor of the EPA, dismissing MSA's suit
with prejudice. MSA's appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
States compile lists of impaired by, first, pursuant to the CWA,
identifying and prioritizing those waters within its boundaries that do
not meet the its water quality standards. Next, states submit the list of
impaired waters, known as the section 303(d) list, to the EPA for
approval. Finally, once the EPA approves the list, the impaired waters
undergo scientific study to establish the total maximum daily load
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("TMDL") of specifically identified pollutants that may be released
without violating state water quality standards.
In preparing its 1998 list, Missouri divided its waters into three
categories: (1) category one waters were impaired and scheduled for
full TMDL development; (2) category two waters were scheduled for
further monitoring because the water quality data was outdated and
less reliable; and (3) category three waters were declared as impaired
but with no practical remedy available because the pollution resulted
from minerals, nutrients, or sediment naturally occurring in the water.
Post classification, Missouri excluded the Missouri and the Mississippi
rivers ("big rivers") from its list, finding no water quality contaminant
violations. Subsequently, the EPA added several waters to Missouri's
list and declared the waters in all three categories impaired, requiring
Consequently, the Missouri Clean Water
TMDL development.
Commission added the big rivers to Missouri's section 303(d) list,
claiming the pollutant was "habitat loss" due to "channelization." The
EPA approved Missouri's revised list.
MSA claimed the EPA should have disapproved Missouri's section
303(d) list because the category two waters and the big rivers lacked
the required documentation of pollution to be listed as impaired.
MSA also asserted that the premature listing of the challenged waters
injured its members through: (1) potential changes in land
management practices; (2) limitations on crop growth and rotation;
(3) limitations on sale and use of fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides;
(4) decreases in property values; (5) increases in farming costs; and
(5) the inability to plan for and rely on the use of certain waters and
land caused by CWA's requirements.
On appeal, MSA first contended the district court erred when it
concluded that MSA's challenge was not ripe because it did not show
that EPA's approval of Missouri's 1998 list affected MSA's members in
any concrete way. The Eighth Circuit considered the suit's ripeness
for adjudication, stating the ripeness doctrine flows both from the
Article III cases and controversies limitation. The court further noted
that the ripeness doctrine also flows from prudential considerations
for refusing to exercise jurisdiction. Moreover, the ripeness doctrine
seeks "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements
over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from
judicial interference until an administrative decision has been
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties." Thus, for a case to be ripe for decision, it must be fit for
judicial resolution, and the parties must experience hardship in the
event the court withholds consideration of the case's merits.
The court concluded that MSA's claims were speculative and not
ripe for judicial resolution, for although MSA's complaint focused on
potential harm to its members resulting from stricter controls of the
use of the challenged waters, the more stringent controls on water use
would not occur until after TMDLs were developed and implemented.
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Even then, the court noted, it would remain uncertain whether TMDL
development or regulatory implementation would adversely impact
the members. Thus, it was clear the EPA's approval of Missouri's 1998
list failed to affect MSA's members in any concrete way.
The court next considered MSA's contention that because the EPA
challenged jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss and not a motion for
summary judgment, the court should hold MSA to a relatively modest
standard of asserting jurisdiction in its pleadings. MSA argued that
under the liberal pleading standard; its assertion of potential decreases
in property values stated a current harm sufficient to present a ripe
claim. Although the court agreed that it should hold MSA to a modest
standard of asserting jurisdiction in its pleadings, it found that MSA's
complaint did not support this contention. The court noted the
complaint described a "potential... decrease in property values
and/or property rights as a result of Clean Water Act requirements."
Considering this language in context, the court found that the "as a
result of Clean Water Act requirements" clause was consistent with
MSA's other claims of harm that could occur after the implementation
of TMDLs. Further, the court found that MSA's argument that even if
harm had not yet occurred, but was certainly impending also failed,
stating the "potential" diminution of property values was not a
sufficiently immediate or sizeable threatened harm to warrant judicial
intervention.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision finding
that MSA's claims of harm were too remote to be anything other than
speculative and not ripe for judicial resolution, however it dismissed
the suit without prejudice for lack ofjurisdiction.
Gloria MariaSoto
NINTH CIRCUIT
San Francisco BayKeeper v. Whitman, 287 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2002)
(affirming that the United States Environmental Protection Agency
did not have a non-discretionary duty to establish water pollution
standards for the State of California since the constructive submission
doctrine, which triggers the Environmental Protection Agency's nondiscretionary duty to act, did not apply when California submitted
some total maximum daily loads).
Environmental group San Francisco BayKeeper ("BayKeeper")
appealed a summary judgment decision by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California dismissing BayKeeper's
claim that the State of California ("California") failed to both
implement an adequate water pollution control program and establish
total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs"). BayKeeper argued California
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failed

to comply with

the Clean Water Act's

("CWA")

time

requirement for submitting TMDLs, which thereby created a nondiscretionary duty for the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") to submit TMDLs on behalf of California. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
BayKeeper's primary argument relied on section 303(d) of the
CWA, which allowed the EPA thirty days to approve or disapprove
identified TMDLs. TMDLs quantify the maximum level of pollutant a
water body can receive each day without violating water quality
standards. This section required the EPA to establish TMDLs for a
state when the EPA disapproved the state's submission. BayKeeper
argued that California's failure to submit TMDLs triggered the EPA's
duty to submit TMDLs for California on the theory of constructive
submission. Under this theory, a state's complete failure to submit
TMDLs triggered the EPA's non-discretionary duty to act.
The court rejected' this argument and refused to view failure to
submit as constructive submission. Constructive submission required a
clear and unambiguous decision not to submit any TMDLs, and in this
case, California's first TMDL submission in 1994 came more than
fifteen years after the initial deadline for submission. Since 1994
however, California submitted at least eighteen TMDLs and
Since
implemented a schedule for completing submission.
California's initial submission, the state has dedicated substantial
resources to its TMDL program. Based on California's actions, the
court determined that the constructive submission doctrine was not
viable.
BayKeeper alternatively argued unreasonable delay under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("Act"). Under section 706(1) of the
Act, courts can compel agency action if it is unreasonably delayed.
The court also rejected this argument and explained that a claim of
unreasonable delay follows from an agency's statutory duty. As
reviewed in the earlier argument, the EPA had no statutory duty to act,
which destroyed BayKeeper's claim of unreasonable delay.
Stefania Niro

Tillamook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 288 F.3d
1140 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of motion for preliminary
injunction to prevent a municipal water supply reservoir expansion
project, holding that the Army Corps of Engineers conducted an
adequate investigation and determined the impact to the environment
was minimal).
The City of McMinnville ("City") developed a plan to expand its
water supply reservoir in order to prevent an expected water shortage
between 2002 and 2020. The expansion included placement of
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dredge into navigable waters, the Nestucca River, which required the
City's Water and Light Commission ("Commission") to obtain a
section 404 permit from the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"). The
expansion would raise the existing dam by thirty feet and increase the
storage capacity of the reservoir. The Corps issued initial and final
environmental assessments ("EA"), as required under a section 404
permit. Both the Corps' initial and final EAs concluded a finding of
no significant impact ("FONSI").
Tillamook County ("County")
brought an action against the Commission in the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon, seeking a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction, claiming the Corps failed to
adequately comply with the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") when it issued the
'section 404 permit. The court denied both the County's request for a
temporary restraining order and motion for a preliminary injunction.
The County appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals arguing
that the Corps' FONSI was arbitrary and capricious.
The County argued that the Corps should have prepared an
environmental impact statement ("EIS") under the NEPA.
Alternatively, the County argued that if there was no requirement for
the Corps to prepare an EIS, the Corps failed to adequately evaluate
alternatives and describe mitigation measures for the reservoir
expansion.
The appellate court clarified that it would only reject a decision
not to prepare an EIS if an agency committed a clear error of
judgment. NEPA required the Corps to make an environmentally
informed decision-and for major federal actions with significant
impacts to the environment-required the Corps to prepare an EIS.
The court determined that if an agency issued a FONSI, then there is
no requirement for an EIS. Its role was solely to ensure the Corps
considered the environmental impacts, not to interject itself within the
Corps discretion. Since the Corps' final EA concluded a FONSI, there
was no requirement for an EIS.
Furthermore, the court determined that if an agency adopted
mitigation measures in response to identified impacts, the agency did
not have to prepare an EIS. The court rejected the County's argument
that the Corps failed to adequately evaluate alternatives and describe
mitigation measures. The court determined that the Corps considered
and rejected a number of alternatives to the reservoir expansion.
Additionally, the court explained that the Corps' mitigation plan
satisfied the requirement of developing proposed mitigation measures
to a reasonable degree. There was no requirement for precise details
of those proposed measures. The court determined that the Corps'
assessment of the reservoir expansion was adequate to comply with
NEPA and the CWA.
Stefania Niro
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Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding the
Environmental Protection Agency's statutory interpretation of its
authority to impose total maximum daily loads on waters containing
only nonpoint source pollution).
Betty and Guido Pronsolino ("Pronsolinos") filed suit pursuant to
sections 702 and 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
They challenged the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA")
authority to impose total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs") on rivers
only polluted by non-point sources and sought a determination of
whether the Clean Water Act ("CWA") authorized the Garcia River
TMDLs. The district court granted summary judgment to the EPA.
The Pronsolinos appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment.
Congress enacted the CWA in 1972. Section 303 of the CWA
required each state to identify the waters within its boundaries for
which the required effluent limitations are not stringent enough to
establish applicable water quality standards. Section 303(d)(1)(C)
required states to-establish TMDLs on the waters it identified within its
boundaries. In 1992, the EPA set TMDLs on the Garcia River in
California pursuant to this provision of the CWA.
In 1998, the Pronsolinos and other landowner along the Garcia
River applied for harvesting permits. The EPA granted the permits,
but required the landowners to comply with certain restrictions,
including the TMDLs previously set by the EPA. The Pronsolinos
subsequently filed suit.
The EPA argued the court should defer to their interpretation of
the CWA regulations based on Chevron, which held that an agency's
statutory interpretation is entitled to such deference if "Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law, and... the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of law." The Pronsolinos did not contest
the EPA's rulemaking authority, but instead argued that the EPA failed
to exercise it here. The Pronsolinos argued the EPA should receive no
deference because it inconsistently interpreted section 303(d). The
court interjected a middle standard of deference set out in Skidmore,
where deference was determined according to the agency's
persuasiveness.
With regard to the EPA's rulemaking and interpretation of the
laws, the court determined that the Chevron standard applied because
of the delegated authority of the EPA to interpret the CWA. Even still,
the court decided it should apply, at a minimum, deference under
Skidmore. However, the court found both standards resulted in the
same decision. It held the EPA's regulations of TMDLs applied
regardless of how the water body received its pollution. Disagreeing
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that the EPA had inconsistently interpreted the statute at issue, the
court found that the EPA interpreted the statute today exactly as it did
initially.
The Pronsolinos contended the EPA upset the balance of the
federal and state control created by the CWA by establishing TMDLs
for waters impaired only by nonpoint source pollution. The court
disagreed and determined the Garcia River TMDLs served as an
informational tool for the creation of the state's implementation plan,
which Congress independently and explicitly requires. Thus, the court
found no merit in the federalism argument.
Ultimately, the court upheld EPA's reasonable interpretation of
the CWA, finding that the EPA did not exceed its statutory authority in
identifying the Garcia River pursuant to section 303(d) (1) (A) and
establishing the Garcia River TMDLs, even though the river was
polluted only by non-point sources of pollution.
Staci A. McComb
Ka Makani 'O Kohala Ohana Inc. v. Dep't of Water Supply, 295 F.3d
955 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding the minimal economic involvement of a
federal agency does not satisfy the National Environmental Policy Act's
"major Federal action" requirement mandating an environmental
impact statement).
Ka Makani '0 Kohala Ohana ("Ka Makani"), a citizen's coalition,
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii
requesting injunctive relief against the Hawaii Department of Water
Supply ("DWS") and other federal and county agencies and officials
pending the completion of a federal environmental impact statement
("EIS").
The district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants, DWS. Ka Makani appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's
decision granting summary judgment to DWS.
DWS began planning the Kohala water project in 1987. The water
project would transfer as much as 20 million gallons of groundwater
per day from the northern part of Kohala to the southern part of
Kohala. The project involved two governmental agencies, the United
States Geological Survey ("USGS") and the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). The USGS provided
partial funding for the project and participated in a series of
preliminary studies, which assessed the groundwater availability. In
1988, the DWS and the USGS entered into four Joint Funding
Agreements, which divided the costs of the studies. HUD involved
itself after Congress passed an appropriations bill allotting $500,000 to
the County of Hawaii for an EIS. HUD provided application materials
and advice, including a recommendation restricting the scope of the
activities. Narrowing the scope of the project exempted it from the
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National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") requirements, thus
expediting the grant approval process. When HUD approved the
grant, the funds were only to be used for preliminary purposes.
The DWS took $30,000 in grant funds in 1995 to pay for the
contractors working on the state EIS. This was the only time the DWS
drew upon the grant funds. In 1998, the DWS placed the Kohala
project on hold, but it assured HUD the project would resume.
Finally, in 1999, the DWS reallocated the funds to another project in
South Hilo.
Since NEPA did not have a separate judicial review provision and
the suit involved legal issues, the appellate court relied on the
reasonableness standard of review. The court noted that controlling
weight is given to the agency's interpretation of its own regulations
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent.
NEPA only required an EIS if "major Federal actions significantly
affect the quality of the human environment." Because there is no
clear standard for determining what constitutes "major Federal
action," the analysis relies on the degree and nature of the
involvement. Here, the court weighed the amount of funds actually
spent on the project, the total amount of federal funding, and the total
estimated cost of the project and concluded that HUD and USGS's
involvement did not constitute "major Federal action." The court also
found that there could not be any "major Federal action" because of
the lack of decision-making power, authority and control HUD and
USGS possessed over the project. Furthermore, the DWS always
maintained final decision-making power over the project.
Ka Makani also argued that HUD's own provisions required an
EIS. The court found that HUD did not need to conduct an EIS if the
grant is a special purpose grant, as it was in this case. Furthermore,
the court held it illogical to conduct an EIS over the entire Kohala
project.
Staci A. McComb
Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305
F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that notice of alleged Clean Water
Act violations regarding a particular source is sufficient for all similar
claims derived from that same source in a citizen suit, and past cited
violations, along with evidence of present violations, is sufficient to
establish an ongoing violation of the Clean Water Act).
The Community Association for Restoration of the Environment
("CARE") brought a citizen suit against Henry Bosma and his two dairy
operations ("Bosma") in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Washington, alleging that Bosma violated the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") by discharging pollutants and manure into
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navigable waters without a permit. The court ruled in favor of CARE
finding that it provided Bosma with adequate notice of CARE's intent
to sue, and that CARE had established that Bosma's operation met the
definition of an ongoing violation as required under the CWA. Bosma
appealed both district court rulings to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the judgment and held that the
court did not commit "clear error" in finding that CARE provided
sufficient notice and proved an ongoing violation existed.
Bosma owned and operated two dairies. Each dairy contained
approximately 3,000 head of cattle, and met the definition of a
concentrated animal feeding operation ("CAFO") under the CWA.
The Act describes a CAFO as a point source, and CAFO operators are
required to obtain a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit. The Washington Department of Ecology ("DOE")
regulates CAFOs. For many years, Bosma had a record of discharge
problems, and refused three requests by DOE to obtain the required
NPDES permit. In January 1977, Bosma obtained a general NPDES
dairy permit from DOE for one of the dairies, and later modified the
permit to include both dairies in 1998.
A person seeking to bring suit under the citizen suit provision of
the CWA must give sixty days notice of his intent to sue to the alleged
violator, the administrator, and the state so that the violator has a
chance to comply and avoid litigation. In October 1997, CARE sent
notice of its intent to sue Bosma for twelve allegedly illegal discharges.
Within sixty days, CARE filed a complaint in the district court alleging
the original violations listed in the mailed notice, and thirty-two
additional violations. Bosma argued that the original notice alleging
twelve violations was insufficient notice of CARE's thirty-two additional
violations, however, the appellate court found that CARE's notice was
adequate and provided Bosma with sufficient information so that
Bosma had knowledge of the point source where the alleged violations
occurred.
The CWA regulates the discharge of pollutants, and defines
discharge of pollutant as any discernable, confined and discrete
conveyance from any point source. CARE alleged that Bosma, as a
point source, violated the CWA over thirty times by allowing the
manure from his two dairies to drain illegally into a drainage system
that eventually drained into navigable waters. Moreover, CARE
asserted that Bosma's manure fields were part of the point source
under the CWA and that the discharge of manure was included under
the CWA. The appellate court found that CARE's notice sufficient for
all alleged violations because the violations were all derived from the
same point source, and the multiple violations constituted several
instances of a single violation.
The CWA requires that notice provides sufficient information so
that the alleged violator can identify the alleged actions and the dates
of violation, the persons responsible, and the name and contact
information of the person giving notice. Focusing on the statute, the
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court of appeals looked to the words "sufficient information" and
determined that Bosma received adequate notice. It determined that
the purpose of notice is to prevent litigation and allow the violator to
correct the problem. Then the court interpreted point source to
include manure fields, reasoning that the purpose of the CWA is to
regulate all discharges, including those coming from land near a
drainage ditch. This conclusion, paired with ample evidence that
Bosma was aware the drainage ditch drained into navigable waters,
provided Bosma with notice of all closely related claims in regards to
the drainage ditch. Thus, notice to a person or company in violation
may serve as notice for all similar claims derived from the same source.
The court of appeals also affirmed the district court's finding that
CARE proved the existence of an ongoing violation. It considered
multiple violations over time as an ongoing violation unless Bosma
could prove that there was no likelihood of repeating the violation.
Repetition may be inferred by the trier of fact, or implied when
additional violations occur after the plaintiff filed suit. The court of
appeals rejected Bosma's argument that CARE had not presented
sufficient evidence to show he actually committed the alleged
violations, and that therefore, future violations could not be inferred.
It found CARE had proven the existence of past violations by
providing evidence of date-specific violations. The court also inferred
an ongoing violation in light of the particular facts of the case. The
DOE had cited Bosma for numerous violations in the past and Bosma
refused to obtain a permit for many years. Additionally, CARE
provided testimony, photos, and video footage showing that Bosma
placed deposits of manure in proximity to the water after CARE filed
suit. The court of appeals concluded that evidence of past violations,
in conjunction with evidence of existing violations, was a basis for a
reasonable person to infer that there may be continuing violations.
Because Bosma failed to provide sufficient evidence to the contrary,
the court affirmed the district court's decision.
Holly Shook
Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that: (1) individual farmers and state agencies showed
a genuine issue of material fact as to risk of injury-in-fact to confer
Article III standing; and (2) claim and issue preclusion did not bar
action against the Bureau of Reclamation).
Two farmers in the Central Delta Area of the San Joaquin River
("San Joaquin") and two California State Agencies ("State Agencies")
sued the Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR") and pursued a temporary
restraining order ("TRO") in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California to prevent flooding of fisheries unless the
BOR reserved sufficient water to meet salinity standards downstream.
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After the district court denied the TRO, the parties submitted crossmotions for summary judgment. The district court granted the BOR's
motion, finding the farmers and State Agencies lacked standing to sue
and that claim and issue preclusion barred their action. The district
court then granted permission for an interlocutory appeal to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to address standing and claim and
issue preclusion rulings.
The BOR operated the Central Valley Project in California, which
took water from mountain sources and delivers it to beneficial uses.
The New Melones Unit within the Central Valley Project consisted of a
dam on the San Joaquin that diverted water into the New Melones
Reservoir. California water rights permits issued in 1973 allow for
various uses of this dammed water. The amount of water released for
these uses affected the salinity level downstream, which in turn
affected certain types of crops. The Vernalis standard identified
acceptable salinity levels in the SanJoaquin.
In 1992, Congress passed the Central Valley Project Improvement
Act ("Act"), which included three important directives for the New
Melones Unit: (1) flooding fishery areas at twice the normal level; (2)
BOR management of 800,000 acre-feet of water for the fisheries; and
(3) supplementing water used for the fisheries. The BOR accordingly
adjusted its operations to divert water from New Melones Reservoir to
flood the fisheries in compliance with the Act, and the farmers and
State Agencies brought this action.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first addressed whether the State
Agencies and farmers had standing to sue. The State Agencies'
standing depended on whether the farmers could allege a sufficient
injury-in-fact to give them standing as individuals. The Ninth Circuit
articulated a three-prong standing test: (1) an injury-in-fact; (2) a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of;
and (3) a likelihood that the court could redress the alleged injury.
The Ninth Circuit focused its inquiry on the injury-in-fact requirement
after finding the farmers' alleged injury was fairly traceable to the
BOR's decision to release the waters, and that the court could redress
the injury by ordering the BOR to use different methods to comply
with the Act.
The Ninth Circuit relied on the United States Supreme Court's
ruling in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, which held the threat of injuryin-fact was sufficient to confer standing. In applying this rule, the
Ninth Circuit found the individual farmers alleged a sufficient injuryin-fact by showing they faced a significant risk the crops they planted
would not survive if the BOR flooded the fisheries in compliance with
the Act. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the BOR's argument the
individuals must allege statutory violations to show injury-in-fact,
noting other circuits have held individuals can sue before the harm or
statutory violation occurs. It also disagreed with the BOR's claim the
farmers' harm was merely contingent, finding that while obligated to
consider contingencies, the possibility the BOR could change its
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course of conduct was not sufficient to prevent a showing of injury.
The Ninth Circuit found that because the individuals alleged a
sufficient injury-in-fact to confer standing, the State Agencies also had
standing since their members could sue in their own right.
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the BOR's second argument that
claim and issue preclusion resulting from previous administrative and
judicial proceedings regarding the New Melones Unit management
barred the action. The Ninth Circuit stated claim preclusion applies
where: (1) prior litigation involved the same parties or parties in
privity; (2) prior litigation involved the same claim or cause of action;
and (3) a final judgment on the merits terminated the prior litigation.
Applying this rule, the Ninth Circuit found claim preclusion did not
bar the current action because courts will narrowly construe the scope
of the prior litigation to the "same transactional nucleus of facts."
Since the prior actions challenged BOR releases under different New
Melones plans, and not under the New Melones plan as adjusted to
comply with the Act, the Ninth Circuit held claim preclusion did not
bar the action.
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the BOR's claim that issue
preclusion barred the action.
The Ninth Circuit noted issue
preclusion applies where: (1) a judgment on the merits resolved the
issue in question in a prior suit; (2) the second action involves the
same parties or parties in privity; and (3) the second action is based on
the same cause of action. The Ninth Circuit held issue preclusion did
not bar the action, stating the "same cause of action" requires
"identical" and not "merely similar" issues litigated. Because the Ninth
Circuit found the prior action here was only similar because it
challenged BOR operations from 1995 to 1997, and the current action
challenged BOR operations under a different management plan in
1999, issue preclusion also did not bar the action.
JaredB. Briant

TENTH CIRCUIT
Bufford v. Williams, No. 00-6055, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 13235 (10th
Cir.July 2, 2002) (holding that failure to establish a pollutant's point
source is insufficient grounds to prove a Clean Water Act violation).
Norman and Zula Bufford ("Buffords") sought to prevent
wastewater allegedly originating at Crescent Wastewater Facility,
operated by Williams, from leaching onto their property, located
adjacent to the facility. The Buffords claimed that the facility's
groundwater interceptor trench was a pollutant point source
damaging their property. The parties filed simultaneous summary
judgment motions in the District Court for the Western District of
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Oklahoma. The court held for Williams, because the Buffords failed
to establish that Williams' alleged pollutant discharge violated the
Clean Water Act. The Buffords appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the judgment for Williams because the
Buffords failed to show a causal connection between the facility and
pollutants found on their property.
The wastewater treatment facility contained a three-tiered
retention lagoon and a land applicator. As water flowed through the
lagoons, its waste was broken down, and upon reaching lagoon No.
three, the water was suitable for, and was subsequently used for the
facility's irrigation. Its high quality water required no Oklahoma
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("OPDES") permit. The
lagoons were "no discharge" ponds, evidently without leakage.
Oklahoma law required irrigation rates to not exceed the crop's ability
to absorb the wastewater's nutrients, therefore the application
maximized evaporation and crop uptake and minimized water pooling
on the application field. Because soil also filtered wastewater, the
probability for groundwater contamination was "minimal." Cracks in
the sewer lines in 1994, and a 1999 tornado both required direct
discharges from lagoon No. three to the application field, yet tests
revealed the water's high quality was no threat to livestock or
agriculture, because it was of higher quality than discharge from many
facilities working under OPDES permits.
In 1998, the Buffords hired an expert to perform a Limited
Environmental Site Investigation on their property. The Buffords
raised cattle and used their land for grazing. Elevated fecal coliform,
total organic carbon, and chemical oxygen demand levels indicated
the presence of biodegradable organic materials. However, fecal
coliform existed in both human and cattle waste, and it was impossible
to differentiate their source. The expert admitted he: (1) did not
observe the wastewater facility's water enter the Buffords property; (2)
did not enter the wastewater facility; (3) did not sample water from the
interceptor trench or treatment lagoons; (4) did not know details
concerning the land application system, or whether it was operating
when he took samples; and (5) did not know the facility's groundwater
level. Yet, nevertheless he assumed that the facility was the sampled
water's source.
The court found that Buffords' expert affidavits failed to provide
evidence that the trench was a point source, or that fecal coliform
originated at the facility. Damage to the Buffords' property was
unlikely due to the fact that the wastewater lagoons held water longer
than necessary to destroy fecal coliform, and it was also quickly
destroyed in the environment. Williams provided evidence that the
trench was an outlet for naturally occurring groundwater, however,
not at outlet for the lagoon or irrigation system's discharge. The court
found that the test evidence "reveal [ed] nothing" about the pollutants'
source, thus, the Buffords failed to establish that the interceptor
trench was a point source violating the Clean Water Act. Further, area
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surface elevations reflected that eliminating the interceptor trench
would not have decreased flow to the Buffords' property. Therefore,
the appellate court affirmed the lower court's denial because the
Buffords did not meet their burden of proof.
Robert Lykos

United States v. City of Las Cruces, 289 F.3d 1170 (10thCir. 2002)
(holding that section 8 of the Reclamation Act and federal compact
and treaty obligations not directly implicating interstate equitable
apportionment issues do not create federal question jurisdiction).
In 1986, Elephant Butte Irrigation District ("EBID") filed suit
against the United States and other parties in the New Mexico state
district court, claiming senior appropriative rights on the Rio Grande
River from Elephant Butte Dam to the Texas state line. EBID sought a
stream adjudication and an injunction preventing the New Mexico
State Engineer from allowing appropriation of Rio Grande River water
until completion of the adjudication. Following three unsuccessful
attempts to have EBID's suit dismissed, the United States and Texas
("United States") filed a declaratory judgment action in the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico to quiet title to Rio
Grande Reclamation Project ("Project") water. The district court
found it had discretion to dismiss the United States' suit under the
Colorado River doctrine based on substantial similarities between the
state and federal court actions. Alternatively, the Brilihart doctrine
gave the district court discretion to grant declaratory relief to the
United States' where similar claims were at issue in parallel state court
proceedings. The district court dismissed the suit. The United States
appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Project runs through New Mexico and Texas, beginning in
northern New Mexico at Elephant Butte Reservoir. A 1906 treaty
obligated the United States to provide Project water from the Rio
Grande River totaling 60,000 acre feet per year to Mexico. The United
States argued the quiet title action involved Project water used to meet
delivery obligations under the Rio Grande Compact ("Compact") and
the 1906 treaty with Mexico. Both the Compact and the Project
involved equitable apportionment of interstate waters pursuant to
federal law. Because the United States' claims involved a federal
question, requiring the district court to assert jurisdiction, the
appellate court improperly dismissed the suit on five counts.
First, the United States asserted Brilihart discretion applied only to
declaratory judgments, not quiet title actions. Thus, the district court
lacked discretion to dismiss the United States' claims. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Quiet Title Act was the
exclusive means for challenging the United States' title to real
property. The court held that although the United States sued under
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the Quiet Title Act, Brillhartapplied, because the United States sought
only declaratory relief.
Second, the United States contended district courts had discretion
to dismiss actions only where federal and state court proceedings were
parallel. Because the New Mexico state court proceedings involved
different parties, and the United States' rights in Project water were
not at issue, neither Brillhart nor Colorado River applied. The court
held Colorado River required only substantial similarity between parties
and issues to trigger district court discretion to dismiss a federal action.
Further, under Brilihart,district courts have even greater discretion in
granting declaratory judgments where parallel state proceedings exist.
Third, the United States claimed the federal action implicated
section 8 of the Reclamation Act and obligations under the Compact
and the 1906 treaty with Mexico, creating federal questions and
requiring the district court to assert jurisdiction. The court held
section 8 of the Reclamation Act prevented reclamation project
acquisitions and water distributions from interfering with interstate
equitable apportionments. Because the instant case did not involve an
interstate equitable apportionment dispute, Section 8 was inapposite.
The court found both the 1906 treaty and Compact raised questions of
federal law. However, the federal action did not require consultation
of either the Compact or the 1906 treaty, thus no question of federal
law arose.
Fourth, the United States argued the interstate and international
character of the Project favored a federal forum. The court agreed
adjudication of rights in an interstate stream raised questions of
federal common law, but held the United States' suit for declaratory
relief did not involve the issues of equitable apportionment between
states. Effectively, the United States asserted title to Project water
under applicable state, not federal law. Because the United States'
claims did not implicate federal common law, the suit did not favor a
federal forum over state court proceedings.
Fifth, the United States asserted Project rights and federal law
exclusively governed obligations under contracts between the United
States, New Mexico, and Texas. The court found the United States'
complaint failed to mention existence or relevance of any federal
contract or to cite any specific contractual language bearing on the
title dispute. Thus, the United States' claims raised no contractual
issue under federal law. The court held the district court did not
abuse its discretion in withholding judgment over the United States'
declaratory action, but vacated the dismissal, remanding for
consideration of whether a stay in the federal proceedings was a
preferable remedy.
Alan Curtis
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ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d
1364 (1 lth Cir. 2002) (affirming violation of the Clean Water Act when
a pump station operated without a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System permit, and vacating an injunction to stop
pumping due to significant public consequences).
The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians ("Tribe") and the Friends of the
Everglades ("Friends") brought a citizen suit against the South Florida
Water Management District ("Water District") in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging the Water
District violated the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by discharging
pollutants without a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the lower court's decision that the Water District was in
violation of the CWA and therefore had to obtain an NPDES permit
within a reasonable amount of time.
The South Florida Water Management District managed the
Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project through the
operation of levees, canals, and water impoundment areas. The C-il
Canal ran through the C-1I Basin and collected water run-off. The S-9
pump station then pumped this water through pipes into the Water
Conservation Area-3A ("WCA-3A"). The water pumped by the S-9
station into WCA-3A contained pollutants, in particular, higher levels
of phosphorus than the naturally occurring level in the WCA-3A.
On appeal, the parties disputed whether the pumping by the S-9
pump station of the already polluted water constituted an addition of
pollutants to navigable waters from a point source. The CWA
prohibits the discharge of pollutants from a point source into
navigable waters without an NPDES permit.
The Act defined
"discharge of a pollutant" as the addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from a point source. It also defined "point source" as any
confined conveyance, including but not limited to a pipe, from which
pollutants are discharged.
The parties agreed that the S-9 pump station and associated pipes
constituted a point source that discharged phosphorus, a pollutant.
However, the Water District argued that the S-9 pump did not itself
introduce additional pollutants, but rather the pumped water was
already polluted. The court rejected the Water District's argument
and concluded that an addition from a point source occurs if the point
source is the cause-in-fact of pollutants released into navigable waters.
Here, the pollutants would not have entered the second body of water
but for the S-9 pump station. Therefore, the S-9 pump station was the
cause-in-fact of the additional phosphorus to the WCA-3A.
The appellate court then reviewed the district court's decision to
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enjoin the operation of the S-9 pumping station until the Water
District obtained an NPDES permit. The court stated that when
determining whether an injunction is proper, a court should not only
"balance the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to
them," but also "pay particular regard for the public consequences" of
the injunction. Without the operation of S-9, the western portion of
the county would flood in a matter of days, causing damage to, and
displacement of, a significant number of people. Therefore, the court
vacated the judgment awarding an injunction but ordered the Water
District to obtain an NPDES permit within a reasonable amount of
time.
Lisa M. Thompson

Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 296 F.3d 1021 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that
appellate courts have jurisdiction to review modifications of consent
decrees, and that such modification is improper when there has been
no change in law or fact subsequent to the party's agreement to the
consent decree).
This case arose when the Sierra Club, along with various other
environmental organizations ("Sierra Club"), sued the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") and several of the EPA's directors,
including Mr. Meiburg. Sierra Club asked that the court order the
EPA to implement total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs"), which the
EPA was required to establish under a previously established consent
decree. The Sierra Club originally brought the case in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, which found
for Sierra Club. The EPA appealed, alleging the district court's
holding improperly modified the consent decree. The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed, and remanded the case to the
district court.
The Clean Water Act ("CWA") established a statutory and
regulatory scheme for lowering pollution levels in waters of the United
States. The CWA addresses both point source pollution, which comes
from a discernable point where pollutants are discharged, and nonpoint source pollution. When both point source and non-point source
pollutants affect waterways, the CWA requires states to list each
affected waterway in the state, and to set water quality standards for
each. If a waterway does not meet those standards, the CWA requires
states to determine TMDLs for the waterway, specifying the maximum
daily amount of each pollutant that can pass through the waterway
without violating the water quality standards. The CWA gives the EPA
approval authority over both the list of polluted waterways and the
corresponding TMDLs. If the EPA disapproves, the CWA requires it to
issue its own list or its own TMDLs. The EPA has, for the most part,
delegated authority for implementing TMDLs to the states.
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In 1994, the Sierra Club sued the EPA. The Sierra Club asserted
that Georgia had established TMDLs for only two of approximately 340
polluted waterways, and that these two were insufficient to meet the
requirements of the CWA. The Sierra Club wanted to force the EPA to
take responsibility for establishing and implementing TMDLs in
Georgia. In Sierra Club v. Hackinson, the district court granted 'the
Sierra Club summary judgment, and entered an injunction requiring
the EPA to establish and implement TMDLs in Georgia. The EPA
appealed this ruling. While the appeal was pending, the parties
agreed to a consent decree, which required the Sierra Club to establish
(but not implement) TMDLs in Georgia on a fixed schedule. At the
time of this suit, the EPA was on schedule for establishing TMDLs in
Georgia. However, Georgia had not implemented the TMDLs, nor
had they otherwise incorporated them into their pollution
management plans.
Seeking to improve water quality in Georgia, the Sierra Club
attempted to re-open the consent decree and to force the EPA to
While the case progressed, Georgia
implement the TMDLs.
implemented the TMDLs, and the EPA moved to have the case
The Sierra Club argued that Georgia's
dismissed as moot.
implementation plans were again insufficient to meet the
requirements of the CWA. The district court denied the motion, and
ruled that the EPA was obligated under the consent degree to assure
the adequacy of Georgia's implementation plans. The EPA's appeal
resulted in this case.
As a threshold issue, the court noted it only had jurisdiction if the
district court's order modified the consent decree. Modification
occurs, irrespective of the title given to the order by the district court,
when the order changes the legal relationship between the parties.
The court looks to the plain terms of the consent decree to determine
the legal relationship of the parties prior to the order. Here, before
the district court order, the EPA had a duty only to establish TMDLs.
After the order, the EPA had both a duty to establish TMDLs and a
duty to assure the TMDLs were adequately implemented. This added
duty changed the legal relationship between the parties. Thus, the
court ruled it had jurisdiction to review the merits of the district court
order.
Modification of a consent decree is only appropriate when: (1) a
significant change in factual conditions or in law has occurred; and (2)
the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed
circumstance. The court noted there had been no change in the law
since the consent decree, nor had there been a change in factual
circumstances. The relevant regulations of the Act were unchanged
since the consent decree was formalized, and the lethargy of Georgia's
implementation was likewise unchanged. Neither condition necessary
for modification of the consent decree was present, yet the district
court order imposed new duties on the EPA. Accordingly, the court
held the district court had improperly modified the consent decree.
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The decree only required that the EPA establish TMDLs. Because the
EPA had established TMDLs, the district court should have sustained
EPA's motion to dismiss the case as moot. The Eleventh Circuit
reversed and remanded the case to the district court.
James Siegesmund
Fishermen Against the Destruction of the Env't, Inc. v. Closter Farms,
Inc., 300 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding the Clean Water Act did
not require that farm obtain a permit to discharge water from its water
management system into lake).
Fishermen Against the Destruction of the Environment, Inc.
("FADE") brought a Clean Water Act ("CWA") suit against Closter
Farms, Inc. ("Closter Farms") alleging that Closter Farms discharged
pollutants into Lake Okeechobee without a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. After trial, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida found
the pollutants either fell within agricultural exemptions not requiring
a permit under the CWA or were covered by other permits, and
entered judgment for Closter Farms. FADE appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.
Closter Farms operated a sugar cane farm adjacent to Lake
Okeechobee. Closter Farms leased its land from the State of Florida,
and the lease required Closter Farms to operate a water management
system. The water management system provided drainage for Closter
Farms' lands, as well as for an airport, a wastewater treatment plant, a
county park, a vacant lot previously occupied by a tractor sales
operation, and a county road, all adjacent to Closter Farms. The water
management system took excess water from Closter Farms' irrigation
canals and pumped it into Lake Okeechobee.
Closter Farms argued it was not required to obtain a permit for two
reasons.
First, the CWA exempted discharge from agricultural
operations from the NPDES permit requirement. Second, the
adjacent properties that share the water management system all had
NPDES permits for their lands. The district court found FADE failed
to establish discharge of a non-exempt pollutant and entered
judgment for Closter Farms.
Reviewing the district court's decision de novo, the appellate court
identified two implicit findings in the district court's ruling. First, any
pollutants that originated on Closter Farms' property fell within the
agricultural exemptions of the CWA. Second, either an existing
NPDES permit or exemptions to the permitting requirements covered
pollutants that originated elsewhere.
Agricultural storm water discharges and return flows from
irrigation agriculture are exempted from the CWA permitting
requirements. FADE alleged Closter Farms' discharges were neither.
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The court found three sources of the discharged water: (1) rainfall;
(2) groundwater withdrawn into the canals from the areas being
drained; and (3) seepage from the lake. Additionally, it found that
each of these sources fell within the CWA exemptions as either
"agricultural storm water discharge or "return flows from irrigation
agriculture." Closter Farms was thus not required to obtain a permit
for any waters discharged into Lake Okeechobee that originated on its
lands.
Finally, the court found insufficient evidence in the record to
conclude that Closter Farms discharged non-agricultural pollutants
into Lake Okeechobee. The only testimony that supported such a
conclusion was from an environmental manager with the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection. Without identifying any
studies or research, the manager tentatively concluded that runoff
from the waste treatment plant, the county road and the county park
The court found such evidence
likely contributed pollutants.
insufficient to conclude these sources discharged any pollutants,
affirming the district court's ruling.
Brian L. Martin

Georgia v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 302 F.3d 1242 (11th
Cir. 2002) (holding that parties can intervene as a matter of right
when the parties have a legally protected interest in water quantity,
such as, the right to an equitable apportionment of water flowing
through the interstate stream and the right to hydropower
production).
The State of Georgia ("Georgia") sued the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia to compel increased releases of water
from a reservoir managed by the Corps. The district court denied a
motion to intervene submitted by State of Florida ("Florida") and
Southeastern Federal Power Customers, Inc. ("SeFPC"). The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that both Florida
and SeFPC could intervene as a matter of right.
The Chattahoochee River originates in Georgia and becomes the
Apalachicola River at the Florida Border. The Flint River joins with
the Chattahoochee and the Apalachicola Rivers to form the
Florida,
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Basin ("ACF Basin").
share
the
water
supply
of
these
interconnected
Georgia and Alabama
rivers, and in 1997 enacted the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
("ACF") Compact. The ACF Compact required the states to negotiate
water allocation, however, no agreement was ever reached. In the
1940s, Congress authorized the Corps to build and manage the Buford
dam across the Chattahoochee River. The resultant lake, Lake Lanier,
is within the ACF Basin and thus subject to the ACF Compact. In 2000,
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Georgia made a request to the Corps for increased water releases from
Buford Dam and increased withdrawals from Lake Lanier to
accommodate the municipal and industrial needs of Atlanta. After the
Corps failed to respond for nine months, Georgia filed suit against the
Corps. Subsequently, Florida and SeFPC filed a motion to intervene.
The district court denied both motions to intervene. The appellate
court reviewed de novo.
The issue before the appellate court was whether the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provided for intervention as a matter of right for
Florida and/or SeFPC. Before a party can intervene as a matter of
right, it must: (1) make a timely motion to intervene; (2) show that it
has an interest in the subject matter of the suit; (3) show that its ability
to protect that interest may be impaired by the disposition of the suit;
and (4) show that the existing parties in the suit cannot adequately
protect that interest.
Florida made a timely motion to intervene and thereby satisfied
the first requirement. Turning to the second requirement, the court
concluded that Florida possessed the required interest in the subject
matter of the litigation. Even though the remedy sought by Georgia
would occur within Georgia's borders, it would have a practical effect
on the quantity and quality of the Apalachicola River, water to which
Florida had a right under the ACF Compact. Additionally, the court
concluded that irrespective of the ACF Compact, Florida had a
protectable interest because a state has a right to an equitable
apportionment of water flowing through an interstate stream located
within its borders.
In reference to the third requirement, the court concluded that
Florida's interest would be impaired by disposition of the suit because
Florida did not have access to the two alternative means suggested by
Georgia-the ACF Compact negotiations and filing an original action
in the United States Supreme Court. Florida did not have a clear and
compulsory right to be heard by the Supreme Court, nor did Florida
have a remedy under the ACF Compact since a water allocation
agreement had not been finalized. Under the last requirement, the
proposed intervener must show that the existing parties could not
adequately represent their interest, but this burden is minimal. The
court of appeals concluded the Corps could not represent Florida's
interest because the Corps had no independent stake in the quantity
of water reaching the Apalachicola River.
The appellate court also allowed SeFPC, the hydropower
purchaser, to intervene as a matter of right because it also met the four
criteria for intervention. First, SeFPC had a legally protectable interest
in the production of hydropower at the dam because the amount and
power of water that SeFPC received from Buford Dam would be
diminished if Georgia's request was granted. Secondly, a ruling in this
case would have a stare decisis effect on SeFPC's separate suit (filed
several months prior to the subject case) against the Corps; therefore,
the court concluded that SeFPC's interests would be impaired by the

Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

denial of intervention. Thirdly, the Corps could not adequately
represent the purchaser's economic interests, and lastly, the motion to
intervene was timely.
Lisa M. Thompson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Diablo Grande, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d
1059 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that plaintiff satisfied standing and
subject matter jurisdiction requirements of the Clean Water Act, and
classifying general construction activity as a point source).
California Sportfishing Protection Alliance ("CSPA") was a
California nonprofit public benefit corporation with an estimated
membership of 10,000. Diablo Grande, Inc. ("Diablo") was a limited
partnership building a golf resort on 29,500 acres of land west of
Patterson, California. CSPA filed suit against Diablo for violating the
conditions of their General Permit for Storm Water Discharges
Associated with Construction Activity ("General Permit") in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of California. CSPA
claimed this violation introduced pollutants to Salado Creek. CSPA
sought an injunction ordering Diablo to: (1) operate its construction
in compliance with their state permit; (2) provide CSPA with proof of
its compliance with the Clean Water Act ("CWA") for a one year
period; (3) contribute payments to a court-approved environmental
remediation fund; (4) pay civil penalties on a per day of violation basis;
and (5) pay CSPA's attorneys' fees. Both sides filed motions for
summary judgment pertaining to: standing; subject matter jurisdiction;
the definition of "navigable water of the United States"; and defining
what material facts were required of a party asserting a violation of the
CWA.
CSPA asserted the following three arguments: (1) its members had
standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests at issue were
germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim nor
the relief requested required individual member participation. CSPA
brought its complaint on behalf of associate members. Since Diablo
could not show that at least one of CSPA's members would not have
standing in this suit, the court found that CSPA had standing to sue. It
also held that CSPA's state purpose did not need include a certain
activity in order for that activity to be germane to CSPA's purpose. It
followed that enforcement of the CWA was sufficiently germane to
CSPA's purpose to justify standing. Diablo alternately argued that
CSPA lacked standing because there was no evidence of any fish in
Salado Creek. However, CSPA offered evidence establishing the
presence of both bluegill and bullhead fish in the creek and
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ultimately, that the creek fed into the San Joaquin River, which
indisputably contained sport fish. Thus, Diablo's standing arguments
failed.
Diablo argued that CSPA failed to comply with the CWA's notice
requirement, and therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
However, the court found that CSPA's notice letter met the CWA
notice requirements because it: (a) was sent more than sixty days
before filing to sue; (b) identified Diablo as the responsible party; (c)
provided CSPA's full name, address, and telephone number; (d)
identified the locations and dates of the violations. As a result,
Diablo's summary judgment motion on the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction failed.
Further, CSPA's expert witness showed
impermissible turbidity levels in Salado Creek were present at the time
notice was given, and that this trend would likely continue in
correlation with Diablo's construction.
Diablo next argued that Salado Creek was not a navigable water of
the United States and therefore was not covered under the CWA. The
court held under certain circumstances, where a tributary flowed into
navigable water, that tributary was capable of spreading environmental
damage and should also be considered a navigable water of the United
States for purposes of the CWA. Diablo argued that Salado Creek
should be classified as non-navigable groundwater because it flowed
through an underground pipeline on its way to the SanJoaquin River.
The court rejected this argument and held that Salado Creek was a
tributary of the San Joaquin River, despite the fact that, in certain
areas, it flowed through an underground pipe. Therefore, Diablo's
motion for summary judgment failed on the issue of whether Salado
Creek was to be classified as navigable water of the United States.
Finally, Diablo argued that CSPA provided no evidence showing
their discharge fit into the classification required and defined by the
CWA. They based this on CSPA's inability to name a point source
discharge of any pollutants. The court clarified that courts have
previously recognized construction as a point source activity. As a
result, CSPA sufficiently defined a point source as required under the
CWA. The court also held that CSPA did not need to prove that
Diablo's discharge violated the Act at the summary judgment stage of
litigation. Instead, they need only show that there was a genuine issue
of material fact for dispute at trial. Therefore, the court rejected
Diablo's final motion for summary judgment because CSPA defined a
point source as required by the CWA, and CSPA was not required to
prove that the discharge was a violation of the CWA at this stage of
litigation.
Michael Sheehan
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Colorado Wild, Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1190
(D. Colo. 2000) (holding Colorado water quality standards only apply
to discharges of pollutants and not to withdrawals or appropriations of
water; further holding section 313 of the Clean Water Act does not
waive the United States' sovereign immunity when the federal agency
was not itself the polluter in violation of the Clean Water Act).
Colorado Wild unsuccessfully exhausted its administrative
remedies and brought suit against the United States Forest Service
("Forest Service") challenging its approval of a Master Development
Plan ("Plan") for Arapahoe Ski Basin Area in The United States
District Court for the District of Colorado. Defendant-Intervener
Dundee Realty operated the ski area, and through the Plan, sought to
increase its artificial snowmaking operations by diverting water from a
tributary of the Snake River. The court heard the Forest Services'
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b) (1) and 12(b) (6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Colorado Wild contested the Forest Service's approval of the Plan
for Arapahoe Basin Ski Area located in the White River National Forest
near Dillon, Colorado. The Plan would allow Dundee Realty to divert
water from the North Fork, a tributary of the Snake River, in order to
increase its artificial snowmaking operations. As a relatively clean
water source, the tributary assisted to dilute the concentration of toxic
metals within the Snake River.
Colorado Wild contended that
diverting water from the North Fork would increase the pollutants in
the Snake River aggravating the Snake River's water quality problems.
Colorado Wild alleged three causes of action against the
Defendants: (1) violation of the National Forest Management Act
("NFMA"); (2) violation of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"); and (3)
violation of the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). It argued the
Forest Service failed to observe and enforce the maintenance of state
water quality standards in Colorado in violation of NFMA and 36
C.F.R. §§ 219.10(e) and 251.56(a)(1)(i)(C).
NFMA requires the
Forest Service to ensure that all activities it allows comply with state
water quality standards under 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i). The Forest Service
contested this cause of action, asserting that Colorado does not
regulate water quality standards, and therefore Colorado Wild failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The court first pointed out that Colorado regulates water quality
and water quantity through two separate entities. Under the Water
Quality Control Act, the Colorado Water Quality Control Commission
and the Water Quality Division ("Water Quality Agencies") regulated
water quality. However, Colorado water courts administer water
quantity via the prior appropriation system. The court also looked at
the legislature's intent in creating the Water Quality Agencies and
emphasized the Colorado legislature "made clear its intention that the
Water Quality Agencies' authority cannot be exercised in a manner
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that significantly compromises the appropriative rights of present or
future water users." Based on the legislative intent and the statute
itself the court concluded that, under Colorado law, water quality
standards only apply to discharges of pollutants and not to
appropriations of water. Colorado Wild's claim, which was based solely
on the allegation that withdrawals of water from the North Fork would
increase the pollutants in the Snake River, failed to show any violation
of Colorado state water quality standards, and therefore failed.
Next, Colorado Wild argued the Forest Service violated NFMA by
failing to comply with the CWA. The court rejected this argument and
observed the distinct roles the federal government and state
governments have under the CWA. Under the CWA, the EPA
monitored point source discharges of pollutants into navigable waters
while states were responsible for implementing water quality standards
for intrastate waters. The court found that the appropriation of water
was not a discharge of pollution within the meaning of the CWA, and
thus rejected Colorado Wild's claim that the Forest Service violated
NFMA by failing to comply with the CWA.
In its second cause of action, Colorado Wild argued the Forest
Service violated section 313 of the CWA.
The Forest Service
challenged this claim, contending the United States' sovereign
immunity deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
In
response, Colorado Wild asserted section 313 of the CWA waived the
United States' sovereign immunity. The court examined the text of
section 313 and recognized a federal agency waived sovereign
immunity only when one of its facilities or activities resulted in the
discharge of pollutants. However, the court held section 313 did not
waive sovereign immunity where, as here, the federal agency was not
itself the polluter in violation of the CWA. Since the United States was
immune from suit, the court was without subject matter jurisdiction.
The court held Colorado water quality standards only apply to
discharges of pollutants and not to appropriations of water. Thus, the
court dismissed Colorado Wild's cause of action alleging violations of
NFMA for failure to state a claim. The court further held the Forest
Service was immune from suit, since it was not the actual polluter in
violation of the CWA.
Lucia Padilla
Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (D.
Colo. 2002) (holding judicial resolution of a claim that a mining
company violated the Clean Water Act would not interfere with the
company's discharge permit application pending before a state
administrative agency).
El Paso Gold Mines, Inc. ("El Paso") operated a gold mine in
Teller County, Colorado. Sierra Club brought suit against El Paso in
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the United States District Court for the District of Colorado alleging
the company violated the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by discharging
pollutants into navigable waters without a permit. Sierra Club filed a
partial motion for summary judgment based on its compliance with
the statutory prerequisites for initiating a citizen suit under the CWA.
El Paso, in response, filed both a motion to dismiss or to stay and a
cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The former motion
challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrines
of primary jurisdiction and the Buford abstention. The latter motion
claimed Sierra Club failed to meet the statutory prerequisites to sue.
El Paso also filed a second motion for partial summary judgment
alleging it was neither the owner nor operator of the mine shaft
discharging the pollution. The court granted Sierra Club's motion for
partial summary judgment and denied all of El Paso's motions.
El Paso's mine was located in the Cripple Creek watershed and
Mining District. Cripple Creek was a tributary of Fourmile Creek that
was tributary to the Arkansas River. The Mining District contained a
series of underground drainage tunnels. One of those tunnels, the
Roosevelt Tunnel, lay directly underneath El Paso's mine and
discharged into Cripple Creek. El Paso, at the time of the suit, did not
have a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
permit to discharge pollutants into, or from, Roosevelt Tunnel into
Cripple Creek. As a result, Sierra Club brought suit against El Paso,
claiming the mining company violated the CWA by discharging zinc
and manganese into the Roosevelt Tunnel and Cripple Creek without
a permit.
El Paso's motion to deny or to stay the case alleged the court did
not have subject matter jurisdiction, under the doctrines of primary
jurisdiction and the Buford abstention, because the company had a
discharge permit application pending before the Colorado Water
Quality Control Division ("CWQCD").
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a court can stay an
ongoing judicial proceeding so that an administrative agency, rather
than the court, may resolve issues that fall within the special
competency of that agency. In analyzing El Paso's claim that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction precluded subject matter jurisdiction,
the court distinguished the facts of this case from two federal cases
where the courts declined jurisdiction.
In both cases, an
administrative agency issued either an order or a permit while the
citizen suit was pending. In the first case, the court declined
jurisdiction because the court might have subjected the defendants to
conflicting orders. In the second case, the court declined jurisdiction
because the agency's resolution of technical issues might preclude the
need for federal action.
In this case, the court did not decide an issue within the special
competency of the CWQCD; the court only decided whether El Paso
discharged pollutants from a point source into navigable waters. The
court found that resolution of Sierra Club's claim would neither
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require the resolution of technical issues within the special
competency of the CWQCD nor interfere with the orders of the
CWQCD. As a result, the court found the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction inapplicable.
Under the Buford abstention, a federal court must decline to
interfere with administrative proceedings if state court review is
available and: (1) the court must decide difficult and especially
important questions of state law whose resolution transcends the case
then at bar; or (2) the court's review would disrupt state efforts to
establish a coherent public policy. El Paso argued a court decision
regarding the permitting of mining tunnel discharges could create a
conflict in statutory interpretation, interfere with CWQCD
proceedings, and undermine the State of Colorado's attempt to
establish a policy for the regulation of mining tunnel discharges. The
court rejected El Paso's argument and denied the company's motion
to dismiss or stay because there was no evidence in the record about
action CWQCD took on the permit, nor state or federal orders
regarding the discharges.
The court next decided the parties' cross-motions for partial
summary judgment regarding the statutory prerequisites to initiating a
CWA citizen suit. Sierra Club asked the court to affirm its compliance
with the jurisdictional prerequisites. El Paso alleged Sierra Club failed
to identify the pollutants discharged, the point source, or how El Paso
added pollutants to the Roosevelt Tunnel.
The court's analysis addressed two issues. First, El Paso claimed
Sierra Club's notice was not specific enough in its description of the
pollutants, their sources, and how the discharges increased pollution
in the Roosevelt tunnel. The court, citing Public Interest Group of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., dismissed El Paso's claim holding that Sierra
Club's failure to identify specific pollutants did not deprive the court
of jurisdiction. The court found Sierra Club's notice adequate
because the organization told El Paso what the point sources were and
explained how pollution from those sources migrated into navigable
waters. Second, the court addressed El Paso's understanding of Sierra
Club's notice, by analyzing El Paso's actions after Sierra Club gave
notice. Relying on two federal decisions which held that notice was
adequate when an alleged violator took specific remedial action in
response to notice of the alleged violation, the court found that El
Paso's formation of a limited liability corporation and application for
an NPDES permit constituted sufficient understanding of the
allegations and remedial action sufficient to deem the notice
adequate. As a result, the court denied El Paso's motion and granted
Sierra Club's.
El Paso's second motion for partial summary judgment claimed the
company was neither the owner nor operator of the mine shaft
because the company sold the property to a third party two months
prior to receiving notice from Sierra Club. In response, Sierra Club
alleged El Paso retained an easement over and through the property.
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The organization's response cited El Paso's application to CWQCD,
which stated that the company's property included a mineshaft
connecting to the Roosevelt Tunnel. As a result, the court found there
remained a genuine issue of material fact regarding El Paso's
ownership interest in the mineshaft and denied El Paso's motion.
Merc Pittinos

United States v. Lamplight Equestrian, No. 00 C 6486, 2002 U.S. Dist.
L XIS 3694 (N.D. II. Mar. 8, 2002) (holding that the Army Corps of
Engineers has the authority to regulate wetlands with an intermittent
connection to interstate or navigable waterways).
The United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") filed suit in
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against
Lamplight Equestrian ("Lamplight") for using fill material to build a
road in a wetland area without a permit. Lamplight claimed the Corps
lacked authority to regulate the area due to the United States Supreme
Court decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC'), which reduced the scope of
the Corps' authority. Lamplight also claimed that an earlier permit
entitled it to build the road. Each party filed a motion for summary
judgment. The court granted the Corps' motion for summary
judgment against Lamplight.
The disputed wetland was located on Lamplight's property north
of the headwaters of Brewster Creek. The creek connected to the Fox
River, which flowed into other interstate waterways. In considering the
motions for summary judgment, the district court decided that the
only relevant issue pertained to the jurisdiction of the Corps.
The Corps argued that despite the Supreme Court's ruling in
SWANCC, the Corps' authority to regulate the wetland remained
intact. Six lower court decisions holding that SWANCC only narrowly
reduced the Corps' power substantiated this argument. The Corps
claimed that administrative regulations included wetlands within the
scope of the Corps' authority, so long as they could affect interstate
commerce. To affect interstate commerce, a wetland or like area must
lie adjacent to a navigable waterway. In this case, an unbroken line of
water connected the wetland area and Brewster Creek, a tributary of
the Fox River, which in turn fed other waterways, crossing state
boundaries. Thus, the Corps possessed the necessary authority to
regulate the wetland.
The district court agreed with the Corps. Its analysis of the
Supreme Court's decision in SWANCC followed other narrow readings
in the reduction of the Corps' authority. Significantly, the district
court decided that the crucial distinction between this case and the
SWANCC case was the degree of isolation of the regulated area. In
SWANCC, the waters in question lacked a direct connection to a
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navigable waterway. The decision explicitly upheld the authority of
the Corps to regulate areas with a significant nexus to navigable
waterways.
The district court next addressed the dispute regarding the
connection between the wetland and the Fox River. Lamplight
disputed the connection, claiming that the drainage ditch running
from the wetland ended fifty feet east of a swale carrying water to
Brewster Creek. However, Lamplight conceded that, at points, a
continuous stream of water existed between the wetland and the swale,
especially during wet seasons. The deposition testimony of one of
Lamplight's shareholders substantiated this finding. The court found
persuasive a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, HeadwatersInc. v.
Talent IrrigationDistrict, where intermittent connections to a navigable
waterway established Corps jurisdiction. Following this rationale, the
court determined that since pollutants discharged into areas
connected to navigable waterways eventually reach those waterways;
the Corps must be able to regulate the initial discharge. Thus, because
the wetland connected to a navigable waterway, it was subject to the
Corps regulation.
The district court found Lamplight's argument did not have merit
when it asserted that a 1993 permit gave the requisite authority to
build the road. The permit authorized Lamplight to build a parking
area and a pond, not a road. In addition, the permit specifically stated
that if the specifications of the construction project changed in any
way, Lamplight needed to contact the Corps to ensure compliance
with regulations and to determine if Lamplight needed to procure
additional permits. As a result of its findings, the court granted the
Corps' motion for summary judgment, and denied Lamplight's
motion.
JaredEllis
Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. O'Bannon, 189 F. Supp. 2d 893 (N.D. Ind.
2002) (holding that the defendant did not violate Clean Water Act
when a fish hatchery was partially drained causing abnormal water flow
and discharge of mud in the river).
Property owners sought review in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana of an administrative entry of
summary judgment in favor of the Fawn River State Fish Hatchery
("Hatchery"). The court rejected all of the property owners' claims
and entered an order in favor of the Hatchery.
The Fawn River is located in the northeast region of Indiana. The
Hatchery, located on the river near Orland, Indiana, raised
smallmouth bass, walleye, muskies, channel catfish, and rainbow trout
for stocking Indiana's lakes and rivers. The Indiana Department of
Natural Resources ("IDNR") owned and operated the Hatchery. The
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Fawn River was dammed in order to form a 1.8-acre supply pond,
which in turn supplied water to the Hatchery's rearing ponds.
As early as 1996, workers at the Hatchery noticed rust on the dam
structure that threatened its structural integrity. After discussing the
problem with a local welder, the directors of the Hatchery proposed a
repair project to the IDNR. The project involved partial draining of
the dam reservoir in order to repair the rusted areas below the surface.
The IDNR approved the project and the Hatchery obtained funding.
On May 18, 1998, property managers at the Hatchery began to
draw-down the supply pond by opening a control gate in order to
repair the dam. The draw-down resulted in an increase of water to the
Fawn River, which in turn caused great amounts of sediment to be
moved and re-deposited farther downstream. Property owners with
land along the Fawn River claimed the Hatchery's actions violated
sections 402 and 404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). According to
the property owners, 100,000 cubic yards of sediment became mud,
which clogged the river, destroyed fish and wildlife, and violated the
CWA.
Section 402 of the CWA establishes the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES"). Under section 402, the
Environmental Protection Agency may issue permits authorizing the
discharge of pollutants in accordance with specified conditions.
Discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States,
which are regulated under section 404 of the CWA, are exempt from
The property owners claimed the
the NPDES permit process.
Hatchery was required to obtain a section 402 permit before
discharging fill material and pollutants into the Fawn River.
Section 404 of the CWA provided an exception to the NPDES
permit for pollutants that are discharges of dredge or fill material into
waters of the United States. Though not requiring a section 402
permit, in order to discharge dredge or fill material into the waters of
the United States, a section 404 permit is required from the Army
Corps of Engineers. The property owners argued that, if the Hatchery
was not required to obtain a section 402 permit, they were certainly
required to obtain a section 404 permit before lowering the dam gate
and releasing water into the Fawn River. The Hatchery did not obtain
either permit.
The first issue the court addressed was whether the acts constituted
the "discharge of dredged material" as defined in the CWA in order to
trigger a section 404 analysis. The property owners argued the surge
of water added to the river and dredged the bottom of the river,
disturbing the riverbed and causing mud to be introduced into the
river and redeposited downstream. The property owners thereby
asserted the mud in the river was "dredged material." The Hatchery
proposed a narrow definition of "dredged material." The Hatchery
argued that the term dredge only contemplated intentional
mechanized acts of digging up soil or other material and therefore the
mud was not "dredged material." In concluding the term "discharge
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of dredged materials" included dredging that occurred by means of
hydraulics, regardless of intention, the court considered 66 Fed. Reg.
4550, 4554, which specifically stated "there is no support under the
CWA for the position that a discharge must be an intentional act."
The court reasoned the statutory language of the CWA and clarifying
regulations do not indicate an intent by the legislature to limit the
definition of "dredge" to mechanized methods and therefore
hydraulic dredging likewise requires a section 404 permit unless
exempted under further provisions. The Hatchery was therefore not
required to obtain a section 402 permit.
The court then considered whether the Hatchery was exempt from
the section 404 permit requirement by an exception for acts of
maintenance. The Hatchery argued they lowered the dam solely for
the purpose of inspecting the dam control gates and to perform
maintenance to a related intake valve, therefore any discharge of
dredged materials occurred solely as a result of this maintenance. The
property owners countered that "maintenance does not include any
modification that changes the character, scope, or size of the original
fill design" pursuant to the CWA, and thus, since the draw-down
lessened the amount of water in the Hatchery, the discharge did not
meet the maintenance exemption because it exceeded the scope of
the original fill design. The court rejected the property owners'
argument and held the Hatchery's acts constituted acts of
maintenance and therefore were exempt from section 404 permit
requirements, provided the Hatchery avoided the CWA's section 1342
recapture provision.
Section 1342(f) (2) provides an exception to the maintenance
exception of section 404 permit requirements for discharges of
dredged or fill material into navigable waters incidental to any activity
where the flow or circulation of navigable waters may be impaired or
the reach of such waters be reduced. The property owners argued the
addition of 100,000 cubic yards of sediment in a five-mile stretch of the
Fawn River changed the use of the river by rendering it unusable for
recreation as it became mud. The Hatchery argued that the recapture
provision did not apply because any discharge of dredged materials
was incidental to the dam maintenance and did not have as its purpose
changing the use of the Fawn River.
Sarah A. Hubbard
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United States v. Bay-Houston Towing Co., Inc., 197 F. Supp. 2d 788
(E.D. Mich. 2002) (holding civil penalties were not warranted for
failure to obtain permits before discharging peat bog drainage water
where pollutant was a natural result of legitimate commercial activity,
discharge did not exceed appropriate effluent limitations, authorities
were aware of activity, peat harvester made application for permit and
proceeded diligently to obtain permit, and authorities did not tell
harvester to cease mining pending approval of permit).
The United States brought a Clean Water Act ("CWA") action
against Michigan Peat in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, claiming: (1) discharge of pollutants by
peat bog drainage water without National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permits; (2) discharge of dredged or
fill material into wetlands without permits; and (3) violation of an
administrative compliance order issued by the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"). The EPA sought to impose a three
million dollar civil penalty against Michigan Peat. The EPA alleged
that Michigan Peat discharged peat bog drainage water containing
pollutants through ditch outfalls into the Black River Drain without an
NPDES permit required under the CWA. After denying Michigan
Peat's motion for summary judgment, the district court found
Michigan Peat was obligated to obtain permits but the imposition of
civil penalties for failure to obtain permits was not warranted.
The EPA asserted that Michigan Peat should be penalized for its
long-time failure to report its effluent discharges to the state as
required by the CWA, which warranted the penalty based on the
quantity of pollutants that Michigan Peat discharged.
The court held civil penalties were not warranted for Michigan
Peat's failure to obtain the permit before discharging the pollutant
because: (1) the pollutant was a natural result of legitimate
commercial activity; (2) the discharge did not exceed appropriate
effluent limitations; (3) the permitting authorities were fully aware of
the activity; (4) Michigan Peat applied for a permit and proceeded
diligently to obtain the permit once they found out they needed one;
and (5) the licensing agencies did not tell Michigan Peat to stop
mining or to change its current method of peat mining pending
approval of the permit.
The court first found that peat was a commercially useful product
found only in peat bogs and, therefore, mining a peat bog was a
legitimate commercial activity. Because peat mining was a legitimate
commercial activity, the digging of drainage ditches and construction
of haul roads was a legitimate activity as part of a peat mining activity.
Discharge was part of the peat mining process and the court found the
Michigan Peat
discharge did not exceed effluent limitations.
discharged no more than normally produced from mining a great deal
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of peat. The court found no substantive harm to the environment.
During the period that Michigan Peat operated without a permit
and during the permit application process, the permitting authorities
became fully aware of the activity. As soon as the permitting authority
notified Michigan Peat, it filed for, and diligently pursued, a permit.
In its 1994 permit application to the state of Michigan, Michigan Peat
presented a plan to return the mined areas to a wetland state
containing large bodies of open water. The process of reclamation
occurs when human intervention replaces one type of wetland with
another type of wetland that provides different functions and values
The EPA, however, disagreed and
than the original wetland.
requested restoration of the area to the extent practicable to the
original bog-like condition with the same functions and values. The
court held that disagreement with a regulatory demand was not an
avoidance of the permitting authorities.
The EPA, during the application process and fully aware of
Michigan Peat's activities, never advised Michigan Peat to close down,
never suggested modification in the peat mining activities, and never
sought a court order to close down Michigan Peat's operations. The
court found that because no governing agency attempted in any way to
alter or stop Michigan Peat's operations during the application process
Michigan Peat should not be penalized for its activities.
Julie S. Hanson
Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians v. Great Spring Waters of
Am., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 2d 853 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (holding the Water
Resources Development Act of 1986 does not imply, either explicitly or
implicitly, a private right of action to enjoin the diversion or
exportation of Great Lakes waters outside the Great Lakes basin).
Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, Grand Traverse Band
of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, and Little River Band of Ottawa
Indians ("Tribes") brought suit against Great Spring Waters of
America, Inc. ("GSWA") and John M. Engler, Governor of Michigan
("Engler"), in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Michigan to enjoin GSWA from exporting waters from the
Sanctuary Springs ("Springs") in Mecosta County, Michigan under a
provision of the Water Resources Development Act ("WRDA"). GSWA
and Engler moved for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b) (1) and 12(b) (6). The court granted the dismissal,
concluding the WRDA provision disfavors a creation of a private cause
of action.
The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality ("MDEQ")
granted GSWA a license to pump 400 gallons of water per minute from
the Springs. GSWA maintained two wells on the Springs site, each
capable of pumping up to 200 gallons per minute. The Springs
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aquifer flowed into Osprey Lake, which, in turn, flowed into a stream
that flowed into the Little Muskegon River and Muskegon River
watersheds, both of which were tributaries of Lake Michigan. While
acknowledging that GSWA's parent company, the Perrier Group of
America, Inc., possessed title to real property in Mecosta County,
including water rights to the Springs, the Tribes asserted their rights as
riparians and users of Lake Michigan and its tributaries under the
1836 Treaty of Washington.
The Tribes sued under a provision of the WRDA that prevented
the diversion or exportation of water from any portion of the Great
Lakes within the United States, including any tributary within the
United States, for use outside the Great Lakes basin, unless all eight
Great Lakes Governors approve such activity. The Great Lakes states
include Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
New York, and Wisconsin under the WRDA. Based on depositions of
two GSWA employees, the Tribes alleged in their complaint that
GSWA intended to ship bottled water from the Springs, a "portion" of
the Great Lakes within the United States, for sale in Iowa and
Kentucky, areas "outside the Great Lakes basin." The Tribes claimed
GSWA's diversion and exportation of the Springs water required not
only Engler's approval under the WRDA, but the other seven Great
Lakes governors as well.
In the answer to the complaint, Engler admitted that GSWA's wells
would likely reduce the flow of waters into Lake Michigan. However,
he maintained that no "legal, practical or environmental significance"
resulted from the reduced flow, and the pumping activity would not
cause a "diversion" of the Great Lakes waters.
As GSWA moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the court construed the
factual matters set forth in the complaint in a light most favorable to
the plaintiffs. However, the case did not turn on the facts and
arguments set forth in the complaint and answer. Instead, the issue
before the court was whether the WRDA afforded the Tribes the right
to sue to enjoin a diversion or exportation of Great Lakes waters when
Engler unilaterally acted without the approval of the other seven
governors of the Great Lakes. The Tribes claimed that since the other
seven Great Lakes governors failed to act, the WRDA entitled them to
bring a private cause of action.
The court noted the WRDA contained no language that created an
express right of action on behalf of anyone to enforce this provision.
Furthermore, the legislative history offered no guidance on how to
enforce the provision. The court examined the precursors to the
WRDA, as well as subsequent amendments, in order to discern the
policy issues surrounding the legislation.
The court then applied a four-factor test to determine if an
implied private cause of action existed allowing the Tribes to defeat
the motion to dismiss. First, the Tribes must be members of a special
class the act intended to benefit. Second, the court must determine
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whether the legislature intended, expressly or implicitly, to create or
deny such a remedy. Third, the court must conclude if the remedy was
consistent with the statutory scheme.
Finally, the court must
determine if the subject of the suit was one traditionally relegated to
state law, making a private federal enforcement action inappropriate.
The court decided that the WRDA benefited the general public,
but did not allow for a special class of users, i.e., riparians or treatyholders, to assert additional privileges or benefits. The WRDA gave
the Great Lakes states governors the authority to make decisions
collectively to protect the water and enforce the prohibition against
diversion and exportation of the resource. In bolstering deference to
the Great Lakes governors decision making, the court noted that
allowing private suits could frustrate any uniform policies or goals
implemented by the governors concerning conservation issues.
Additionally, the court pointed out the lack of "private right of action"
language and concluded the exclusion of the language was deliberate,
considering such private suit action verbiage exists in a recent
provision of the WRDA.
Completing the analysis set out above, the court found that private
suits were inconsistent with the statutory scheme, again alluding to
deference to the governors. The court agreed with the Tribes that the
subject of the suit falls under a federal interest, as opposed to state.
However, the court disagreed that the compelling interests revolved
around regulating Indian affairs. Instead, the court categorized tribal
rights as peripheral, and emphasized interstate commerce issues
associated with the Great Lakes.
Additionally, the court noted three fact situations where the
current legislative scheme might prove inadequate. As this case
demonstrated, what is to be done if the governors fail to take any
action when diversion or exportation of the Great Lakes occurs? A
second potential problem was the lack of an explicit enforcement
mechanism for the governors to use in supervising a wayward
governor. The third cause for concern was the lack of Congressional
delegation of authority to an officer in the executive branch to
intervene if a governor chose to act in a manner that served his/her
interests, but stood in opposition to federal interests in Great Lakes
waters.
Melissa L. Gordon

Am. Littoral Soc'y v. EPA, 199 F. Supp. 2d 217 (D.N.J. 2002) (denying
summary judgment for conservation groups alleging arbitrary and
capricious decision making because the Environmental Protection
Agency could demonstrate good cause for each of its decisions).
American Littoral Society ("Littoral") brought suit in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey against the
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Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to compel it to implement
the Clean Water Act ("WA"), alleging that the State of New Jersey
("New Jersey") had failed to do so. The CWA delegated to the states
the primary responsibility for setting and achieving Water Quality
Standards ("WQS"). New Jersey set WQSs per the CWA, but failed to
identify areas not complying with those standards. It also failed to
establish guidelines for the amount of pollution a body of water could
absorb before failing WQS compliance. The court denied all of
Littoral's motions for summary judgment, but granted summary
judgment to EPA on the issue of failure to consult under the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA").
Littoral's fifth amended complaint alleged violation of section
706(2) (A) of the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") due to
decisions that were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law. It also alleged violation of
section 706(1) of the APA due to unreasonable delay, and violation of
section 7 of the ESA for failure to confer with the Secretary of the
Department of the Interior, as an agency should when its action is
likely to jeopardize a species proposed for listing under ESA, or will
destroy or adversely modify its habitat.
Section 303(d) of the CWA requires states to identify areas that do
not or probably will not meet WQSs, even with effluent limitations and
other controls. States must then rank these areas by priority and
submit the resulting section 303(d) list to the EPA. Littoral argued
that NewJersey omitted sixty waters from the list, and that the EPA did
not have the authority to approve the list in its seemingly incomplete
state. The EPA answered that Littoral lacked standing and that
administrative records supported the EPA's decision to exclude those
waters. The court held that Littoral easily met the low threshold for
environmental plaintiffs seeking standing, but that the EPA had a
justifiable reason for every omission, and was therefore not arbitrary
and capricious in its decision to omit the waters from the section
303(d) list.
Littoral next alleged that EPA's omission of anti-degradation
waters from the list was arbitrary and capricious.
Federal law
mandated that all states adopt and implement antidegradation
standards to ensure water quality for existing uses. Waters, which fail
to meet WQS under section 303 of the CWA, must appear on states'
section 303(d)
lists.
along with
pertinent
antidegradation
requirements. Littoral argued that the absence of any such water on
New Jersey's section 303(d) list proved that New Jersey omitted all
waters failing the WQS. Because Littoral failed to specifically name a
single water of this description, the court rejected its argument and
held that the EPA's action was not arbitrary and capricious with
respect to anti-degradation waters.
Littoral followed with an allegation of constructive submission and
unreasonable delay. For most of the last decade, the EPA required
states to submit section 303(d) lists and establish total maximum daily
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loads and total maximum daily thermal loads (collectively "TMDL") in
every even-numbered year. NewJersey's failure to submit TMDLs, and
EPA's refusal to disapprove of this practice, constituted unreasonable
delay of agency action, according to Littoral.
To prove this
contention, Littoral needed to show "constructive submission" on New
Jersey's part by demonstrating that New Jersey neither submitted
TMDLs nor planned to remedy its non-compliance. The court held
that New Jersey had submitted some TMDLs and planned to remedy
its failure to comply. While hardly exemplary, New Jersey's record was
nonetheless sufficient for the EPA to prevail on the charge of
unreasonable delay.
The court held that Littoral's fourth count, regarding the EPA's
alleged failure to comply with section 7 of the ESA was moot, as events
had transpired which irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged
violation. By February 2001, the EPA had initiated consultations with
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine
Fisheries Service as mandated by the ESA. While the court recognized
that a narrow exception to the doctrine of mootness could exist in
cases where a wrong is capable of repetition but evades review, Littoral
failed to satisfy this two-prong test.
Curtis Graves
Baker Farms, Inc. v. Hulse, No. 5:01-CV-315-C, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6243 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2002) (holding a federal court lacks subject
matterjurisdiction in adjudicating claims involving a state's property
interests without the consent of that state).
Baker Farms ("Baker"), a Texas corporation, operated its farm and
livestock business on a 188-acre leased property in Floyd County,
Texas. A railway roadbed divided this property into north and south
parcels. In 1992, the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department ("TPWD")
purchased the railway roadbed and converted it into Caprock Canyon
State Park and Trailway ("Trailway") for public recreation. Baker
contacted Jeoffrey Hulse, Park Manager of the Trailway, regarding
Baker's right to access the water well located on the Trailway. Hulse,
along with employee Ronny Gallagher, refused Baker's effort to lay
new electric lines to access the well water.
Baker filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas against Hulse and others, seeking injunctive
relief prohibiting any further interferences with Baker's property
interests in the water well and crossway. In addition, Baker sought to
recover costs incurred in the drilling of an alternative water well on its
leased property, punitive damages totaling $100,000, and attorney's
fees. Defendants moved to dismiss the cause of action due to a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The court granted this motion and
dismissed the case without prejudice.
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Baker alleged their property interest was an appurtenant
prescriptive easement to the water well and crossway located on the
Trailway.
Baker argued TPWD's purchase of the Trailway was
contingent upon all previously established interests, including
easements of record or otherwise. Baker asserted the previous owner,
who drilled the water well on the Trailway in 1964, transferred the
prescriptive easements with the property when he leased it to Baker.
The employees of TPWD, however, disputed the existence of Baker's
prescriptive easement.
The court stated a suit is against the sovereign if "the judgment
sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or
interfere with the public administration," or if the effect of the
judgment would be "to restrain the Government from acting or to
compel it to act." Furthermore, a federal court does not have
authority to hear claims involving a state's property interest without
that state's expressed consent. The instant case revolved around
Baker's disputed easement rights to the water well and crossway on the
Trailway. The State of Texas had record title to the Trailway and was
responsible for its operations. The court contended that if Baker had
a prescriptive easement, it would clearly be exercising authority over
the public domain, restricting the State of Texas' property interests,
and violating state sovereignty under the Eleventh Amendment.
Therefore, since the State of Texas' property interests were
implicit in this claim and the State of Texas had not consented to
adjudication in a federal court, the court did not have the requisite
subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case.
Jessica L. Grether
Trout Unlimited v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 187 F. Supp.
2d 1334 (D. Utah 2002) (holding moot plaintiffs challenges to
completed pipeline and water plant construction projects, and holding
Army Corps of Engineers' review appropriate in addressing water
quality issues related to those projects).
Plaintiffs, including the Utah Council of Trout Unlimited and
concerned environmentalists ("Trout Unlimited"), challenged the
Army Corps of Engineers' ("Corps") decision to approve permits for
construction of a water treatment plant and two pipeline projects in
Summit County, Utah. Trout Unlimited alleged the Corps' approval
of the construction projects violated various federal regulations,
including the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"), the National Environmental Preservation Act ("NEPA"),
the National Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA"), and the Federal
Wildlife Coordination Act ("FWCA"). Trout Unlimited appealed the
Corps' decision in the United States District Court for the District of
Utah, and requested the court remand the agency action. The court
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denied Trout Unlimited's motion for remand.
The construction permit applicants planned to build a water
treatment plant and two pipelines to supply additional drinking water
to the county and to aid in snowmaking operations of local ski resorts.
At the time of Trout Unlimited's challenge to the Corps' decision, two
of the construction projects were underway, rendering certain claims
on those projects moot, claims for procedural remedies
notwithstanding. The claims on the final project remained ripe.
Trout Unlimited's complaint listed six specific violations of federal
regulations, alleging that: (1) the Corps issued nationwide permits
("NWPs") for the construction projects instead of individual permits,
which would invoke a stricter standard of review; (2) the Corps failed
to analyze the projects' impacts on water quality of the nearby
watershed; (3) the Corps failed to evaluate alternatives to the proposed
projects; (4) the Corps failed to evaluate the projects using a NEPA
analysis; (5) the Corps failed to comply with the FWCA, raising
concerns about local trout species; and (6) the Corps failed to address
concerns the projects would jeopardize nearby historic properties.
First, Trout Unlimited challenged the Corps' issuance of NWPs as
opposed to individual permits. Given the project's distance from, and
relatively minimal impact on, nearby East Canyon Creek, the Corps
issued the more general NWP. The CWA grants the Corps authority to
regulate "discharges of dredged and fill material into wetlands"
through permitting systems, and allows the Corps to issue the more
general NWPs in certain situations to maximize agency efficiency. The
Corps determined that all three construction projects would have
minimal impact on East Canyon Creek, thus eliminating the need for
an intensive evaluation or NEPA review. The court held the Corps'
determination to issue NWPs in lieu of individual permits was
satisfactory.
Second, Trout Unlimited alleged the Corps failed to analyze the
projects' impact on water quality. The Utah Department of Water
Quality ("DWQ") originally indicated it intended to withdraw
certification on the pipeline projects because the affected portion of
East Canyon Creek fell within the CWA's definition of impaired waters.
In response, the permit applicants revised the construction plans in
order to lessen the impact on the Creek. The DWQ reviewed the
revised plans and reversed its earlier stance. In examining permit
applications, the Corps must defer to state certification of the project.
Section 401 of the CWA requires permit applicants to obtain
certification from the state to ensure compliance with CWA standards.
If a state certifies a proposal, the Corps need not analyze water quality
issues further. The court held the Corps' reliance on the DWQ's
certification served as sufficient analysis of water quality impacts, and
thus dismissed Trout Unlimited's second contention.
Third, Trout Unlimited alleged the Corps failed to analyze
alternatives to the proposed projects. The court dismissed this claim,
holding since the Corps analyzed alternatives to NWPs when the
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permits were first created, no federal regulation required the Corps to
conduct further analysis.
Fourth, Trout Unlimited alleged the Corps violated NEPA in
failing to analyze the proposed construction projects using NEPA
review. Again, the court dismissed the argument, holding NEPA
review occurred at the time of the creation of the NWPs, with the
Corps analyzing a relevant class of activities at the time it issued the
permit. When applying an NWP to a proposed activity, NEPA does not
require further review of the project.
Fifth, Trout Unlimited's claim under the FWCA alleged the Corps
failed to address concerns about the projects' impacts on local trout
species. The court first pointed out the FWCA does not include a
private right of action for citizen suits, but addressed the issue to
determine whether the Corps' actions were arbitrary and capricious,
and thus in violation of the APA. The Corps' regulations require the
agency to give "full consideration" to other agencies' concerns, yet
under FWCA, requirements the Corps can rely on information from
permit applicants in evaluating compliance with FWCA. The court
found while the Fish and Wildlife Service initially expressed concern
over the projects, the permit applicants addressed the concerns in an
Thus, Trout
environmental assessment provided to the Corps.
Unlimited failed to meet its burden of proving the Corps acted in an
arbitrary and capricious manner.
Finally, the court addressed Trout Unlimited's allegation the
Corps' actions violated the NHPA by failing to evaluate possible
impacts on historic properties. Under the NHPA, state historic
preservation offices must assist federal agencies in the review
processes. The Utah State Historic Preservation Office determined the
proposed projects would not affect historic properties. The court
found the Corps' reliance on such determination reasonable, and
dismissed Trout Unlimited's claim under the NHPA.
The court thus denied Trout Unlimited's appeal and motion to
remand agency action, and entered judgment for the Corps.
KatharineJEllison

United States v. Newdunn Assoc., 195 F. Supp. 2d 751 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(holding the United States Army Corps of Engineers' 1986 regulations
expanding the definition of "waters of the United States" and
extending its jurisdiction over these waters exceeded the grant of
authority to the Corps by Congress under the Clean Water Act).
On June 12, 2001, Newdunn Associates ("Newdunn") and its
contractors began discharging fill material onto its property, grading
its property, and excavating ditches on its property. Newdunn
conducted these activities without a permit under section 404 of the
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Clean Water Act ("CWA") or an individual or general Virginia
Protection Permit under sections 62.1-44.15:5 and 62.1-44.5 of the
Virginia Code. The United States filed suit against Newdunn in the
United States District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia. The
Virginia Department of Environmental Quality ("VDEQ") also filed
suit against Newdunn in Virginia State Court for not obtaining state
permits. The VDEQ's action was removed to the United States District
Court and consolidated the two actions against Newdunn because it
found VDEQ had relied on the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps")
assertion of jurisdiction to bring its claim. At issue was whether the
Corps had jurisdiction over Newdunn's property under the CWA and
its 1986 regulations interpreting the Act.
Newdunn owned a parcel of land in Newport News, Virginia. At
times, run-off generated by rain exited the property through drainage
ditches. The water ran through more than three miles of ditches and
arms of non-navigable runs until it intersected with Stony Run, which
was a navigable-in-fact watercourse. In September 1999, Newdunn
requested and obtained ajurisdictional determination from the Corps.
The determination confirmed Newdunn's property contained thirtyeight acres of non-tidal forested wetlands. Under the Corps' 1986
regulations, the Corps had jurisdiction under the CWA over wetlands
that were sufficiently connected to "waters of the United States." The
September 1999 jurisdictional determination confirmed the Corps had
jurisdiction over the wetlands on Newdunn's property.
The district court, however, found this determination to be
incorrect, holding that the Corps failed to meet its burden under its
1986 regulations of proving the wetlands on Newdunn's property were
sufficiently connected to "waters of the United States" to fall within its
jurisdiction. The Corps argued a "surface water" or "hydrological"
connection existed between the wetlands on the property and "waters
of the United States." However, the court rejected this argument
because the 1986 regulations make no mention of such connections.
The court also reasoned that upholding the Corps' argument would
lead to arbitrary findings ofjurisdiction.
The court found even if the Corps had met its burden, the 1986
regulations exceeded the 1972 Congressional grant of authority in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs. The Corps first
promulgated regulations for the CWA in 1974 under authority granted
by Congress. The Corps revised its regulations in 1975, 1977, and
1986. These revisions continually expanded the definition of "waters
of the United States" and consequently, expanded the CWA's
jurisdiction over these waters. Prior to SWANCC, courts generally
allowed the CWA's jurisdiction to expand under the Corps'
regulations. However, SWANCC limited the Corps' jurisdiction under
the CWA to actually navigable waters, their tributaries, and wetlands
adjacent to each. This limitation is consistent with the Corps' original
1974 interpretation of its jurisdiction under the CWA. Thus, because
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the wetlands on Newdunn's property were not adjacent to navigable
waters, the court found the Corps had no jurisdiction over the
property.
Lastly, the court found sections 61.1-44.5 and 62.1-44.15:15 of the
Virginia Code were coextensive with the CWA because they based their
state jurisdiction on that of the CWA and likewise defined "wetlands."
Also, the VDEQ's actions indicate it consistently based its jurisdiction
over Newdunn's property on the Corps' jurisdiction over the property.
Therefore, since the Virginia statute and the CWA were coextensive,
and because VDEQ relied on the Corps' jurisdiction for its own
jurisdiction-given the court's finding the Corps had no jurisdiction
over Newdunn's property-the court held VDEQ also had no
jurisdiction over Newdunn's property. As such, the court entered
judgment for Newdunn.
Kate Osborn
Lands Council v. Vaught, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (E.D. Wash. 2002)
(holding that absent a finding that injunctive relief would cause
irreparable harm, a permanent injunction is the proper remedy for
violation of the National Environmental Protection Act's procedural
requirements).
In late 1998 and early 1999, the United States Forest Service
("Forest Service") prepared an Environmental Impact Statement to
address a Douglas fir bark beetle outbreak and various ecosystem
imbalances in the Colville National Forest ("CNF") and Idaho
Panhandle National Forest ("IPNF"). The Forest Service released the
Final Environmental Impact Statement ("FEIS") on June 14, 1999, and
adopted some of its proposals. The resulting Douglas Fir Bark Beetle
Project ("Project") would impact 19,000 acres of forested land in the
IPNF and 4,300 acres in the CNF. The Project called for logging 145
million board-feet of trees.
The Lands Council administratively appealed a Forest Service's
decision to implement the Project, however, the Appeal Deciding
Officer denied it in September 1999. The Lands Council then
brought suit against the Forest Service in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Washington, alleging violations of the
Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), National Environmental
Protection Act ("NEPA"), National Forest Management Act ("NFMA")
and the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The district court denied their two
motions for preliminary injunction, but the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals issued a temporary injunction pending appeal. The Lands
Council then amended its original complaint, which is the subject in
the instant case.
The district court considered this amended
complaint, ruling on cross motions for summary judgment brought by
the Lands Council and the Forest Service Chief. The Lands Council
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renewed its petition for injunctive relief.
The court granted summary judgment to Lands Council on five
issues and to the Forest Service on four. The court held that the
Forest Service's decision to move forward with the Project violated
NFMA, because the agency failed to demonstrate consistency with CNF
and IPNF old-growth standards. Additionally, it found the Forest
Service also violated NEPA in three instances, and the court implicated
the agency's FEIS in each case. First, the court criticized the FEIS for
lacking necessary predictions and analyses with respect to water
quality. Next, the court held that the FEIS failed to consider past
timber harvests and those occurring on adjacent lands in its
projections for the CNF portion of the Project, which constituted an
arbitrary and capricious NEPA violation. In a parallel holding, the
court stated that the FEIS lacked data on private logging and on the
cumulative impacts on habitat or wildlife within the Coeur d'Alene
Ranger District portion of the Project, and was likewise arbitrary and
capricious. The court entered a similar holding with respect to the
Priest Lake Ranger District Project segment.
The Forest Service prevailed on other NFMA and NEPA allegations
by persuading the court that its old-growth forest data were adequate,
and that habitat monitoring could suffice in lieu of the customary
population monitoring. With respect to water quality, the court held
that the Forest Service did not violate CWA or NFMA, and was not
arbitrary and capricious. Likewise, the agency did not violate NFMA
with respect to fisheries, because the Project was consistent with the
appropriate CNF and IPNF standards. Finally, the court held that the
Forest Service's Cumulative Impact Analysis did not violate NEPA,
because the Forest Service did not use flawed data. Moreover, its FEIS
considered matters such as grazing and off-road vehicles to an extent
that satisfied the court.
Turning to the issue of permanent injunction, the court held that
violating NEPA's procedural requirements called for that remedy
whenever injunctive relief itself would not cause irreparable harm.
The Forest Service urged the court to enter declaratory judgment but
deny injunctive relief, reasoning that such a holding would benefit the
public while notifying the agency of matters needing correction in
future projects. The court declined to proceed in that manner,
holding that it would render its decision an advisory opinion.
The Forest Service was unable to cite a single case in which the
Ninth Circuit refused to enjoin a violation of NEPA's procedural
requirements. Consequently, the court permanently enjoined the
Project at least until such time as the Forest Service complied with all
applicable laws.
Curtis Graves
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Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 206 F. Supp.
2d 782 (S.D. W. Va. 2002) (granting mining company and Army Corps
of Engineers' motion for clarification of an injunctive order enjoining
the issuance of fill permits for waste disposal, denying mining company
and Corps' motion for a stay pending appeal, denying citizen group's
motion to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party, and denying
citizen group's motion for further injunctive relief).
In early 2002, the citizen group Kentuckians for the
Commonwealth ("Commonwealth") brought an action against
Colonel John Rivenburgh, Robert Flowers, and Michael Green
("Engineers") of the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps").
Commonwealth alleged the Engineers violated the Clean Water Act
("CWA"), the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), and the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") by issuing permits authorizing
the filling of waters of the United States with waste from surface coal
mining. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
concluded issuance of section 404 permits for the purpose of waste
disposal was contrary to the spirit and letter of the CWA and ultra vires.
On May 8, 2002, the district court enjoined the Engineers from issuing
permits under section 404 of the CWA that have no primary use other
than the disposal of waste, and specifically enjoined the Engineers
from issuing mountaintop removal overburden valley fill permits solely
for waste disposal.
In the present case, Kentucky Coal Association, Pocahontas
Development Company, and AEI Resources ("Mining Companies")
were joined as intervener-defendants. The Engineers and the Mining
Companies requested clarification of the May 8, 2002 injunction and
moved for a stay pending appeal. Commonwealth moved to dismiss
for failure of the Engineers to join Beech Fork Processing ("Beech
Fork") as a party and also moved for further injunctive relief against
the Engineers.
The district court granted the Engineers and Mining Companies'
request for clarification of its May 8, 2002 injunctive order. The court
explained the scope of the injunction was not nationwide, it applied
only to the Engineers and enjoined them from issuing section 404
permits from the Huntington District business office. The district
court also stated the injunction enjoined the issuance of section 404
permits for all activities with no primary purpose other than the
disposal of waste, including mountaintop removal overburden disposal
in valley fills resulting from coal mining, but not including dredging
and dredged spoil disposal. The court explained that permanent
injunctive relief was necessary for three reasons: (1) Commonwealth
showed at trial it did not have an adequate legal remedy; (2)
irreparable environmental harm would result absent an injunction;
and (3) section 706(2) of the APA requires courts to hold unlawful
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and set aside agency action found to be contrary to law or outside the
agency's statutory authority. At trial, the court determined the Corps
and the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") acted contrary to
the spirit and letter of the CWA and ultra vires through their
rulemaking authority. The Corps and the EPA created a rule defining
"fill material" that allowed the dumping of waste into streams as long
as the disposal resulted in filling the waters of the United States. The
court found this practice unlawful in light of the CWA and halted the
practice, as required by the APA. The court then denied the
Engineers and Mining Companies' motion for a stay pending appeal,
finding the Engineers and the Mining Companies failed to make a
strong showing they would prevail on appeal on the merits of the case.
The Engineers and the Mining Companies submitted six arguments in
support of their position, not one of which persuaded the court.
The court held the Engineers and Mining Companies failed to
demonstrate irreparable harm would have occurred absent a stay. The
Engineers and Mining Companies argued coal mining depended on
the disposal of waste in section 404 fills. However, the court
determined waste disposal fills were not necessary for coal mining, but
rather were a cheaper alternative to reconfiguring the permits to avoid
the placement of waste in waters of the United States. The court also
determined irreparable harm to the environment could result if it
granted the stay; and a stay could cause harm to the public since it
would substantially harm the environment. Thus, the court denied the
Engineers and the Mining Companies a stay pending appeal because
they failed to substantially show they would prevail on appeal or suffer
irreparable harm absent a stay. The court denied Commonwealth's
motion to dismiss for the Engineers' failure to join Beech Fork as a
necessary party. The court held a necessary party is one who has a
legally protected interest in the litigation, not merely a financial
interest or an interest of convenience. Beech Fork had only financial
and convenience interests in the adjudication. The court therefore
held Beech Fork was not a necessary party, and that dismissal of the
action was improper.
The court also denied Commonwealth's motion for further
injunctive relief requiring the Engineers to revoke authorization to
Beech Fork to dispose of waste rock and dirt in waters of the United
States. The court found the permanent injunction as previously
ordered could not be extended to individual permit holders.
Kate Osborn
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STATE COURTS
ALABAMA
Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., No.
1000563, 2002 Ala. LEXIS 76 (Ala. March 1, 2002) (holding that the
Alabama Department of Environmental Management's procedures
implemented in response to mandates of the Federal Antidegradation
Policy were within the definition of a rule under the Alabama
Administrative Procedures Act and the Alabama Environmental
Management Act).
The Alabama Department of Environmental Management
("ADEM"), attempting to comply with Federal Antidegredation Policy
("FAP") requirements, revised its statewide antidegradation policy but
failed to include methods or procedures for implementing the policy.
As a result, the Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation ("LEAF")
sued ADEM in Montgomery Circuit Court alleging that ADEM, in its
revision, adopted rules that failed to comply with the requirements as
defined by the Alabama Administrative Procedures Act ("AAPA") and
the Alabama Environmental Management Act ("AEMA") for
promulgating new rules. ADEM, relying on Alabama Department of
Transportation v. Blue Ridge Sand & Gravel, Inc., which held standard
specifications adopted by the Alabama Department of Transportation
were not rules, moved for summary judgment and prevailed. LEAF
appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed without opinion.
The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The FAP requires states to develop and adopt a statewide
antidegradation policy, and to identify methods for implementing the
policy. Minimum requirements mandated by FAP include consistency
with the following: (1) protecting existing uses of instream water and
protecting the level of water quality necessary to protect existing uses;
(2) maintaining and protecting the quality of waters exceeding levels
necessary to support propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife, but if a
lower level is found necessary by a state, the state must assure water
quality adequate to fully protect existing uses; (3) assuring water
quality and uses are not lowered below existing statutory and
regulatory requirements; and (4) maintaining and protecting high
quality waters where those waters constitute an outstanding national
resource.
The Alabama Supreme Court distinguished this case from Blue
Ridge Sand & Gravel, Inc. on two grounds. First, the implementation
procedures promulgated by the ADEM constituted a regulation or
statement of general applicability that implemented or prescribed law
or policy, or that described the procedure or practice of an agency,
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bringing the regulations within the definition of a rule. ADEM's
procedures constituted a rule because they implemented the state's
antidegradation policy, proscribed Alabama's pollution policy, and
described the application procedure and requirements for discharge
permits. Second, ADEM's procedures did not fit within an exception
to the definition of a rule because they were not specifically required
by statute, by existing rule, or by federal policy.
While the FAP imposes minimum requirements, or maximum
pollution levels, it does not specifically mandate what pollution levels
Alabama allows. It merely states that if Alabama allows pollution, the
allowable levels must not exceed those stated in the federal
requirements; Alabama must decide and promulgate allowable levels
and must establish criteria for discharge permits.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") likewise did not
require Alabama adopt specific procedures, forms, or economic
analyses. The EPA only required ADEM to adopt implementation
procedures within federal parameters.
Since the court found ADEM's procedures to be rules within the
meaning of the AAPA and the AEMA, ADEM violated the rulemaking
provisions of the AAPA and the AEMA. Thus, the court reversed
summary judgment in favor of ADEM and remanded for further
proceedings.
Rachel M. Sobrero

CALIFORNIA
Arreola v. County of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (allowing recovery when flood control project failed due to
counties' deliberate act of non-maintenance and state's deliberate
obstruction of floodplain).
James Arreola and approximately 300 property owners (Arreola")
sued in inverse condemnation and tort when the Pajaro River broke
through its levee during a storm, causing massive property damage.
Arreola brought his claim against the County of Santa Cruz, Santa
Cruz County Flood Control and Water Conservation District, the
County of Monterey, the Monterey County Water Resources Agency
("counties") and the State of California.
Both the counties and the state appealed from a trial court ruling
in favor of Arreola. The counties appealed on whether: (1) the trial
court properly analyzed the reasonableness of the counties' actions;
(2) inadequate maintenance of a public project can support an inverse
condemnation claim; (3) the trial court erred in defining "design
capacity" of a flood control project; (4) there was sufficient evidence to
support the findings of liability; and (5) the trial court erred in relying
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heavily on Arreola's draft in writing its Statement of Decision. The
state appealed on the following issues: whether (1) the state's liability
for an inverse condemnation claim required a showing of
unreasonableness when claim arose neither from a flood control
project, nor from surface water discharge; (2) the state had a duty to
avoid obstructing a floodplain; (3) Government Code section 830.6
provided immunity for the state; and (4) the counties' actions were a
superseding cause. The Court of Appeal for the Sixth District of
California heard the case.
In 1947, the counties signed a resolution giving their assurance to
conform to federal maintenance guidelines for a flood control project
within their jurisdictions. The Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps")
completed the project in 1949. The Corps designed the project to
have a capacity of at least 19,000 cubic feet per second ("c.f.s."), with
some evidence that the project could accommodate up to 23,000 c.f.s.
for brief periods of time. Canal maintenance required regular
mechanized clearing of vegetation and sandbars. The counties
regularly undertook mechanized clearing until 1972, when conflicts
with the California Department of Fish and Game caused the counties
to cut back to only sporadic mechanized clearings. Officials from the
counties and the state made many complaints and warnings that the
project's flood control capacity was deteriorating, and the project
required mechanized clearing. The state built a highway overpass,
utilizing an earthen embankment containing two forty-eight-inch
culverts to accommodate flows of ninety-eight c.f.s. In March 1995, a
storm overwhelmed the project, and the river broke through the levee.
When the waters reached the highway embankment, the culverts could
not accommodate the flows, and the embankment dammed the flow,
exacerbating the flood area, and causing ponding and sediment
deposit.
The court began its analysis with a background on inverse
condemnation. The court reiterated that the Albers v. County of Los
Angeles court held the constitutional requirement ofjust compensation
revolves around whether the owner of the damaged property would
contribute more than his proper share to the public undertaking if left
uncompensated. Generally, a public entity is strictly liable when its
action proximately causes an injury to real property. However, the
court noted an exception to the Albers general rule of strict liability.
The so-called Archer exception arose under water law doctrines, and
held that landowners had the right to inflict damage upon others'
property in situations of flood control (the common enemy doctrine)
and discharge of surface water in a natural watercourse (the natural
watercourse rule). The court noted the Archer immunity and the
constitutional takings doctrine created a tension between competing
interests.
The court then described the two cases that devised a solution to
the competing doctrines. The Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control
Dist. court held an injured plaintiff could recover under inverse
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condemnation when a public agency's unreasonable design,
construction or maintenance was a substantial cause of the plaintiffs
damages. Locklin v. City of Lafayette fleshed out a six-part test to
determine: (1) the overall public purpose of the project; (2) the
extent to which reciprocal benefits offset plaintiffs loss; (3) the
availability of feasible, lower-risk alternatives; (4) the severity of
plaintiff's damage in relation to plaintiffs risk-bearing ability; (5) the
extent to which damage was a normal risk; and (6) the degree to
which damage is distributed over wide group of beneficiaries. The
court held the trial court correctly applied the Locklin factors in
determining that the counties acted unreasonably.
The court denied the counties' assertion that the trial court
erroneously applied the Locklin balancing test. The counties argued
the relevant public action was not the substandard maintenance of the
project, but rather the initial plan of maintenance the counties
adopted in 1947. The court examined the question of whether lack of
maintenance could be the basis for liability in inverse condemnation.
Relying primarily on Bauer v. County of Ventura, the court found lack of
maintenance was grounds for an inverse condemnation claim so long
as there was a deliberate act to undertake the particular plan or
manner of maintenance. The court found factual evidence that the
counties' lack of maintenance was a deliberate act. The court
concluded by noting that under a Locklin analysis, the lack of
maintenance was unreasonable, and therefore it was appropriate to
assess liability to the counties.
The court then denied the counties' arguments that the trial court
erroneously defined the project's design capacity. The counties
argued that any additional capacity over 19,000 c.f.s. was not part of
the project's design capacity, and failure as a result of flows over 19,000
c.f.s. did not create liability against them. The court found this
argument inapposite. It found that in fact, the Corps designed the
project to continuously accommodate 19,000 c.f.s. with temporary
capacity of 23,000 c.f.s. Therefore, the trial court did not err in
defining the design capacity as 19,000 c.f.s. with an additional 4,000
c.f.s. of temporary capacity.
The court also found no merit in the counties' argument that flows
exceeded project capacity. The jury found the flood did not exceed
the project's capacity. The court applied a deferential standard of
substantial evidence review and found substantial evidence to support
such a finding.
Finally, the court turned to Arreola's claim against the state. The
state contended the trial court did not use the proper reasonableness
standard. The court found no standard of reasonableness applied to
claims against the state. The reasonableness requirement stems from
water law principles of flood control and surface water discharge. In
this case, the action of the state that caused damage was neither flood
control nor surface water discharge. It was the construction of a
public highway that caused the damage. Without the water law
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privilege, the state was strictly liable for inverse condemnation and tort
damages. Affirming the trial court's decision, the court found that if
not compensated, Arreola would contribute more than his proper
share to the public undertaking of highway construction.
Moreover, the court found the state had a duty to avoid
obstructing the floodplain, and the state violated that duty. It used
foreseeability to determine duty, and found facts supporting the
conclusion that the highway's obstruction of floodwater was not only
foreseeable, but was foreseen. The state was aware of reports from the
Corps that a hundred-year storm could generate 43,500 c.f.s. and
overwhelm the project. Additionally, it was also aware the culverts
could not handle the resulting flood.
Since the damage was
foreseeable and foreseen, the state had a duty to avoid the damage,
and breached that duty when it built the highway to inferior standards.
The court continued its analysis by holding that Government Code
section 830.6 was not a defense for the state. In order to have
immunity under section 830.6, the state needed to show that its design
was reasonable. The court found that state's design of the highway
with ninety-eight c.f.s. culverts was unreasonable given the state's
awareness that a hundred-year flood could generate up to 43,500 c.f.s.,
far over the project's capacity.
The court finished its analysis by denying the state's argument that
failure of the project was a superseding cause. The court reasoned in
order for cause to be superseding, it must be unforeseeable. In this
case, the failure of the project was not only foreseeable, but also
foreseen. Therefore failure of the project could not be a superseding
cause.
James Parrot

California v. Murrison, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that notification to the Department of the Fish and Game is
required where a diversion of water occurs).
Scott Edgar Murrison ("Murrison") placed rocks and gravel across
Big Creek, a small creek in Trinity County, to divert ninety-five percent
of the water flow from the creek to a diversion ditch. The Fish and
Game Code ("Code") stated that it was unlawful for any person to
substantially divert or obstruct the natural flow or substantially change
the bed, channel, or bank of any river, stream, or lake without first
notifying the Department of the Fish and Game ("DFG") of the
activity. The State of California brought suit against Murrison for
violation of the Code. The Superior Court of Trinity County found
that Murrison substantially altered the creek without complying with
the Code, enjoining Murrison from further diversion, and assessing
civil penalties. Murrison appealed to the Court of Appeals of
California, claiming his water right could not be limited by the Code,
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the government could not take his water rights without compensation,
the injunction against him was too broad, and civil penalties should
not have been assessed. The court affirmed.
Murrison's water rights dated back to 1870-1912. He argued that
his water right predated the Code and was therefore exempt from its
requirements. The court of appeals found, however, that water rights
predating the Code are not exempt from regulation. It is within the
state's police power to create reasonable regulations to protect the
wildlife of the state.
Murrison argued he was not diverting new water but rather
maintaining his waterworks and was exempt from the Code. The court
found that Murrison's action was not maintenance, but rather a
substantial diversion that required DFG notification.
Murrison also argued that the state could not take his water right
without just compensation. The court found that Murrison's takings
claim was not ripe. Murrison did not bring a takings claim at the trial
court level and was not restricted from making the claim on appeal.
The court stated, however, that they found no restrictions on
Murrison's right to divert water. Murrison was only required to notify
the DFG of his diversion. Had Murrison given notice, the DFG may
have approved the diversion without any restrictions.
Murrison claimed the trial court should not have assessed a civil
penalty. The court found the Code allows penalties in excess of what
Murrison received and justified the penalty based on Murrison's
actions coupled with the nature of the diversion and damages.
Colleen M. Cooley
Hartwell Corp. v. Santamaria, 38 P.3d 1098 (Cal. 2002) (holding
public utility commission's jurisdiction does not extend to suits against
non-regulated utilities and industries, nor to suits alleging violations of
state and federal water-quality standards).
Multiple consumers brought actions in two superior courts against
regulated water providers ("RWPs"), non-regulated water providers
("NRWPs"), and multiple industrial companies for damages and
injunctive relief from alleged water contamination.
The parties
claimed that the water utilities provided them unsafe drinking water
causing death, personal injury, and property damage. The California
Court of Appeals held one of the two superior courts erred: (1) in
staying the proceedings instead of ruling on the merits; (2) by failing
to grant the RWPs' Public Utilities Code section 1759 motion to
dismiss; and (3) by failing to deny the industrial companies' and the
NRWPs' section 1759 motions to dismiss. The appeals court also held
the second superior court was correct in granting the RWPs' motion to
dismiss and denying the NRWPs' and the industrial companies'
motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court of California granted
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petitions for review filed by the RWPs, the NRWPs, the industrial
companies, and the consumers.
The Supreme Court held while section 1759 preempts claims
alleging insufficient water regulation standards, it does not preempt
damage claims against RWPs alleging violations of federal and state
drinking water standards, nor does it preempt any claims against
unregulated entities, specifically the NRWPs and the industrial
companies.
The court began its analysis with a background of the jurisdiction
of the public utility commissions ("PUC"), and the effects section 1759
had on the PUC's jurisdiction and the industrial companies.
Normally, no court except an appeals court or a supreme court has
jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul any PUC order or
decision. However, Public Utilities Code section 2106 creates a cause
of action in any court for damages resulting from a public utility's
unlawful act or neglect of a positive duty. The court resolved the
inherent conflict between these two sections by applying the three-part
test from San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court ("Covalt"). This
conjunctive test bars an action in superior court if: (1) the PUC had
authority to set and enforce regulatory standards; (2) the PUC
exercised that authority; and (3) the superior court action would
hinder or interfere with the PUC's exercise of regulatory authority.
The court then analyzed section 1579's effect on the claims against
the RWPs. The court found all actions against the RWPs passed the
first Covalt prong. The PUC had authority because: (1) it regulated
public health and safety through public utilities, and therefore
regulated water quality; (2) it regulated rates and set budgets for water
treatment, and therefore water quality; and (3) it had statutory
authority to set water quality standards not inconsistent with state
standards, which the court reasoned to mean the PUC could set any
standard above state levels which it deemed appropriate.
The court further found all actions against the RWPs passed the
second Covalt prong because the PUC exercised its authority. The
PUC exercised its authority in a number of ways, including: regulating
rates; issuing guidelines for water quality improvement projects; and
issuing a decision that conforming to drinking water standards would
require investment of $50 million to $200 million over several years.
Finally, the court found some of the consumers' actions passed the
third Covalt prong, while others did not. The actions that did not pass
were those that asserted the water quality standards were inherently
faulty. The court reasoned that superior court review of the water
quality standards themselves would hinder and interfere with the
PUC's exercise of regulatory authority by directly reviewing an order
or decision of the PUC. Therefore, section 1759 preempted claims
alleging faulty standards. However, the court found section 1759 did
not preempt claims that asserted faulty compliance with existing
standards. The court reasoned the PUC only had mechanisms for
prospective remedial programs, but no mechanism by which
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consumers could obtain relief for past violations. Since the PUC had
no jurisdiction to hear suits seeking damages for faulty compliance,
section 1759 did not bar consumers' suits based on such damages
because there was no direct review, reversal, correction, or annulment
of the PUC's order or decision. The court concluded section 1759 did
not bar those claims based solely on faulty compliance.
The court then disposed of consumers' claim for injunctive relief
to provide clean water. The court reasoned an injunction, based on a
finding different from that of the PUC, would clearly conflict with the
PUC decision-making and regulatory functions. The court contrasted
an injunction as a form of prospective remedial relief with ajury award
of damages. The court concluded section 1759 preempted injunctive
relief.
The court then turned its attention to the NRWPs and the
industrial companies. The NRWPs and industrial companies argued
three points. First, they argued section 1759 encompassed both utility
and nonutility parties. Second, that section 1759 and Covalt applied
broadly to subject matters and issues before the PUC, not just to
actions against regulated utilities. Finally, they argued some of the
RWPs' water was from the same supply as the NWRPs. Thus a jury
award undermined the PUC's report that the drinking water was safe
by directly reviewing, reversing, correcting, or annulling the PUC's
decision.
The court dismissed the first argument by reasoning the
California Constitution restricts the PUC's duties to regulated utilities.
Therefore, suits against unregulated utilities and non-utilities could
not possibly interfere with the PUC's official regulatory duties. The
court dismissed the second argument by noting the NRWPs and the
industrial companies cited no case law to support their argument. The
court noted the NRWPs and industrial companies cited isolated
statements from cases in an attempt to bolster their position. The
court read the statements within the broader context of the cases and
found the statements actually supported the position that section 1759
and Covalt applied only to cases against regulated utilities. The court
dismissed the third argument by noting the PUC had no jurisdiction to
hear cases against NRWPs. Therefore, the PUC's jurisdiction would
suffer no injury if the superior court addressed the case. Moreover, if
the superior court had no jurisdiction, the cases would have no forum
at all.
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court on the
preemption issues only, and affirmed the remainder of the appellate
decision. The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.
James Parrot
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Milliken v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., No. E029724, 2002 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 2541 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2002) (holding an
environmental impact report is adequate if it: (1) properly describes a
project's environmental setting and scope; (2) adequately analyzes a
project's impact on groundwater quality; (3) adequately analyzes a
reasonable range of alternatives and properly rejects each alternative;
and (4) is consistent with the applicable zoning and land use laws).
The plaintiff, Bradley Milliken, appealed a Superior Court of
Riverside County order to the Fourth Appellate District of the
California Court of Appeals. The order denied Milliken's petition for
a writ of mandate to prohibit the defendant, the Coachella Valley
Water District ("District"), from certifying an environmental impact
report ("EIR") and expanding its Water Reclamation Plant ("Plant").
Milliken appealed from an order that denied a writ of mandate to
set aside the actions of the District in certifying an EIR and approving
plans to expand its Plant. The District proposed to increase the Plant's
wastewater collection, reclamation, and disposal capacity from 2.5 to
5.0 million gallons per day ("mgd"): In order to achieve the proposed
increase, the District planned to upgrade the Plant's facilities and
build two more percolation ponds. The proposed location for the
ponds was a 105-acre parcel north of the Plant and on the upstream
side of a United States Bureau of Reclamation flood control dike.
Milliken's family owned a date farm and residence north of the Plant
site and southeast of the pond site. A portion of Milliken's land was an
agricultural preserve under the Williamson Act.
The Plant originally consisted of a 1.0 mgd aerated lagoon
treatment facility with on-site percolation pond disposal. In 1995, the
District completed construction of a 2.5 mgd extended aeration facility
with tertiary and biosolids handling facilities at the Plant. The District
proposed several upgrades including headworks, an aeration basin and
blower, two secondary clarifiers, and a pump to transport treated
effluent (recycled wastewater for irrigation) to new ponds. The
District intended the project to provide treatment of increased sewage
flows until 2017.
Milliken appealed the District's certification of the EIR to the court
based on five arguments: (1) the EIR failed to adequately describe the
project's environmental setting; (2) the EIR failed to describe the
project's true scope as a segment of a larger unstated project; (3) the
EIR failed to analyze the project's potential impacts on water quality;
(4) the EIR failed to consider alternatives and rejected each alternative
based only on cost; and (5) the project's purpose was inconsistent with
zoning and land use laws and would have significant impacts on land
use.
The court began its analysis by stating Milliken had the burden of
proving the EIR was inadequate. In response to Milliken's first claim,
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the court stated the EIR adequately described all land uses in the area
of the Plant. Further, the EIR contained extensive information about
the area's weather and wind conditions. The court then concluded
the EIR specifically described Milliken's land, the exact location of
Milliken's residence in relation to the Plant and the pond site, and the
wind conditions near the project. The EIR also acknowledged one
alternative pipe line might cross Milliken's property and that some of
Milliken's property had been removed from agricultural reserve status.
Milliken relied on two other cases where the court held an EIR as
inadequate. However, the court distinguished the prior cases, where
the court found EIR lacked sufficient explanation or detail regarding
the surroundings, from the present case and concluded the EIR
sufficiently described in detail the project's environmental setting.
Second, Milliken asserted the project's true scope was 20.0 mgd,
not 5.0 mgd as stated in the EIR. The District argued any expansion of
the Plant above 5.0 mgd was not foreseeable, thus no analysis of the
effects of future expansions was needed. Milliken provided no
evidence to show the EIR understated the project or concealed the
ultimate capacity of 20.0 mgd. The EIR based its estimated scope on
population growth according to census tract figures, which were not
disputed by Milliken.
Furthermore, Milliken claimed the project sized its headworks for
8.5 mgd. According to Milliken, the headworks size proved the
ultimate capacity of 20.0 mgd. Contrary to Milliken's assertions, the
court concluded the 8.5 mgd headwork proposed by the District did
not necessarily mean the Plant expansion was planned to be 20.0 mgd.
The court found Milliken overestimated the importance of the 8.5
mgd headworks and ignored evidence the Plant's overall operating
capacity was 5.0 mgd. Milliken claimed a 1993 interoffice District
memorandum showed the true scope of the project was 20.0 mgd.
The court held Milliken misread the 1993 memorandum and later
interoffice communications clarified Milliken's misunderstanding.
Milliken also claimed the average daily influent to the Plant increased
by 222 percent between 1994 and 1999, which proved the true scope of
the project was 20.0 mgd. The court dismissed Milliken's second
argument and stated the evidence did not prove the 222 percent
growth rate would continue in the future.
Third, Milliken maintained the EIR did not adequately analyze the
possible contamination of the groundwater in the area of the Plant,
including water in Milliken's well. In contrast, the District claimed the
EIR adequately analyzed possible groundwater contamination and the
EIR properly concluded the project would have no significant impact
on the groundwater quality. The court reasoned an EIR's analysis
should be specific enough to allow informed decision making and
public participation. The EIR should also include information about a
project's environmental impacts and reasonable alternatives. Based on
test results from a monitoring well and an irrigation well, the EIR
concluded there would not be a significant affect on the quality of the
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groundwater.
Further, there was no evidence of effluent
contamination in Milliken's well. The court held the EIR adequately
analyzed the project's affect on groundwater surrounding the Plant
and substantial evidence supported the EIR's conclusions.
Milliken also argued the EIR failed to include evidence of past
groundwater contamination at the Plant.
Results of quarterly
groundwater tests were part of the public record, even though the EIR
and administrative record did not include the results. The court
found Milliken failed to prove the EIR's lack of test results misled the
District, the public, understated any problem, or was prejudicial.
Fourth, Milliken claimed the EIR did not adequately analyze
alternatives to the project and the District chose this project based only
on its low cost. An EIR must provide sufficient information about each
alternative in order to permit evaluation, analysis, and comparison to
the proposed project. The EIR analyzed seven alternatives to the
proposed project and thoroughly explained the reasons why each
alternative was rejected. The court held the EIR adequately analyzed a
reasonable range of alternatives. The court found that the District
rejected each alternative for an environmental or a technological
reason, rather than cost alone.
Finally, Milliken asserted the project would significantly impact
land uses, since it was inconsistent with Riverside County's and the City
of Indio's zoning ordinances, and the Riverside County
Comprehensive General Plan. The county zoned the Plant and pond
site under the W-2 zoning ordinance. Uses permitted under the W-2
zoning included: water works facilities (public and private) for the
primary purpose of production and distribution of water for irrigation
purposes, public utility uses such as structures and installations
necessary for conservation, and development of water (dams,
pipelines, water conduits, tanks, reservoirs, and wells).
Milliken
argued the project was inconsistent with the W-2 zoning, because the
project did not produce and distribute water for irrigation purposes.
Milliken also claimed the project was not necessary to the conservation
and development of water. According to Milliken, the project's main
purpose was wastewater disposal. The court found the project would
expand the Plant's capacity to produce and distribute recycled water
for irrigation and conservation.
The court held Milliken's
interpretation of uses under W-2 zoning was too narrow. Accordingly,
Milliken failed to show the project's inconsistency with the city's
ordinance.
Milliken then presented an argument the project was inconsistent
with the Western Coachella Valley Plan ("WCVP").
The WCVP
provides rivers, floodways, lakes, and reservoirs are limited to open
space and limited recreational land uses. Since the pond site would be
located in a floodway, Milliken claimed the percolation ponds did not
preserve or maintain open space. However, the court held Milliken
disregarded section 1.5 (a) of the WCVP, which provided several
reasons a public service facility may be consistent with all land use
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designations under the WCVP. The reasons included: the facility
would not create a land use problem, the site had adequate
circulation, water distribution, sewage collection and utility service,
and the location would notjeopardize public health, safety and welfare
or the facility was necessary to ensure public safety and welfare. The
project satisfied all the requirements under the WCVP, therefore the
court held it was consistent with the WCVP.
The court affirmed the District's decision and concluded the EIR
adequately described the project's environmental setting and scope,
adequately analyzed the project's impacts on groundwater quality and
reasonable alternatives, and Milliken failed to show the project was
inconsistent with zoning or land use laws.
Susan Curtis
State ex reL. Dept. of Parks & Recreation v. Schoendorf, No. H022039,
2002 WL 972147 (Cal. Ct. App. May 10, 2002) (holding: (1) a claim of
adverse use cannot be supported where a water right was used with
implied permission that was never expressly disclaimed; and (2) a
property owner may only rely on an overlying water right to extract
water from the ground beneath the owner's property, not to divert
surface flow to which the owner has no riparian right).
The Schoendorfs appealed an action alleging they illegally diverted
surface flow of a spring from land owned by the State of California.
Schoendorf claimed prescriptive and overlying rights to the spring.
On summary adjudication, the Monterey County Superior Court ruled
in the state's favor. Schoendorf appealed, alleging the trial court
erred in failing to infer adverse use and improperly adjudicating their
overlying right claim. The California Court of Appeal for the Sixth
District affirmed the trial court's ruling.
The surface flow of the spring arose on the state's land and only
reached Schoendorf's property by means of a springbox and pipeline.
From 1944 to 1954, Schoendorf's predecessor in interest used this
diversion to supply their property with water. The state gained title to
the waters of the spring and surrounding land in 1962. In 1996,
Schoendorf installed a new springbox and pipeline on the state's land
after acquiring neighboring property.
In 1999, the state brought an action against Schoendorf alleging
they were illegally diverting water from the spring. The state also
claimed sole riparian rights to the spring because without the
diversion, no water from the spring would reach Schoendorf's
property. The state sought removal of the diversion and restoration of
its property, as well as a declaration that Schoendorfs diversion was
illegal. Schoendorf filed a cross-complaint seeking declaratory relief.
They alleged a prescriptive right to the spring based on adverse use by
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their predecessor in interest. Additionally, they claimed an overlying
right to the spring because their property overlaid the water that is the
spring's source. The state moved for summary judgment, claiming
Schoendorf asserted no defenses to the state's causes of action, and
their claims of prescriptive and overlying rights to the spring were
without merit. In opposing the motion, Schoendorf argued the state
did not establish Schoendorfs use of the spring was permissive.
Although claiming an overlying right, Schoendorf did not allege this
right provided a defense to the state's claims or constituted an
independent ground for their own causes of action. The trial court
granted the state's motion and subsequently entered judgment
declaring that Schoendorf had no right to the spring. The judgment
also prohibited Schoendorf from diverting water from the spring.
In their appeal, Schoendorf claimed the trial court erroneously
failed to infer adverse use of the spring by long term occupants of the
property ("Lopez family"). They argued even if evidence suggested
the owners knew the Lopez family used the spring, the use was adverse
because it occurred without the owner's express permission. In
affirming the trial court's ruling, the court relied upon well-established
principles of California law. A party claiming tide by prescription
bears the burden of proving the use was open, notorious, continuous,
adverse, and uninterrupted for a period of five years. If property is
used with express or implied permission of the owner, the use is not
adverse. Schoendorf only presented evidence suggesting the Lopez
family used the spring without express permission, not that this use
was adverse.
Undisputed evidence established that the state's
predecessor in interest ("Brown") was aware the Lopez family used the
springbox and pipeline to divert spring water to their property. At one
time, Brown employed members of the Lopez family, and even had
them maintain the Browns' pipelines, including the pipeline in
question. Brown also directed Mr. Lopez to dismantle other pipelines
carrying water elsewhere. The court considered these facts strong
evidence to support the trial court's inference that Brown permitted
the Lopez family to use the spring.
Schoendorf also claimed that even if permissive use was established
between 1944 and 1954, the state did not prove permissive use at any
other time. Rejecting this argument, the court again relied on a wellestablished principle of state law: "Where a use is initially permissive, it
remains so unless its permissive character is expressly disclaimed."
Schoendorf offered no evidence the Browns ever disclaimed
permissive use of the spring. The state established that use of the
spring was permissive at least as early as 1944, and remained so until
the state acquired the land in 1962.
Also at issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in
summarily adjudicating Schoendorf s counterclaim asserting an
overlying right to the spring water. Schoendorf argued the state never
expressly sought adjudication of Schoendorf's overlying rights claim
and this claim was relevant to the relief sought by the state. In
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affirming the trial court's ruling, the court briefly noted that in its
summary judgment motion, the state asserted there was no merit to
Schoendorf's causes of action. The court also concluded the trial
court was not required to resolve the overlying rights claim because it
was not a matter of controversy and immaterial to both parties' causes
of action and relief sought.
A landowner possesses exclusive riparian rights to a spring if the
natural flow of the spring does not cross the boundaries of the land on
which it is located. Similar to a riparian right, an overlying water right
is appurtenant to land; however, an overlying right only confers the
right to extract water from the ground underneath the owner's land.
The court stated that an overlying right does not permit a landowner
to trespass onto a neighbor's land to divert water from a spring to
which the landowner has no riparian right. Therefore, the court
reasoned if Schoendorf did possess an overlying right to extract water
from underneath their own land, that right would not entitle them to
divert that water from the state's property. Neither would this right
allow Schoendorf to avoid an action to remediate a wrongful diversion.
Hence, the overlying rights claim was immaterial to the state's causes
of action. Further, Schoendorf only alleged the overlying rights claim
entitled them to extract groundwater, not that this right entitled them
to install the springbox and pipeline. The state never challenged
Schoendorf's right to extract groundwater from underneath the state's
property; therefore, this claim was not a matter of controversy. Thus,
the court also concluded the overlying rights claim did not provide a
basis for Schoendorfs causes of action and declaratory relief sought.
In sum, the court affirmed the lower court's determination that
Schoendorf did not have a prescriptive right to the state's spring,
because under California law, using property with implied permission
is not considered adverse use, and permissive use remains so until
expressly disclaimed. The court also held the trial court properly
adjudicated Schoendorf's overlying right claim. In doing so, the court
reaffirmed prior California decisions holding that a property owner
may only rely on an overlying water right to extract water from the
ground beneath the owner's property, not to divert surface flow to
which the owner has no riparian right.
ArthurR. Kleven
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COLORADO
SL Group, L.L.C. v. Go West Indus., Inc., 42 P.3d 637 (Colo. 2002)
(holding SL Group's failure to protest defendant's application in a
timely manner may be excused if plaintiff can demonstrate its
untimeliness was due to mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect
pursuant to Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-93-304).
SL Group ("SL") and Go West Industries ("Go West") owned
adjoining properties, which once consisted of an undivided parcel
owned by Philip and Francis Lawhead. Water Court, Division Four
granted Go West's application for an absolute surface water right
based on a historic appropriation for irrigation dating back to July 1,
1938. Subsequently, the water court dismissed SL's verified petition
for reconsideration to correct substantive errors in judgment. The
water court judge did not consider the merits of its previous
adjudication involving Go West, but instead dismissed the petition
based solely on the ground that SL failed to demonstrate that its
failure to timely protest Go West's application was due to mistake,
inadvertence, or excusable neglect. SL appealed the water court's
order dismissing its petition directly to the Colorado Supreme Court.
SL and Go West's adjoining properties were located in a remote
desert area approximately one hour outside of Nucla, Colorado. In
March of 1998, Go West filed its application for surface water rights to
the Meadows Ditch Extension to West Shavano Creek alleging prior
appropriation for irrigation dating back to July 1, 1938. In the
application, Go West listed the United States Forest Service ("USFS")
as the owner of the land upon which the point of diversion was located
and named itself as the owner of the land on which the stock pond was
located. Go West made no similar reference in its application to SL.
Pursuant to state statute, the water clerk published a resume of the
application in a local newspaper and mailed a copy to the USFS. On
February 22, 1999, the water court approved the referee's ruling
granting Go West an absolute water right to stock water and irrigation
from the West Shavano Extension.
Approximately a year and a half later, on September 5, 2000, SL
filed a Verified Petition for Reconsideration. SL asserted it was
entitled to receive notice and in fact was not aware of the application
and subsequent adjudication in favor of Go West. Essentially SL
argued the property Go West described in its application encompassed
SL's property and the stock pond was actually located on SL's
property.
SL further argued its failure to timely petition the
application was due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect
within the meaning of Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92304(10).
Go West challenged the petition for reconsideration,
contending SL failed to show excusable neglect. Without a hearing,
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the water court dismissed SL's petition, concluding publication was
proper and that there was no showing of mistake, inadvertence, or
excusable neglect within the meaning of the law.
Under Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92-302(3), the clerk of
the water court must prepare a monthly resume of water applications,
publish the resume in local newspapers of general circulation, and
mail it to parties who may be potentially affected by the adjudication.
The Colorado Supreme Court emphasized that strict compliance with
the notice provisions is required in order to satisfy due process. The
Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969
("WRDAA") provides that any person whose fights were adversely
affected and who failed to file a protest due to mistake, inadvertence,
or excusable neglect may petition to correct substantive and/or
ministerial errors in ajudgment and decree within three years, further
evidencing the WRDAA's commitment to giving parties proper notice.
A party's conduct is excusable when "the surrounding circumstances
would cause a reasonably careful person similarly to neglect a duty."
The court further explained that determining whether conduct is
excusable involves a balancing of equities, including inter alia, the
danger of prejudice to the non-moving party, the length of the delay
and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, and the good faith of
the movant.
The court then looked at the facts surrounding Go West's
application. Go West did not identify SL as the owner of the property
which used water from the West Shavano extension or refer to SL
whatsoever in its application. In addition, SL never received the
resume and did not have knowledge about the application until a year
after the decree. Based on these facts, the court held SL sufficiently
showed its failure to protest the application in a timely manner was
due to mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect pursuant to state
statute, and that the water court abused its discretion in dismissing
SL's petition for reconsideration.
The court reversed the water court's order dismissing SL's petition
for reconsideration and held SL's failure to timely file its petition to
Go West's application was due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect within the meaning of the law.
Lucia Padilla
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden, 44 P.3d 241
(Colo. 2002) (holding both acreage irrigated and actual volumetric
use were relevant in determining whether a water user impermissibly
expanded use of its decreed rights).
Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Company ("Farmers") sought
declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the City of Golden
("Golden") impermissibly enlarged use of decreed water by increasing
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both total acreage and the diverted percentage of decreed fights
devoted to lawn irrigation. Golden argued that a change of use
proceeding already fully litigated the terms and conditions of the
decrees necessary to protect junior appropriators, thus precluding any
volumetric change in Golden's decreed rights. The District Court,
Water Division One agreed, entering judgment for Golden. Farmers
appealed. The Colorado Supreme Court held Farmers' claim of
increased lawn irrigation constituted an allegation of changed
circumstances sufficient to overcome Golden's assertion of claim
preclusion and remanded. The water court held Golden did not
impermissibly expand use of its decreed rights, using no more water
for lawn irrigation than contemplated in the original change-of-use
proceedings. The court did not consider Farmers' claim that Golden
increased lawn acreage irrigated with decreed water, because the claim
failed to address the crucial question of whether Golden's use of water
exceeded its decreed rights. Farmers appealed.
Golden obtained two water rights decrees in 1961 and 1964,
allowing diversion of 4.66 cubic feet per second continuously from
Clear Creek each year from May 1 to October 1. Golden acquired
several senior water rights, seeking to change use from agricultural
irrigation to municipal purposes. Based on an engineering study
comparing Golden's actual municipal consumption with consumptive
use for agricultural irrigation, the court determined Golden used 50%
of its municipal supplies for domestic purposes with the remainder
devoted to lawn irrigation. The court determined lawn irrigation was
75% to 95% consumptive. In contrast, household uses were only 1.5%
consumptive. To protect junior appropriators, the court limited
Golden's use of decreed water for lawn irrigation to 53% of water
diverted. Further, the decrees barred watering more than 225 acres
during any irrigation season. In 1994, Golden used 55% of water
diverted to irrigate 267 acres of lawn.
The Colorado Supreme Court held the original restrictions on
Golden's decreed rights balanced historic consumptive use with future
use, preventing injury to junior appropriators. The decree conditions
effectively imposed volumetric limits of 900 acre-feet ("af") on
Golden's use of decreed rights for lawn irrigation from May 1 to
October 1. Therefore, if Golden used more than 53% of diverted
water for lawn irrigation, or irrigated more than 225 acres, it
impermissibly enlarged use of decreed water. Based on trial evidence
presented by Farmers, the court determined Golden watered 267 acres
in 1994, violating this condition of the decree.
Conversely, the 53% limit on use of diverted water for lawn
irrigation contemplated Golden's full use of its decreed rights. In
1994, Golden actually diverted less than half of its entitlement. Thus,
the water court determined Golden's use of 55% of diverted water for
lawn irrigation did not violate the terms of the decrees because actual
irrigation use did not exceed the 900 af limit. The court remanded
with instructions the water court enter an injunction prohibiting
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Golden from watering more than 225 acres or applying more than 900
af to lawn irrigation.
Alan Curtis

City of Thornton v. City of Denver, 44 P.3d 1019 (Colo. 2002) (the
water court erred in refusing to hold a hearing or extend the period of
retained jurisdiction over the City and County of Denver's plan of
augmentation when the operation of the plan created a cognizable
issue of injury to the City of Thornton's senior water rights due to a
change in water quality).
In May 2000, the City of Thornton ("Thornton") timely petitioned
the District Court, Water Division 1 to invoke its retained jurisdiction,
claiming that recent operation of the City of Denver's ("Denver")
augmentation plan increased pollution at Thornton's diversion
structure and therefore made normal use of the water for municipal
use unsuitable. Thornton asked the water court to extend the period
for retained jurisdiction until Denver and Thornton resolved another
dispute involving Denver's use of Bi-City effluent. Denver presented
the argument that only the Water Quality Control Commission
("WQCC") under the Water Quality Control Act ("WQCA") could
determine injury as a result of quality and the water court had to limit
their analysis to quantity issues. The water court accepted Denver's
argument and refused to extend the period of retained jurisdiction
upon a finding that a better understanding of the detrimental water
quality effects was not the type of injury the general assembly intended
the retained jurisdiction statute to address. Furthermore, the water
court decided that controversies in the water court required final
resolution, and to allow jurisdiction to be retained based upon the
outcome of a subsequent dispute would frustrate this requirement.
Thornton appealed the water court's decision to the Colorado
Supreme Court on the issue of whether the water court erred in
deciding to not retain jurisdiction over the Denver augmentation plan
as a result of Thornton's claim of injury due to water quality. The
court reversed the water court's decision and remanded the case back
to the water court.
In 1991, Denver sought an augmentation plan ("Plan") to offset
out-of-priority depletions caused by the diversion of South Platte River
water to irrigate Overland Park golf course. This augmentation plan
proposed to substitute Denver's Bi-City ("Bi-City") treated effluent for
the out-of-priority South Platte River diversions.
Thornton and other water users on the South Platte filed
statements of opposition to the augmentation plan application filed
with the water court. The other water users stipulated out of the
controversy, however, Thornton remained in the case because of their
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concerns over the quality of water discharged from Bi-City and the
subsequent increase in pollutants at their diversion point downstream
of the discharge. In March 1993, Thornton and Denver agreed to the
terms and conditions for the augmentation plan and in May 1993 the
water court entered a decree granting Denver's augmentation plan.
The water court entered this decree upon an initial finding of no
injury, however, upon requests from both Denver. and Thornton and
pursuant to Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92-304(6) decided to
retain jurisdiction over the plan's operation.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed Colorado law that
augmentation plans can only be approved by the water court if the
augmentation plan's terms and conditions are sufficient to mitigate
injury (either in quantity or quality) to senior appropriators. The court
also determined that the law in Colorado allowed the water court to
retain jurisdiction to temporarily reserve their final determination of
injury to senior appropriators as the result of augmentation plan
operation due to uncertainties. This allowance was predicated upon
the water court's initial finding of no injury as a result of the operation
of the augmentation plan to senior appropriators. The court noted
that typically this analysis in Colorado centered on quantity concerns
(discrepancies in time, place and amount) instead of quality concerns.
The court further determined that the Water Right Determination
and Administration Act ("WRDAA") and precedential case law
established that the prior appropriation doctrine prohibits the
discharge of pollutants into streams where doing so makes the water
unusable for the normal uses of senior appropriators. In short, the
court determined that pollution was prohibited if it caused injury to
senior appropriators. It concluded that the WQCA clearly expresses
intent by the General Assembly to prevent water pollution and refers
to the need to protect beneficial uses of water through the WQCC
adoption of guidelines. Furthermore, the court resolved that the
WQCA expressly reserves the determination of injury to senior
appropriators to the water courts. Additionally, it found that the
WRDAA requires that only the water court approve augmentation
plans that will not injuriously affect the rights of a senior appropriator.
The court concluded that both the WQCA and the WRDAA guarantee
the right of a senior appropriator to a substitute water supply suitable
for their normal use of water prior to the implementation of the
augmentation plan.
Applying this analysis to the facts of this case, the court concluded
that the water court erred in not extending the retained jurisdiction
period, or in the alternative, holding a hearing on Thornton's claim of
injury. The court determined that the actual operation of Denver's
Plan created a cognizable issue of injury due to water quality not
anticipated by Thornton at the time of the initial decree. Further, the
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court decided that the stipulation initially agreed to by Thornton on
the suitability of the Plan did not preclude the water court from
reconsidering this injury.
William H. Fronczak
Park County Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Park County Sportsmen's
Ranch, 45 P.3d 693 (Colo. 2002) (holding proposal to artificially
recharge ground water aquifers that underlie various landowners
property would not result in a trespass claim, require consent, or
require condemnation with compensation to the landowners).
Park County Sportsman's Ranch ("PCSR") filed an application for
a conditional water right, plan for augmentation and exchange
("applications") involving the extraction and subsequent recharge of
water into the South Park formation for augmentation, storage and
beneficial uses with District Court, Water Division 1. Park County
Board of County Commissioners, James B. Gardner, and Amanda
Woodbury ("Landowners") in Park County objected to the PCSR
applications and also filed for declaratory judgment relief in Park
County District Court claiming that the placement of water in storage
above or below the surface of their land absent their consent
constituted a trespass pursuant to the cujus doctrine-to whomever
the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and the depths. The water
court received the declaratory judgment motion from the district court
vis-i-vis a change of venue and denied the action. The water court
stated that the landowners had not alleged that PCSR's proposal
invaded or compromised the use, benefit, or enjoyment of their
properties in any way. Furthermore, the water court determined that
recharge activities involving the movement of ground water underlying
the landowner's property did not constitute a trespass and that PCSR
was not required to obtain consent from the landowners or
condemnation and payment of compensation. Upon request from the
landowners, the water court ruled in favor of PSCR and the
landowners appealed that ruling to the Colorado Supreme Court on
the issues of whether: (1) the appeal was not rendered moot by
subsequent decision of water court denying PCSR's application for a
conditional decree; (2) the landowners have a property right under
the cujus doctrine to require that PCSR obtain their consent before
recharging aquifer; and (3) PCSR is required under the Colorado
Constitution or state statutes to seek consent of landowners or pay
landowners just compensation.
The court initially determined the action on appeal was not moot
because resolution of property issues affecting water rights are proper
for the water court to determine, and PCSR's applications were
predicated upon resolution of these issues.
Regarding the landowners' trespass claim, the court determined
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that they did not have absolute ownership of everything below the
surface of their properties. It further found that water, surface and
ground, in Colorado is a public resource and holders of decreed water
rights have the right to pass the appropriated water through natural
surface and subsurface drainages.
Contemplating, the conjunctive use projects, the court determined
that these types of projects were water projects that utilize the natural
water bearing formations and that the General Assembly, in
authorizing the use of aquifers in the storage of artificially recharged
water pursuant to a decreed conjunctive use project, supplanted the
landowner's common-law property ownership theory (the cujus
doctrine). The court determined that Colorado statutes encouraged
the issuance of conditional decrees for water in underground aquifers
artificially recharged, if the applicant can and will lawfully capture,
possess and control water for beneficial use, which it then artificially
recharges into the aquifer. This determination is predicated upon the
finding that the decree will not cause injury to senior appropriators.
The court then analyzed the relationship between water use rights
and land use rights. It recognized that Colorado, since its inception,
has abandoned the common law theory of ground water belonging to
the overlying landowner. The court determined surface water and
ground water are public resources, that the right to use water also
includes the right to cross the lands of others to place the water to use,
and that natural water bearing formations can be utilized to transport
and retain water. The court also determined that surface landowners
do not have the right to claim as property rights, surface water, ground
water, the use rights thereto, or the water bearing capacity of natural
formations. Then, the court concluded by rejecting the landowners'
claim that the cujus doctrine provides them with a property right
requiring consent for artificial recharge and storage of water in
aquifers that extend through their land. Furthermore, the court
concluded that within Colorado water is not a mineral and therefore
the laws of minerals and property ownership are inapplicable to water
and water rights.
Finally, the court rejected the landowners' claim that the Colorado
constitution and statutes require condemnation with compensation
before an applicant could obtain a right to store water in the aquifers
underlying their lands. The court concluded that condemnation with
compensation was only applicable for reservoirs or storage artificially
constructed on or in land. The court also concluded that reservoirs in
this context refer to damming water, not water artificially recharged
into an aquifer. Finally, the court concluded that allowing property
owners to control who may store water in natural formations, or
charging water right holders for easements to occupy natural water
bearing formations would upset Colorado's historical balance between
water use rights and land use rights. However, the court noted that
the use of natural water bearing formations (either surface or ground)
does not allow a water user to alter the natural drainage pattern,
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increase the water levels beyond the ordinary high water mark or
tortuously interfere with surface uses due to the increase in ground
water levels.
William H. Fronczak
Application for Water Rights in Rio Grande County ex rel. State Eng'r
v. Bradley, 53 P.3d 1165 (Colo. 2002) (holding an applicant
requesting a change in point of diversion of an existing water right did
not meet his burden of proving the change would not cause injury or
enlarge the right where the right was historically used in combination
with other rights, and holding applicant did not present sufficient
evidence to differentiate and quantify historical use of the individual
right for which the change was requested).
David W. Bradley ("Bradley"), in an effort to improve the irrigation
of his farmland, sought to construct a well intended as an alternate
point of diversion for an existing water right. After the State Engineer
refused to issue a well permit, Bradley filed an application with the
water court for Water Division No. 3, requesting a change in point of
diversion. The water referee denied the application on the grounds
that Bradley failed to meet his burden of proving the amount
requested at the new point of diversion did not exceed the historic use
of the right. Bradley filed a protest, and the State Engineer and
Division Engineer for Water Division No. 3 ("state") intervened. At a
hearing before the water court, neither Bradley nor the state offered
evidence sufficient to quantify the historic use of the right.
Nonetheless, the water court found Bradley met his burden of proof
regarding historic use and ordered the state to issue the requested
permit. On hearing the state's appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court
concluded the record did not support the water court's ruling. The
court reversed the water court's order and remanded the case for
possible further fact-finding or modification of the application.
Under Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92-305(3), a water
court must approve an application for a change of water right if the
change will not injure the owners or users of other decreed rights.
The court emphasized an owner may only change a water right; the
owner may not enlarge the right beyond the amount of historic use.
As used by the court, "historic use" referred to the "historic
consumptive use" of a right; the amount of the appropriation
consumed by the application to the decreed beneficial use. Unless the
application to beneficial use consumes one hundred percent of the
amount originally decreed or historically diverted, the historic use is
necessarily less. Even where historic use is less than the amount
originally decreed or historically diverted, the measure of a water right
for change purposes is the amount of historic use. Thus, when
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requesting a change in point of diversion, the amount of water
decreed to the new point may be limited to the quantity of historic use
at the original point of diversion. Accordingly, quantification of
historic use is necessary to ensure a right will not be enlarged.
As an applicant, Bradley bore the burden of proving the requested
change would not cause injury. The court stressed this burden
included proving the requested change would not enlarge the right
beyond the scope of its historic use. However, Bradley never
presented evidence to the water court that the historic use at the
originally decreed point of diversion equaled the amount requested at
the new point of diversion. Bradley requested a decree for the full
amount of the original decree, 1200 gallons of water per minute, at the
new point of diversion. Under the planned irrigation scheme, this
amount would irrigate approximately eighty-five percent of his
cropland. As a result, he needed to prove the original point of
diversion supplied at least eighty-five percent of the water historically
used in irrigating that land. Bradley irrigated his property by three
sources: two surface water rights and the groundwater right for which
he requested the change.
Undisputed evidence indicated the
groundwater right was never the sole means of irrigation. In any given
year, Bradley irrigated by some combination of the three rights.
In support of his application, Bradley offered evidence suggesting
the proposed amount to be diverted at the new well would not be
greater than the overall amount used for irrigation in the past.
However, he did not quantify the percentage the groundwater right
contributed to this overall amount. Because of this failure to
differentiate and quantify the historic use of the individual right, and
the undisputed evidence indicating he never used the right in full, the
court found no support for the conclusion that Bradley satisfied his
burden of proof.
Moreover, the court believed these facts
demonstrated a "near certainty" the requested change would enlarge
Bradley's original right. The court reasoned enlarging Bradley's right
would, at the least, advance his priority to any additional water over
that ofjunior appropriators. In Colorado's overappropriated San Luis
Valley, advancing Bradley's priority would necessarily injure the users
of other vested rights. Consequently, the court reversed the water
court's order and remanded the case.
In reversing the water court, the court reaffirmed an applicant
requesting a change of an existing water right may not enlarge that
right beyond the quantity historically used. In addition to proving the
change will not injure other users, an applicant also bears the burden
of proving the change will not enlarge the right. Where an applicant
historically irrigated by a combination of water rights, differentiating
and quantifying the historic use of a right to be changed-whether by
direct gauging or deduction-is essential to meet this burden.
Arthur P Kleven
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Double RL Co. v. Telluray Ranch Props., 54 P.3d 908 (Colo. 2002)
(holding: (1) the water court may not cancel a conditional water right
without first providing notice of cancellation or expiration to the
owner of the water right, even when the owner fails to file an
application for a finding of due diligence; and (2) the water court's
failure to give notice only extends for the time period in which the
diligence application may be filed).
The Water Division of the District Court of Colorado, Division 4
cancelled Double RL's ("Ranch") conditional water right after it failed
to file an application for a finding of reasonable diligence before the
statutory deadline. The Ranch made a motion to vacate the order,
which the court denied. The Ranch appealed the water court's
decision to the Colorado Supreme Court.
In 1994, the Ranch received a decree for a conditional water right.
While reviewing this water right in 2001, the Ranch learned that its
application for a finding of due diligence was past due. Colorado
Revised Statutes section 37-92-301 (4) (a) (I) requires that the owner of
a conditional water right file an application for a finding of reasonable
diligence every six years from the date the water right is decreed. If
the owner fails to file the application, the court considers the water
right abandoned and will cancel it. Because the Ranch failed to file
the required diligence application in 2000, the water court cancelled
the Ranch's conditional water right in May 2001 without notice. In
June 2001, the Ranch moved that the water court vacate the
cancellation of its conditional water right and allow it to file a belated
application. The Ranch argued this was necessary because the water
court did not give notice of the cancellation. Colorado Revised
Statutes section 37-92-305(7) provides that the water court must
provide notice of the pending cancellation to the owner of the right
before a conditional water right may be cancelled. Even though the
water court stated there was no evidence it sent notice of cancellation
to the Ranch, the water court denied the motion. The Ranch argued
the water court improperly considered the mandate of section
301(4)(a)(I) while ignoring the notice of cancellation provision of
section 305(7) and appealed the water court's decision to the
Colorado Supreme Court.
The court turned to the history and legislative intent of the two
sections in order to give them both a consistent effect. The Colorado
General Assembly enacted section 301(4) (a) (I) in 1969 as part of the
Water Right Determination and Administration Act. Reviewing the
language of the statute, the court found that the section requires
notice that the water court intends to cancel the conditional water
right, not that an application for a finding of reasonable diligence is
due. Considering section 305(7), the court referred to the historical
background of the bill. Ultimately, the court found sufficient evidence
of the statute's intent to hold the water court may not cancel a
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conditional water right and that a conditional water right does not
expire without first providing notice of cancellation or expiration
under section 305(7).
Thus, even though the Ranch failed to file its application for a
finding of reasonable diligence, the water court improperly canceled
the conditional water right by failing to provide the Ranch with the
required statutory notice that its conditional water right would expire
or be cancelled. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and
directed the water court to allow the Ranch to file an application for
finding of reasonable diligence.
Mark Shea

West Elk Ranch v. United States, No. 02SA93, 2002 WL 31681910
(Colo. Dec. 2, 2002) (holding a party cannot show they "can and will"
put water to a beneficial use if they have not obtained, and there is no
evidence the party will obtain, the required permits to use the United
States National Forest).
West Elk Ranch ("West Elk") sought a conditional water right to a
spring adjacent to their property on the United States National Forest
in the water court for Water Division No. 4. The United States Forest
Service ("USFS") denied West Elk's application for a Special Use
Permit ("SUP") to capture water and divert it to their property.
Therefore, the water court granted summary judgment to the USFS
and denied the conditional water right request because West Elk did
not meet the conditional water right "can and will" requirement. West
Elk appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court claiming they would
eventually obtain an SUP, however, the court affirmed the lower
court's decision.
West Elk's predecessor in interest applied for a conditional water
right to use Bear Gulch Spring, located on the national forest, for
stock watering and domestic use. The Department of Justice filed a
statement of opposition to the petition because West Elk had not
obtained an SUP and the USFS expressed concerns over the project's
environmental effects. Ultimately, after filing SUP applications, the
USFS denied West Elk's application due to environmental concerns.
The water court found that West Elk could not and would not put the
water to beneficial use without an SUP from the USFS; therefore, it did
not meet the conditional water right "can and will" requirement. After
the USFS filed a summary judgment motion, the court denied West
Elk's application and granted summary judgment in favor of the USFS.
On appeal, the supreme court first reviewed the definition of
conditional water rights. A conditional water right is perfected when
the holder of a right with priority finalizes their appropriation with
reasonable diligence.
The application must establish that the
applicant has taken the "first step" towards perfecting his right and
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illustrate how the applicant "can and will" finalize the appropriation.
The court then reviewed the FW case where FWS and the
Colorado Division of Wildlife ("DOW") owned adjacent submerged
property. FWS wanted a conditional right to expand its storage right,
however, DOW would not grant permission to submerge more land
and expand the storage capacity of the lakes. Therefore, the FWS
court did not grant FWS a conditional right because they did not
obtain permission to enlarge the lake and, therefore, could not put
water to a beneficial use.
West Elk argued the present case was analogous to In re Gibbs
where Gibbs requested a conditional right to withdraw water from a
well located on adjacent property. The well property owner had not
granted access permission. In granting a conditional right, the In re
Gibbs court did not require such permission at the time of the decree
because Gibbs illustrated she could gain access to the well through a
prior easement or private condemnation.
The court found this case more factually similar to WS than In re
Gibbs because the USFS did not grant West Elk an SUP, nor was there
evidence that it would grant an SUP in the future. Thus, absent an
SUP, West Elk could not and would not put water from Bear Gulch
Spring to beneficial use. In finding the water court properly granted
summary judgment, the supreme court concluded there was no
question of material fact and West Elk could not meet the "can and
will" requirement.
Holly Kirsner

CONNECTICUT
Ace Equip. Sales v. Buccino, 797 A.2d 516 (Conn. 2002) (holding that
a pond originally created by damming a natural stream is treated
under the law in the same way as a natural pond with respect to
riparian rights and that owners of abutting land are presumed to
possess riparian rights in the adjoining pond).
Ace Equipment Sales ("Ace") initiated this suit in the Superior
Court of Connecticut seeking an injunction to bar Thomas and Irma
Buccino ("Buccino") from entering onto or using Hall's Pond for
recreational purposes, and a declaratory judgment that Buccino
owned no part of the pond bed. Buccino claimed ownership of a sliver
of subaqueous land at the base of the pond dam and sought a
declaratory judgment regarding that boundary and an injunction to
enforce their right to use the pond and removal of a fence, erected by
Ace, which barricaded their right-of-way. The court granted summary
judgment in favor of Buccino and denied Ace's motion. The issue of
the precise location of the boundary between Buccino's land and that
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of Ace remained unresolved by this decision.
Gardiner Hall ("Hall") owned all the land under Hall's pond and
surrounding it. The pond was a manmade pond formed by the
erection of a dam and spill way at its southwesterly end. On December
23, 1995, Hall conveyed the dam and mill property downstream of the
pond to the predecessors in title of Buccino who then acquired the
dam and mill property on February 24, 1967. Hall retained the land
upstream from the dam until July 1, 1987, when it was conveyed to the
predecessors in title of Wellington Fish and Game Club ("WFGG")
who acquired the land on July 29, 1996. On September 11, 1996,
WFGG conveyed most of this property to Ace but retained a portion
including about one-half acre of the pond bed.
Buccino and Ace were the only owners of the land abutting the
pond. When Buccino purchased the dam and mill property, they also
acquired rights to take and use pond water for industrial purposes to
meet the needs of the mill and factory on the property and the
obligation to maintain the dam.
Both parties moved for summary judgment on the complaint and
counterclaim. The court concluded that a genuine factual dispute
existed regarding Buccino's boundary line because the court did not
establish whether Buccino owned the sliver of land in issue or had
acquiesced to having the dam as their boundary. However, because
there was no factual dispute that the dam was constructed on land that
Buccino owned and the dam abutted the pond, riparian rights to use
the body of water were still appurtenant to land merely bound by that
water but not extending underneath it. According to the court,
riparian land applies to a tract of land that borders on a watercourse
or lake, whether or not it includes a part of the bed of the watercourse
or lake.
Ace argued abutters of artificial water bodies have no riparian
rights and because the pond was manmade, riparian rights did not
apply. However, the court agreed with Buccino's position that riparian
rights were appurtenant when property abuts an artificial pond in the
absence of contractual restriction or prescriptive extinction of those
rights. Additionally, a riparian proprietor can make reasonable use of
a pond for recreational purposes.
Ace also argued that this right only applied to natural ponds, not
artificial manmade ponds. The court concluded if a natural stream is
dammed so as to form a lake or pond permanently, or for an extended
period of time, that artificial lake or pond is treated the same as a
natural one in terms of riparian rights.
Because Hall's Pond existed as a pond for at least half a century,
there was no proof that the pond was constructed temporarily. The
court concluded that the pond should be treated under the law
similarly to a natural pond with respect to riparian rights. The court
held that the owner of abutting land presumes to possess riparian
rights in the adjoining lake or pond. Thus, because there was no
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evidence that Buccino's predecessors withheld such rights, Ace had, as
a matter of law, the right to use Hall's pond for recreational purposes.
Regan Rozier

City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington, 800 A.2d 1102 (Conn. 2002)
(holding exhausting administrative remedies is unnecessary to a
Connecticut Environmental Protection Act claim and finding
unreasonable public trust impairment must be consistent with
Connecticut Environmental Protection Act statutory scheme)
City of Waterbury ("Waterbury") appealed the Connecticut
Superior Court's declaratory judgment for the Town of Washington
("Washington"), which held that Waterbury's Shepaug dam operation
violated the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act ("CEPA")
because it polluted the public trust, but not by becoming a public or
private nuisance. The trial court found alleged excessive diversions
interfered with the Washington's riparian rights, breaching the parties'
1921 contract. On appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, the
Washington cross-claimed for injunctive relief, alleging the diversions
unreasonably impaired the public trust, and that relief granted could
not cure Waterbury's breach. The supreme court reversed and held
that: (1) exhausting administrative remedies was unnecessary to a
CEPA claim; (2) the trial court's unreasonable impairment finding was
incorrect because it did not consider minimum flow statutes as within
CEPA's mandate; and (3) Waterbury established a prescriptive
easement against the Washington's riparian rights. On remand, the
court must consider CEPA, public trust and riparian rights claims, as
well as a new remedy for the contractual claim.
A 1921 contract permitted Waterbury to divert, out of the Shepaug
River, only amounts necessary for consumption and storage.
Diversions were unlawful when reservoirs were full. When Waterbury
built a treatment plant in 1988, a reservoir, from which it did not draw,
frequently overflowed.
Waterbury also incurred increased costs
pumping water uphill to "high-service areas," allegedly with a greater
impact on natural resources than necessary. Over-reliance on Shepaug
dam diversions resulted, though other reservoirs overflowed.
Waterbury claimed an 1893 agreement allowed these diversions if
in accord with minimum flow statutes, and therefore also in accord
with CEPA. It challenged the trial court's unreasonable impairment
definition, contending that only administrative agencies have
jurisdiction to determine whether minimum flow statutes are within
CEPA's scope.
CEPA, however, did not require exhausting
administrative remedies because the requirement was neither
statutorily explicit nor implicit. Its legislative history contemplated
administrative relief prior to trial, with judicial discretion over whether
to retain the case or refer it to the agency. The trial court therefore
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properly had subject matter jurisdiction. Cases requiring exhausting
administrative remedies were overruled.
Further, the trial court's unreasonable impairment definition as
"something more than de minimus," would force defendants to claim
lack of alternatives as a sole affirmative defense. CEPA compliance
instead determines the proper standard. Because minimum flow
statutes were not designed solely to protect fish and wildlife, they were
proper factors in establishing unreasonable impairment, consistent
with CEPA's statutory scheme.
Waterbury further established a prescriptive easement against
Washington. Waterbury's conduct was sufficiently open and visible for
the statutory period to give the Washington notice that flow
diminished by diversions adverse to the Washington's rights. The
easement's scope however, was for the trial court to determine on
remand, with reference to the 1893 and 1921 agreements. The trial
court's remedy was inadequate because it was based on a faulty,
unreasonable impairment definition and denied relief for Waterbury's
contractual breach.
Robert Lykos
Grannis Island Co., Inc. v. City of New Haven, No. CV000445887S,
2002 WL 230912 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 2002) (affirming a city
planning commission's denial of a proposed regrade plan because the
petitioner did not support the plan with sufficient evidence and the
plan was inconsistent with the Connecticut Coastal Management Act).
Grannis Island Co. ("Grannis") owned property in New Haven,
bordered by tidal wetlands and property owned by New Haven Land
Trust ("NHLT").
Previously, the New Haven Water Authority
("NHWA") owned the adjacent property where Grannis stored
construction materials. Subsequently, NHWA conveyed their property
to NHLT. Upon acquiring ownership, NHLT requested Grannis
remove the stored materials from their property. Consequently,
Grannis decided to "regrade and fill 4.6 acres of upland on [its]
property" in order to store their construction materials. To attain
permission for the regrade, Grannis applied to the New Haven City
Plan Commission ("Commission") for a coastal site plan review and a
soil and erosion control permit. After a hearing, the Commission
denied Grannis' application. Grannis appealed the application denial
to the Superior Court of Connecticut.
At issue before the court was whether the record supported the
Commission's decision to deny Grannis' application. The court
affirmed the Commission's decision based on the following factors: (1)
there was insufficient evidence regarding the spatial relationship
between the proposed regrade and the tidal wetlands border; (2) the
description of the regrade plan was insufficient; (3) Grannis failed to
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identify and mitigate potential adverse impacts of the regrade; and (4)
the Commission identified conflicts between the goals of the
Connecticut Coastal Management Act ("CCMA") and the regrade
when discussing open space in relation to Grannis' property.
First, the court addressed the Commission's conclusion there was
insufficient information showing the spatial relationship between the
regrade area and the tidal wetland border. During the Commission's
hearing on Grannis' application, a letter from the Connecticut
Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") stated the DEP
could not define the boundary of tidal wetlands on the subject
property. Thus, the court found the DEP letter supported the
Commission's conclusion.
Second, the court discussed the Commission's conclusion that the
project's description was insufficient. While Grannis submitted a letter
showing proposed sediment and erosion controls, it did not show
these measures on the regrade plan nor did Grannis establish where
on the property they would place the measures. Hence, the court
affirmed the Commission's decision that the description was
insufficient.
Third, the court addressed the Commission's conclusion that
Grannis failed to identify and mitigate potential adverse impacts of the
regrade. Specifically, Grannis introduced no evidence of plans to
mitigate the effects of rainwater washing over construction materials
stored on their property.
Consequently, the court upheld the
Commission's conclusion that Grannis failed to mitigate adverse
impacts.
Fourth, the court evaluated whether the Commission based its
denial of Grannis' application on a desire for the property to become
open space.
The Commission initiated a zoning ordinance
amendment process to re-designate open space areas no later than
November 1, 2000, twenty-one days after the Commission denied
Grannis' application. The newly proposed zoning ordinance map
labeled Grannis' property as open space. If the Commission rezoned
Grannis' property to open space, then storage of construction
materials would be a non-conforming use. Further, the Commission
acknowledged open space was consistent with New Haven's "future
land use plan" and the Commission supported the NHLT acquiring
property in the area where Grannis' property was located. While the
court found the evidence could support a conclusion that the
Commission based its denial of Grannis' application on a desire for
the property to become open space, the court found it was more
reasonable the Commission was identifying conflicts between the
regrade and the goals of the CCMA. For the above reasons, the court
found the record supported the Commission's conclusion.
Heather Chamberlain
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Delmar Assocs., Inc. v. Monroe Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No.
CV010509213S, 2002 WL 1816338 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 2, 2002)
(holding that a corporation applying to develop low-cost housing is
aggrieved when a town Planning and Zoning Commission denies the
application without providing specific harms to aquifers, streams, and
other aspects of community character or the probability that the harms
will occur).
Delmar Associates ("Delmar"), acquired two parcels of land
totaling approximately 23.8 acres from two 1998 deeds in Monroe,
Connecticut. Delmar owned these parcels without interruption and
without conveying the land to a third party from 1998 to 2002. It filed
three applications to approve the creation of an affordable housing
project called Castle Wood. They applied to (1) amend Monroe's
zoning regulations by adding a new Design Housing Opportunity
("DHO") district; (2) rezone the 23.8 acres associated with Delmar's
proposal to the DHO district; and (3) seek approval for the
development of the residential unit. Less than one percent of
Monroe's housing consisted of affordable housing.
The Town of Monroe Planning and Zoning Commission
("Commission") denied Delmar's three applications. The Commission
based their decision on the following five concerns: aquifer and stream
protection, wastewater disposal, preservation of community character,
blasting, and reduction of open space.
The Superior Court of Connecticut conducted a plenary review of
the records in support of the Commission's denial of Delmar's
applications. The court held that the Commission arbitrarily denied
the applications and abused its discretion. The court reversed the
Commission's denial of the applications and gave revisions and
modifications. The court determined the outcome by looking at
whether the Commission based their denial on a substantial public
interest. The review process consisted of two parts: (1) weighing the
public interest against Monroe's need for affordable housing, and (2)
whether reasonable modifications could be made to the application
permitting approval.
The Commission expressed concern about converting areas near a
stream into impermeable surfaces. The high-density surfaces could
result in less water penetrating and recharging the groundwater system
and an increase in the pollutants entering streams. The court stated
that concerns about pollutants entering streams and the recharging of
groundwater systems are public interests in need of protection.
However, it noted the lack of a reasonable basis that the Commission's
denial of the applications will protect this public interest. The court
pointed to the absence of evidence in the record of specific harm and
the possibility that the harm will occur to reverse the denial of the
application on the impermeable argument. It also declared that the
Commission provided no evidence of the lack of reasonable
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modifications.
The court reiterated that the Commission must consider other
permitting and regulatory agencies' actions when protecting the
public interest. For example, the Commission expressed concern
about the proposed septic tank having a designed flow of 13,950
gallons a day. The Commission noted that larger septic systems have
more potential for heavy impact than individual septic systems. The
court pointed to the fact that the State Department of Environmental
Protection must approve, permit, and regulate every septic tank with a
capacity exceeding 5,000 gallons a day.
The court acknowledged that all five concerns constituted public
interest in need of protection. Upon a scrupulous review of the
record, it also determined that the Commission had no reasonable
basis to conclude that the denial of Delmar's applications would
protect these public interests. Mere possibility of harm would not be
enough to validate a denial, but rather the record must contain
evidence of the potential harm and the probability that such harm will
occur.
Adriano Martinez

IDAHO
N. Snake Ground Water Dist. v. Gisler, 40 P.3d 105 (Idaho 2002)
(affirming denial of water district's challenge of special master's
conclusions regarding a decree of a water right and awarding attorney
fees).
The North Snake River Ground Water District ("NSGWD")
appealed the decision of the Fifth Judicial District Court of the Snake
River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") to the Supreme Court of Idaho
concerning the Bradley and Linda Gisler's ("Gisler") water right
decree. The court affirmed Gisler's decree, stating that the NSGWD
failed to follow the procedures required by the Idaho statute for
challenging a right.
Under Idaho law, a time-sensitive process exists for both claiming a
water right and challenging that right. A claimant files a water right
claim, after which the Idaho Department of Water Resources
("IDWR") investigates the claim and issues a director's report, to which
any interested party may file objections or responses. The claimant
may then contest the report by utilizing a streamlined, non-judicial
process known as the "standard form five" ("SF5") process, or by
referral to a special master, who issues a recommendation.
Subsequently, a party may file a motion to alter or amend, which the
special master will review and rule upon. The special master's final
decision may be challenged and reviewed by the SRBA district court,

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

which may remand to the special master, make a recommendation, or
issue a partial decree. The district court decision is appealable to the
state supreme court.
NSGWD first entered Gisler's water right proceedings with a
motion to alter or amend following Gisler's agreement with the IDWR
in an SF5 and the special master's endorsement of that agreement.
NSGWD argued that IDWR incorrectly utilized a flood irrigation
model rather than a sprinkler model when determining Gisler's water
right. The special master denied the motion, and NSGWD appealed
to the SRBA district court. The district court also denied the motion,
stating that NSGWD's late entry and attempt to enter factual
arguments into the proceedings were an attempt to circumvent the
procedural requirements of the IDWR. The district court found that
this was an improper forum for challenging IDWR's procedures and
that regardless, the factual arguments presented by NSGWD did not
demonstrate clear error. NSGWD subsequently appealed to the
supreme court.
The supreme court denied the motion and held that the timing
required by the IDWR process was well established, and that to permit
a party to object to an agreement after the fact was an unfair burden
on the claimant. By ignoring the steps outlined by IDWR, a party
endangers its ability to challenge a water right. Further, the court
found that the NSGWD on prior occasions attempted similar late
entries with motions to alter or amend, and the court advised NSGWD
of the impropriety of this practice. As such, the court found NSGWD's
appeals to be frivolous, unreasonable, and lacking a foundation in law.
The court awarded attorney fees and costs to Gisler.
Chris Cummins

ILLINOIS
Sparks v. Gray, No. 5-00-0382, 2002 WL 481567 (MII. App. Ct. Mar. 29,
2002) (holding a permanent injunction against adjacent property
landowners was an appropriate solution where a significant
accumulation of water on landowner's property was caused by the
addition of fill dirt on adjacent property and constituted a substantial
injury of a continuing nature).
Property owners, James and Margaret Sparks, sued adjoining
property owners, Donald and Virginia Gray, seeking injunctive relief
from the Grays spreading fill dirt on their property. The Circuit Court
of Madison County, Illinois granted the injunction, enjoining the
Grays from placing fill on their land. The Grays appealed to the Fifth
District of the Appellate Court of Illinois claiming the court was
incorrect in granting the injunction because the injury to plaintiff's

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 6

land was neither substantial nor of a continuing nature.
The Sparks and the Grays owned adjoining lots in Pontoon Beach,
Illinois. Roads bordered the two lots on two sides, and a canal
bordered their properties on one side. The Grays' land also had
ditches on three sides that accommodated water runoff from Sparks'
property. The City of Pontoon Beach required all new construction to
be built on lots with an elevation of at least 417 feet above sea level.
The Grays' land was under this 417-foot requirement, while the Sparks'
property was 423 feet above sea level.
The Grays decided to procure a building permit for their property,
but knew that in order to do so, it was necessary to elevate the land to
the 417-foot level. To accomplish this, defendants brought in a large
supply of fill dirt to raise the elevation of their property. This increase
in elevation resulted in a reversal of the natural flow of rainwater and
caused water to accumulate on Sparks' property.
The issue in this case is whether the significant accumulation of
water on the Sparks' property constituted a substantial injury of a
continuing nature.
The Sparks requested a temporary and a
permanent injunction against the Grays, claiming the flooding of their
property caused irreparable harm for which they had no adequate
remedy at law. During the bench trial, the court heard expert
testimony that the fill on the Grays' property would affect flooding.
The court granted the Sparks' request for injunctive relief and
prevented the Grays' from spreading any more fill dirt on the
property.
The Grays appealed, claiming there was insufficient proof that
specific, substantial injury would have occurred unless the court
granted the injunction. The appellate court refused to substitute their
judgment for that of the trial court judge regarding the credibility of
the witnesses, and deferred to the trial court's factual findings as well.
The court noted the trial judge, after hearing the witnesses and
examining the property herself, determined the Spark's injury was
substantial enough to grant the injunctive relief requested. The court
then reviewed the record and agreed with the trial court judge,
holding the evidence and reasonable inferences there from supported
a finding of substantial injury. The appellate court ultimately found
that, because the significant water accumulation on Sparks' property
constituted an injury of a continuing nature, there was no adequate
remedy at law and affirmed the trial court's grant of permanent
injunction.
Note: At the time of publication, The Appellate Court of Illinois for
the Fifth District reheard the case and reversed its previous decision.
The court held that, because the Grays' actions only result in the
displacement of water and did not result in impeding its natural flow;
the Sparks failed to prove they possess a clear and protectable interest
entitling them to an injunction. 777 N.E.2d 1026 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
David W Hall
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MASSACHUSETTS
Kiewit-Atkinson-Kenney v. Mass. Water Res. Auth., No. 01-1920 BIS,
2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 71 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2002) (holding
a differing site condition could not be proven to account for a failure
to meet a contractual post-mining baseline water inflow, thus negating
tunnel constructor's claim of equitable adjustment).
Kiewit-Atkinson-Kenney ("KAK") sued the Massachusetts Water
Resources Authority ("MWRA") to recover extra costs KAK claimed
they incurred due to a "differing site condition" ("DSC"), resulting in
increases in water inflows during tunnel construction. KAK moved for
partial summary judgment in the Superior Court of Massachusetts at
Suffolk, requesting the court to declare that, for contractual purposes,
the DSC was the reason KAK failed to meet a contractual post-mining
baseline for water inflows into the tunnel of one thousand gallons per
minute ("gpm").
In April 1988, as part of the Boston Harbor clean-up effort, the
MWRA planned to accept bids for the construction of Outfall Tunnel,
a 9.5 mile-long tunnel carrying treated wastewater to the ocean. Prior
to soliciting bids, the MWRA had its design engineer prepare a
Geotechnical Design Summary Report ("GDSR") for the project. The
GDSR established the geotechnical baselines for the project.
In March 1990, MWRA solicited bids for construction of the
tunnel. KAK, a joint venture, submitted the lowest bid, totaling
$201,900,000. MWRA and KAK entered into a contract entitled
Boston Harbor Project-Effluent Outfall Tunnel ("contract"). KAK
divided the project into three operations: (1) the mining and lining of
the entire outfall tunnel, including 43,026 feet of mainline tunnel and
6,600 feet of diffuser tunnel; (2) the excavation of smaller tunnels
running to the ocean floor and connection thereof to the diffuser
section of the main tunnel; and (3) the clean-up and removal of the
required construction utilities. KAK completed the project in January
1999.
KAK claimed it incurred additional costs because of a DSC water
inflow increase during construction. A DSC is a physical site condition
that differs substantially from the expected conditions set forth in the
contract. The issue here was whether a DSC caused the increase in the
water inflow, requiring KAK to spend more money during
construction. The contract included a clause that granted KAK the
right to an equitable adjustment of the construction price should it
encounter a DSC. Under the contract, the GDSR established the only
geotechnical baseline for all subsurface and physical conditions. The
GDSR distinguished between inflows occurring prior to tunnel
construction as being more than one thousand gpm and expected
inflows of less than one thousand gpm after completion of the tunnel.
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KAK claimed the GDSR set a baseline of one thousand gpm for water
inflow after the first operation of mining and lining, while the MWRA
claimed the GDSR merely set a goal for water inflow. Each position
was ambiguous due to the uncertain language of the DSC when
applied to either the baseline or the goal.
The court found merits in both arguments. KAK had to achieve a
goal along with a baseline by which that goal could be measured. The
court stated the baseline was not significant unless MWRA could prove
the reason for the baseline's failure, whether the baseline failed
because of a DSC or otherwise. The court noted there was no
evidence of water inflow differing from the baseline after the
installation of the lining, nor was there evidence the first operation
had failed. KAK's motion asked the court to order a partial summary
judgment identifying a DSC and stating the contractual post-mining
baseline for water inflows to the tunnel was one thousand gpm. The
court refused to declare a DSC caused the failure to achieve the postcontractual baseline without further exploration.
The court granted KAK's motion for summary judgment to the
limited extent of declaring the contractual post-mining baseline for
water inflows into the tunnel was one thousand gpm, however, the
court did not recognize the existence of a DSC.
David W Hall

MINNESOTA
Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Big Stone County Bd. of Conm'rs,
638 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that ditch repair in
protected wetlands required: (1) either Department of Natural
Resources permission or a public waters work permit; (2) a mandatory
Environmental Impact Statement; and (3) either an approved wetland
replacement plan or exemption determination from the local
government unit).
County Ditch 2 was an agricultural drainage ditch that passed
through a Type-5 protected wetland. In 1998, adjacent landowners
petitioned the Big Stone County Board of Commissioners ("Board") to
repair the ditch by removing sediment to re-establish its original
depth. The Board then commissioned an Environmental Assessment
Worksheet ("EAW"), a brief document that determined if an
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") is necessary. The EAW
incorrectly identified the area as a Type-3 wetland, incorrectly found
that the repair would not affect wetland status, and concluded that an
EIS was unnecessary. The Board additionally determined the project
was exempt from the statutory wetland replacement plan requirement,
but did not seek an exemption from the local governmental unit prior
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to beginning work.
The Minnesota Center for Environmental
Advocacy ("Center") sought a declaratory judgment in the Big Stone
County District Court to determine which requirements applied to the
ditch repair project.
The district court first granted partial summary judgment in favor
of the Center requiring the Board to obtain Department of Natural
Resources ("DNR") permission and a public waters work permit to
undertake the project. At the conclusion of the trial the district court
held the Board was required to have an approved wetland replacement
plan or exemption from the local government unit, but was not
required to have an EIS. The Board then appealed the district court's
granting of partial summary judgment and its conclusion.
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals first addressed the
Board's argument the applicable statutes did not require them to
obtain either DNR permission or a public waters work permit prior to
beginning the project. Section 103E.011 (2) of the Minnesota Statutes
defined the circumstances requiring permission and a public waters
work permit, and section 103G.245(1) (2) identified the exception to
the work permit requirement. The court found that if the Board
satisfied the statutory permission requirements, then the permit
exemption would apply to the ditch repair project. However, since the
Board did not get permission from the DNR Commissioner as
required by statute, the Board was not entitled to the work permit
The court held the Board must have either DNR
exemption.
permission under section 103E or a public waters work permit to
proceed with repairs altering wetland public waters.
Second, the court addressed the district court's ruling that an
exemption to the statutory EIS requirement existed for "routine ditch
maintenance or repair within twenty years of major repair." The court
found this exemption to the EIS requirement did not apply, and
according to the unambiguous language of section 4410.4600s(20) of
the Minnesota Rules, the EIS requirement was mandatory because the
Since the EIS was
ditch repair eliminated a protected water.
mandatory, the court held the Board did not have to prepare a
corrected EAW.
Finally, the court addressed the Board's claim that it was exempt
from the statutory wetland replacement plan requirement. The Board
relied on section 103G.2241(3)(1) of the Minnesota Statutes,
providing an exemption for activities that are exempted from federal
regulation under 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f). However, the court relied on
section 103G.221, stating a party can not drain public waters wetlands
unless they are replaced by wetlands that will have equal or greater
public value. The court found the ditch repair did not qualify for the
exemption under section 103G.2241 for parties who drain wetlands,
and in this case the federally regulated activity was the drainage of
wetlands, not the discharge of dredged materials into the ditch. The
court held the project required either an approved wetland
replacement plan or an exemption determination from the local
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government unit in addition to the DNR permission or public waters
work permit requirement and mandatory EIS.
JaredB. Briant
Zaluckyj v. Rice Creek Watershed Dist., 639 N.W.2d 70 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2002) (requiring landowners to exhaust administrative remedies
prior to bringing declaratory judgment and mandamus action and
holding landowners were not entitled to ajury trial on issue of
exhaustion of administrative remedies).
A district court order dated April 12, 1909, established the
Washington County Judicial Ditch No. 2, a thirteen-mile public
drainage system. A mixture of private and public holdings, including
public wetlands and waters, comprised the land ownership along the
ditch. A group of landowners ("Landowners") and the City of Hugo
("City") owned the land on or near the ditch. Rice Creek Watershed
District ("Watershed District") was the drainage authority. The
landowners petitioned the Watershed District to fix drainage pipes
after water overflowing from the ditch flooded their land. In 1995, the
City applied to the Watershed District for a permit to lower three
culverts. The Watershed District issued a permit in 1998 to lower one
of the culverts.
The City lowered the culvert then sought
determination as to whether to lower the other two culverts,
obstructing the flow of the ditch. The Watershed District denied the
petition and noted the City may petition the Watershed District to
repair the ditch.
The Washington County District Court ruled the landowners failed
to exhaust administrative remedies and dismissed the complaint. The
City did not petition for repair or seek district court review of the
decision on petition. Instead, the City and landowners filed a
declaratory judgment complaint and a petition for a writ of mandamus
in district court, seeking an order for removal of the obstructions and
repair of the ditch.
The Landowners appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals
held the Landowners were not entitled to ajury trial on exhaustion of
administrative remedies because the petition for repair of the ditch
was still an available remedy. The Landowners claimed they were
entitled to ajury trial because the issue of exhaustion of administrative
remedies involved disputed questions of fact. The court held that facts
existed which required resolution by the court, and the issues of
exhaustion and futility of administrative remedies are generally legal
questions for the court. Having decided the issue was properly within
the court's discretion, the court decided whether the Landowners had
exhausted their administrative remedies.
The Minnesota legislature created an extensive statutory
administrative process for addressing ditch problems that would
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allocate the costs among the landowners who benefit from the
drainage. Landowners argued this process was not available to them,
as a matter of law, because the statute required the costs of repair not
exceed the benefits. Landowners also asserted the costs of present-day
repairs would exceed the determination of benefits in 1909 and that
no redetermination had been calculated. While the court decided this
is true under the statute, it also noted an alternate provision under the
statute that authorizes repairs if the drainage authority determines the
repairs are necessary for the best interests of the property owners.
This section did not use a cost-versus-benefit analysis.
The court held the petition for repair of the ditch would not be
futile and that the Landowners had failed to show evidence the
Watershed District made a policy decision against redetermination, or
a final decision on whether to repair the ditch. Landowners may
petition for repair of the ditch.
Julie S. Hanson

MONTANA
Bitterroot River Prot. Ass'n v. Bitterroot Conservation Dist., 45 P.3d
24 (Mont. 2002) (holding an authorized conservation district had
jurisdiction to determine whether a body of water was a stream entitled
to the protections of the Natural Streambed and Land Preservation
Act of 1975).
The Bitterroot Conservation District ("BCD") served as the
conservation district for Ravalli County, Montana. Under the Natural
Streambed and Land Preservation Act of 1975 ("Streambed
Preservation Act"), BCD, as the authorized conservation district, was
responsible for issuing permits to anyone who planned to alter or
modify a perennial-flowing stream in Ravalli County. The Bitterroot
River Protection Association ("BRPA") was a private conservation
group and it filed for a writ of prohibition in Montana's District Court.
BRPA wanted to stop BCD's determination of whether a slough was a
"stream" as defined in the Streambed Preservation Act. The Montana
District Court originally heard the case. Upon the district court's
denial of the writ, BRPA filed for a writ of prohibition in the Supreme
Court of Montana.
In July 1995, Brian Monta requested a portage permit from BCD
for the Mitchell Slough ("slough"). Mr. Monta planned to alter or
modify the slough, and he needed a permit because BCD considered
the slough a body of water in Ravalli County. However, a question
arose as to whether the slough constituted a perennial-flowing stream
and thus subject to BCD's jurisdiction under the Streambed
Preservation Act. BCD announced it would determine the slough's
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status following a public hearing on the issue. After the public
hearing, but before BCD classified the slough, the Bitterroot River
Protection Association ("BRPA") filed its suit requesting a writ of
prohibition.
As the party requesting the writ, BRPA had the burden of
demonstrating that BCD's proceedings to determine the status of the
slough were clearly unlawful. The district court held that BRPA failed
to meet this burden, and declined to issue the writ and the BRPA
appealed to the Supreme Court of Montana.
The Streambed Preservation Act defines a stream, but it does not
explicitly give any entity the power to classify bodies of water as
streams. Since the Streambed Preservation Act applies only to streams,
such classification is necessary.
The courts generally allowed
government agencies to decide whether an agency had jurisdiction
over a particular issue. However, courts may interfere with that
decision only when three conditions are met: (1) the agency's
jurisdiction is plainly lacking; (2) there is clear evidence that requiring
a party to exhaust its administrative remedies will result in irreparable
injury; and (3) the agency's special expertise will be of no help in
determining jurisdiction.
The court found that none of these
conditions were present in this case.
BCD did not plainly lack jurisdiction. The court acknowledged
that the Streambed Preservation Act gave BCD the explicit power of
declining its protection to certain streams. If the legislature had given
any entity other than BCD the classification power, BCD could
effectively veto that entity's decision. The court found that it made
sense for the classification power to be within the BCD's jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the initial BCD classification did not result in irreparable
injury-judicial review, for example-would still be available if BRPA
did not agree with BCD's decision. Finally, the court found that BCD's
expertise would be useful in making this type of classification. The
legislature intended the Streambed Preservation Act to protect streams
with significant aquatic and riparian attributes in need of protection;
BCD's expertise made it better equipped than the court to determine
which streams possessed those attributes. Therefore, the court had no
reason to interfere with BCD's determination of its jurisdiction over
the initial classification of the slough.
BRPA also argued that if the slough did not qualify as a stream
under the Streambed Preservation Act, it would be excluded from the
constitutional guarantee of citizen access to surface waters as a ditch.
BRPA argued that this threat to citizens' constitutional rights made a
judicial classification of the slough's status more appropriate. The
court rejected this argument, holding that no dichotomy existed
between streams (as the term is used in the Streambed Preservation
Act) and ditches (in the constitutional sense).
The court denied BRPA's petition for a writ of prohibition.
James Siegesmund
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In re Adjudication of Existing Rights to the Use of All the Water, 55
P.3d 369 (Mont. 2002) (overruling case erroneously claiming: (1) fish,
wildlife and recreational uses were not beneficial uses; and (2)
diversion was required for a valid appropriation. Holding water
court's inclusion of a remark from overruled case in abstracts on
rulings prior to this decision did not violate claims examinations
rules.)
Appellant Montana Department of Fish Wildlife and Parks
("Department") took issue with the repeated inclusion of a remark in
the abstracts of rulings by Respondent Montana Water Court ("Water
Court"). Particularly, the Department contested the inclusion of the
remark on five pre-1973 water rights claims by the Department in the
Missouri River drainage area. The remarks noted the Montana
Supreme Court's earlier holding, in an adjudication known commonly
as the Bean Lake case, raised questions about the validity of the
Department's claims. The questions arose because the Department's
five claims involved diversionary appropriations for fish, wildlife and
recreational purposes. The remark suggests such diversions and Bean
Lake suggested these uses had not been recognized as valid bases for
appropriations before 1973. The Montana Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve confusion about two issues stemming from the
Bean Lake decision. The court overruled Bean Lake holding: (1) fish,
wildlife and recreational uses were recognized as beneficial uses prior
to 1973, and therefore provided valid bases for appropriation; and (2)
appropriations did not require a diversion.
First, the court addressed the issue of whether Montana law
recognized appropriations based on fish, wildlife, or recreational uses
prior to 1973. In 1973, Montana adopted a new constitution allowing
appropriations based on fish, wildlife and recreational use. Prior to
this, a statutory provision called a "Murphy Right" allowed for nondiversionary appropriations for in-stream flow. Montana legislators
created these rights primarily to protect in-stream flows for designated
"blue ribbon" fisheries in the state. The water court's remark
excerpted the Bean Lake holding, stating Montana law recognized no
pre-1973 appropriations for fish, wildlife or recreation except under a
Murphy Right.
The court criticized the Bean Lake court's rigid view of a Murphy
Right as the only way to get an appropriation for fish, wildlife, or
recreational uses prior to 1973. To support this criticism, the court
undertook a discussion of the historical treatment of fish, wildlife and
recreational uses in western water law. Citing a number of scholarly
works and judicial opinions, the court declared beneficial use the
"touchstone" of the appropriation doctrine. Accordingly, if courts
historically recognized fish, wildlife and recreational uses as beneficial
uses before 1973, such uses provided a sufficient basis for an
appropriation. Since the Bean Lake decision recognized fish, wildlife
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and recreational uses as beneficial, its insistence on the requirement of
a Murphy Right added an obligation unsupported by law and
suggested such uses alone could not serve as a basis for an
appropriation. On this point, the court overruled Bean Lake.
The second issue of confusion engendered by Bean Lake concerned
whether Montana law recognized non-diversionary appropriations for
fish, wildlife, and recreation outside of a Murphy Right. While the
Department and the dissent suggested correction of the Bean Lake
holding need only cover diversionary appropriations, the court found
it best not to so limit its revision of the Bean Lake rule. The court
reasoned since the Bean Lake decision never discriminated between
diversionary and non-diversionary appropriations, and since courts
subsequently applied the Bean Lake rule to cases involving both types
of appropriations, this necessitated a broad review of the law in all
areas affected by the creation and application of the Bean Lake rule,
including non-diversionary appropriations.
Again, the court engaged in an analysis of the historical
development of the prior appropriation doctrine. The numerous
scholarly works cited emphasized historical flexibility of the prior
appropriation doctrine. These works argued practical considerations,
not rigid adherence to formal rules, historically guided courts in
determining requirements for a valid appropriation. In sum, while
diversions helped give notice of intent to put water to a beneficial use,
and to define the approximate extent of that use, they were not
required. Precedent showed the law required only the intent to use
the water, which could be proved without a diversion.
The court highlighted numerous prior decisions from Montana
and other western states upholding non-diversionary appropriations
for situations like instream watering of cattle, floating of logs on rivers,
and public recreational use. In particular, the recreational use cases
recognized a public right to use waters for such purposes under the
historic "public trust doctrine." This doctrine antedated the 1973
Constitution and the Murphy Rights statute. The court also noted
language in the Montana Water Use Act ("Act") recognizing pre-19 7 3
non-diversionary, instream uses by Indian tribes as beneficial, and felt
this recognition should be extended to non-tribal waters since the Act
likewise recognized the uses.
The court recounted and criticized an argument in Bean Lake
assigning significance to the fact the framers of the Montana
Constitution deleted a proposed subsection listing recreation as a
beneficial use. The court determined the legislative record from the
convention showed the deletion of this subsection more likely
reflected the framers' intent to prevent possible subsequent
modifications to it, not hostility to recreational uses. Having thus
concluded its exhaustive study of the diversion issue, the Court
overruled Bean Lake, holding fish, wildlife and recreational uses had
always provided a proper basis for appropriation with or without
diversion.
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Finally, the court determined the water court's inclusion of the
Bean Lake remark in any cases prior to this decision did not constitute
a policy stance or opinion, and therefore did not violate provisions of
the claim examination rules put forth by the court. In essence, the
court resolved the "remark" controversy in favor of the water court, but
in resolving the confusion underlying the remark, the court ruled in
favor of non-diversionary, non-consumptive public water rights in
Montana.
Daniel C. Wennogle

NEBRASKA
City of Lincoln v. Cent. Platte Natural Res. Dist., 638 N.W.2d 839
(Neb. 2002) (holding: (1) a decision not to allow a party to join a water
permit application can not be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable;
and (2) the party seeking to become part of a water permit application
must prove why they would benefit or be harmed if the application was
granted).
The appellee, City of Lincoln ("City"), filed an application for a
water permit. The appellant, Saunders County ("County"), objected to
the permit, requested a hearing, and sought to become a party to the
proceedings. The Director of the Nebraska Department of Natural
Resources ("Department") denied the County's request to become a
party. The County appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court of
Nebraska.
The City filed a permit application to appropriate flows of the
Platte River for induced ground water recharge on September 9, 1993.
Following the application, the City published a notice announcing the
deadline for filing objections and requests for a hearing was August 17,
1994. Several parties filed timely objections, various hearings
occurred, and the City dismissed some of the objections. The
remaining objectors settled with the City. The settlement reduced the
stream flow initially requested by the City.
On September 23, 1999 the County filed an "Objection and
Request for Hearing" and asked to become a party to the proceedings.
The City opposed the County's request since it was filed five years after
the deadline. Subsequently, the director of the Department denied
the request due the County's late response and failure to prove injury.
The director based the denial on the County's failure to prove either
that it would benefit or be harmed if the City granted the application.
The director considered five factors in the conclusion: (1) why the
County did not file its request by the deadline; (2) whether the County
had sufficient interest in the subject matter; (3) whether another party
represented the County's interest; (4) whether the County's
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participation would be helpful in a decision; and (5) whether the
County's participation would unduly disrupt or delay the proceeding.
The director found each factor sufficient to deny the request.
The County based this appeal on twenty assignments of error. The
Supreme Court of Nebraska focused on whether the director's
decision was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and discussed all
the other assignments of error in relation to this issue. First, the
County argued the Department used incorrect standards to determine
if the County could be a party and that the Department failed to keep
complete records. The court held the County did not establish why
the standards were incorrect. Also, the court found the Department's
decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable even though
the record does not include a draft of the Department officer's
findings.
Secondly, the County claimed Susan France, the division manager,
LeRoy W. Sievers, the hearing officer, and the Department director
participated in ex parte communications excluded from the record.
Further, the County asserted France and Sievers were investigators on
the City's application. According to the County, the Department
should have excluded France and Sievers from serving in
administrative proceedings regarding the same case. Sievers also
served as legal counsel for the Department and provided advice on
applications proceedings. The director stated in response that no one
from the Department served as an investigator in the contested case.
Accordingly, no one from the Department participated as an advocate
or prosecutor in this case since 1994. The court rejected the County's
allegations for lack of factual support to prove France and Sievers were
prosecutors, investigators, or advocates in this matter.
The County then asserted Sievers erred in denying its request for
subpoenas for a state hydrologist and France. According to Nebraska
Evidence Rules, the party who objected to the denial of subpoenas
must prove the people subpoenaed had necessary and unique
knowledge relevant to the case. Therefore, the County had an
obligation to prove the hydrologist and France had unique knowledge
necessary to whether or not the County could be a party. The court
held the County failed to meet its burden of proof.
Finally, the court addressed whether the director's decision was
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The County claimed it did not
object to the application sooner, because they did not know the City
changed the original proposal by not asking for enough water to
recharge the aquifer under the Platte River and to provide water for
the County. Further, the County based its claim of interest in the
application on five reasons: (1) citizens' interests; (2) Clear Creek
Drainage District rights; (3) zoning regulations; (4) the County's rights
to County roads; and (5) County riparian rights. The court found the
County failed to support any of its claims of interest and the director's
decision was based on competent, relevant evidence.
Therefore, the court affirmed the Department's decision since the
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County failed to establish the director's denial of the County's hearing
request was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
Susan Curtis
Saunders County v. Metro. Utils. Dist.-A, 645 N.W.2d 805 (Neb. Ct.
App. 2002) (holding: (1) a plaintiff must have standing to bring the
cause of action; (2) a given water right will not give standing to
challenge previously established water rights; (3) the authority to
enforce zoning and flood plain regulations does not provide standing
without evidence the water rights will violate these regulations; (4)
riparian rights alone will not give standing without evidence of their
infringement by the water right being contested; and (5) a contractual
relationship alone will not suffice to establish standing to challenge a
water right).
Saunders County brought this action before the Nebraska Court of
Appeals after the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources
("NDNR") dismissed eighteen causes of action filed by the county
against the Metropolitan Utilities District ("District").
On October 6, 1993, the District applied to the NDNR for a permit
to appropriate the natural flow of the Platte River for induced ground
water recharge. On March 1, 1994, the District filed a second
application with the NDNR requesting the transference of the Platte
waters to the Platte West Wellfield. The NDNR published notice of the
District's requests on multiple occasions duringJuly and August of that
year. No parties filed objections in response to these notices, and as a
result, the NDNR granted the two permits on December 10, 1998.
On May 11, 1999, Saunders County filed a complaint with the
NDNR regarding the District's applications. Saunders County argued
the NDNR's initial approval of the District's application was void due
to procedural inadequacies, and the county requested a hearing on
these matters. The county also sought an injunction halting further
water withdrawal.
In November 1999, the NDNR responded to the seventeen causes
of action, ruling Saunders County did not have sufficient standing to
contest the District's applications. The county later sought a hearing
on this issue, which the NDNR granted, but only to uphold its previous
dismissal of Saunders County's claims due to a lack of standing.
Subsequently, the NDNR denied Saunders County's request for a
rehearing. The county appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals on
five grounds: (1) NDNR violated the county's due process rights; (2)
NDNR erroneously allowed a department hearing officer and unit
supervisor to be involved in the proceedings; (3) NDNR erroneously
denied requested subpoenas; (4) NDNR failed to keep a complete
record; and (5) NDNR erroneously dismissed the county's seventeen
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causes of action.
In analyzing these five assignments of error, the court stated an
appellate court's obligation in assessing a director's factual findings is
to ensure the previous rulings were supported by competent and
relevant evidence, so as not to be arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable. The court then proceeded to apply this test to the five
aspects of Saunders County's appeal. The Nebraska Court of Appeals
affirmed the NDNR's judgments.
First, the court recognized that Saunders County incorporated
allegations of deprived due process within almost all of its assignments
of error to the NDNR. However, in City of Lincoln v. CentralPlatteNRD
the Supreme Court ruled both federal and state constitutional rights
to due process apply only to "people" in a jurisdiction. Noting a
county is neither a natural nor an artificial person, the court
disregarded all of Saunders County's arguments regarding due process
violations.
Second, the court assessed Saunders County's argument that
NDNR should have prohibited the involvement of the hearing officer
and unit supervisor, Sievers and France, in the county's proceedings
regarding the District. Saunders County also asserted the officers'
involvement violated disciplinary and ethical standards. However, the
NDNR contested Sievers' and France's involvement, stating in the
previous hearing there was no evidence that reflected either officers'
role in investigation, prosecution, or advocacy related to this
complaint. The court then held Saunders County failed to present
sufficient evidence of the officers' prior involvement as investigators,
prosecutors, or advocates on this matter to outweigh the presumption
of honesty.
Third, the court analyzed Saunders County's claim that the NDNR
erroneously denied its requests for subpoenas for Sievers; France; Ann
Bleed, the state hydrologist; and David Vogler, an NDNR attorney.
Again, the appellate court resorted to the Supreme Court's language
in CentralPlatteNRD, stating persons performing adjudicative functions
are "presumptively incompetent to testify" and parties may not
subpoena them, unless that employee has "unique knowledge
indispensable to the adjudication." The court in this case held the
burden of proving unique and indispensable knowledge was on
Saunders County, yet it failed to demonstrate these four employees
had any such information. Therefore, the court dismissed this
assertion of error for denial of subpoenas.
Fourth, the court similarly dismissed Saunders County's claim that
the NDNR failed to maintain a complete record of the proceedings on
this matter and failed to disclose the hearing officer's findings. The
court held a record's imperfections do not lead a department's
conclusions to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
Fifth, the Court addressed Saunders County's contention that
NDNR erred in dismissing its seventeen causes of action against the
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District based on their finding that the county lacked standing to bring
these actions. The court acknowledged one must have standing to sue
via some real interest in the cause of action, such as some legal or
equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the
controversy. Saunders County contended the subject matter of the
controversy is the District's wells, and the county did have a legally
protected interest in the matter. The NDNR conversely stated
Saunders County's complaint reveals that the subject matter of this
controversy pertains to the District's applications, not its wells. The
court agreed with the NDNR on this issue, holding each cause of
action brought by Saunders County alleged deficiencies in the
District's applications or the department's approval of those
applications.
Within this framework, the court then evaluated Saunders
County's contention that the NDNR inaccurately assessed the county's
standing given the county's: (1) outstanding surface water rights
applications; (2) adjacent water well; (3) obligation to administer
zoning and flood plain regulations; (4) alleged riparian water rights;
and (5) construction contract with the District that allegedly provided
the district with water from the District's wells.
Saunders County first asserted it had standing to bring actions
against the District because the county filed three applications to
appropriate surface water. The NDNR had yet to grant these
applications, and the county filed them after the NDNR approved the
District's applications; therefore, the District had the earlier priority
date. Finding that a mere application for a water right does not grant
a property right to the applicant, the NDNR originally dismissed the
claim that these outstanding applications gave Saunders County any
standing in the instant case. The court affirmed NDNR's conclusion,
finding it well supported by the evidence, and neither arbitrary,
capricious, nor unreasonable.
Saunders County also attempted to establish standing based upon
a water well constructed near the District's well field, arguing its well
would suffer potential negative consequences due to the drawdown in
the area of the District's well. Nevertheless, Saunders County did not
register its well until approximately two years after the NDNR
approved the District's applications. The court affirmed the NDNR's
initial judgment that a new well cannot create a water right that gives
rise to standing to challenge a water right previously established.
Next, Saunders County alleged standing in this cause of action
because of the county's role in zoning and flood plain regulations. Yet
Saunders County provided no evidence the District's water rights
would violate zoning or flood plain restrictions in any fashion.
Therefore, the court established the county proved no legal or
equitable right, title, or interest in this case upon the basis of zoning
and flood plain guidelines.
Saunders County also alleged its real estate deeds and patents in
Saunders County gave the county riparian water rights that gave rise to
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its standing in this case. In assessing this claim, the court stated it must
first determine if any property is riparian in nature, and then
determine the extent to which Saunders County demonstrated this
right. Based on the evidence, the court concluded at least some of the
county's property did have water flowing over or along its borders, and
was, therefore, riparian in nature. However, the court then agreed
with the NDNR's finding that Saunders County failed to make these
riparian rights relevant to the instant case by neglecting to prove any
manner in which the District's granted water rights would harm those
of the county.
Lastly, Saunders County argued it granted the District a
construction permit stipulating the District would supply water to areas
of Saunders County on a cost basis, as permitted by law. Again,
Saunders County was insufficient in making this fact relevant to the
instant case. The court stated the county did not provide any basis for
how this contractual clause should warrant standing to challenge the
legality of the District's applications for water rights it the county.
Once more, the court found the evidence adequately supported
NDNR in rejecting Saunders County's argument for standing based
upon this construction contract, and was not arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable.
Jessica L. Grether
NORTH CAROLINA
Deep River Citizens' Coalition v. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 560
S.E.2d 814 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (holding trial court's failure to state
both whether it used a de novo or whole record standard of review,
and the extent to which the court applied either standard to each issue
raised, precluded appellate review of decision).
Deep River Citizens' Coalition ("DRCC") challenged the Piedmont
Triad Regional Water Authority ("Water Authority") petition to the
North Carolina Environmental Management Commission ("EMC").
Once EMC issued a final decision, DRCC appealed this final decision
to the Wake County Superior Court. The court upheld the agency's
final decision. DRCC appealed to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, claiming the trial court erred by not reviewing EMC's
decision under a de novo standard of review. The Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded the case, ordering the trial court to advance its
own characterization of the issues and delineate the standards of
review for each issue presented.
For over a decade, the Water Authority sought to build a water
supply reservoir on the Deep River, located in eastern North Carolina.
In 1988, the Water Authority sought EMC's approval to purchase land
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by eminent domain and divert water from the Deep River Basin. Four
years after the Water Authority submitted the petition, EMC approved
the purchase and diversion. DRCC challenged the approval in Wake
County Superior Court.
Although the trial court reversed EMC's approval of the purchase
and diversion, the North Carolina Court of Appeals later remanded
the case to the North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings
("OAH"). In the original proceeding, DRCC did not have a contested
case hearing. Thus, the appellate court held the trial court was
without jurisdiction to review the case, vacated the trial court's
decision, and remanded the case to OAH to provide DRCC with a
contested case hearing upon which EMC could make a final decision.
After the OAH hearing, EMC granted summary judgment against
DRCC on all issues. DRCC appealed EMC's decision to the Superior
Court of Wake County, which both affirmed EMC's order and issued a
supplemental order concerning the scope of its review. DRCC's
appeal of both orders provided the basis for this decision and its
second visit to the court of appeals.
In its appeal, DRCC argued the trial court erred because it did not
review the record de novo. North Carolina uses a de novo standard of
review when an appellant claims an agency made a decision based on
an error of law and uses a whole record review when an appellant
claims an agency's decision was arbitrary and capricious or not
supported by substantial evidence.
DRCC claimed the trial court should have applied a de novo
standard of review because the record did not support EMC's
conclusions and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources abused its discretion by refusing to hold a public hearing.
The court rejected this claim and held that a whole record review was
appropriate because DRCC did not assert the trial court made errors
of law.
In addition, the court also held it could not properly conduct its
review of the trial court's decision because the trial court never
explicitly stated whether, or to what extent, it was using a whole record
or de novo standard of review. The trial court stated the standards of
review but did not outline its application to this particular case. As a
result, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the trial court
decision and ordered the trial court to advance its own
characterization of the issues presented by the petitioners and
delineate, clearly, the standards of review used for each issue.
Merc Pittinos
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PENNSYLVANIA
Machipongo Land & Coal Co., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 799 A.2d
751 (Pa. 2002) (holding that courts must consider horizontal
conceptualization of property must be considered when determining
whether the Environmental Quality Board effected a taking of
property in designating property unsuitable for surface mining of
coal).
Owners of coal mining property sued the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") for declaring their
property unsuitable for mining, thus rending the property unavailable
for mining in the future. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
declared that some but not all of the designations by the DEP were
invalid, and both the DEP and the owners appealed to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The court affirmed the ruling that one
property parcel had no value for mining purposes, but reversed the
remainder of the judgment and remanded to the trial court with
directions to consider: (1) whether a taking occurred under all
applicable analyses; and (2) whether mining could be enjoined under
a theory of public nuisance.
In 1989, the Brisbin Recreation Board and the Locust Grove
Sportsmen club petitioned the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources ("DER") to declare the Goss Run Watershed
"unsuitable for mining" ("UFM"). Such a regulation would affect the
property rights of Machipongo Land and Coal Co., Inc., the Victor E.
Erickson Trust, and Joseph Naughton ("property owners"). All the
property owners stipulated that they use their property for activities
other than coal mining and that they owned interests in their land for
several decades.
The property owners intervened in the DER
administrative proceedings, however, DER determined that surface
mining of coal within the Goss Run Watershed had a "high potential to
cause increases in dissolved solid and metal concentrations in Goss
Run that would adversely affect the use of the stream as an auxiliary
water supply" and "a significant potential to disrupt the hydrologic
balance
causing
decreases
in
the
net
alkalinity
of
discharges... destroying the habitat for wild trout populations."
The Pennsylvania Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
("PaSMCRA") determines if use of land for mining: (1) is
incompatible with existing state or local land use plans or programs;
(2) will affect fragile or historic lands in which such operations could
result in significant damage to important historic, cultural, scientific
and aesthetic values and natural systems; (3) will affect renewable
resources of lands in which such operations could result in a
substantial loss or reduction of long-range productivity of water supply
or food or fiber products and such lands to include aquifers and
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aquifer recharge areas; or (4) will affect natural hazard lands in which
such operations could substantially endanger life and property, such
lands to include areas subject to frequent flooding and areas of
unstable geology.
The Pennsylvania General Assembly revised PaSMCRA in 1980 to
comply with Federal SMCRA in creating a mechanism to designate
certain lands as UFM. It stated the purpose of PaSMCRA was to
prevent the pollution of rivers and streams, protect wildlife and the
environment generally, and to maintain jurisdiction over in-state
mining activities. The statute delineated standards to determine
whether land should be deemed UFM.
The DER recommended to the Environmental Quality Board
("EQB") that the Goss Run Watershed be designated UFM. The EQB,
effective May 23, 1992, designated the 555-acre area of the Goss Run
Watershed UFM and the property owners protested. The property
owners challenged designation of the land as UFM and argued
alternatively that if the land was UFM, then such designation
constituted a government taking of property which requires just
compensation pursuant to article I, section 10 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court articulated three
categories of land analysis to determine whether all economical,
beneficial, or productive use of land was prevented by government
intervention.
The court found that property rights could be severed on a piece
of land by: (1) a horizontal, physical division; (2) a vertical division,
severing by air, surface, and/or mineral rights; or (3) a temporal
division. The property owners urged the court to divide their property
vertically, thus by regulation declaring the Goss Run Watershed
property UFM, the government deprived them of economic use of the
land.
The court rejected the property owner's argument that courts,
including the United States Supreme Court, have refused the vertical
severance of mineral, air, and surface estates. The court held that, in
determining whether a government designation of UFM constituted a
taking, it may only look at horizontal property rights, not vertical or
temporal.
Also on appeal was the issue of whether the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania could present evidence that the proposed use of the Goss
Run Watershed by the property owners constituted a public nuisance.
The court held that the lower court erred by not allowing the
Commonwealth to present evidence of nuisance because the
Commonwealth recognized that "polluting the waters of the
Commonwealth is a public nuisance."
SarahA. Hubbard
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TEXAS
City of Waco v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 83 S.W.3d
169 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that a case is ripe when a controversy
exists over the effect of a state statute prohibiting the issuance of
permits to dischargers that cause or contribute to the violation of
water quality standards and there is actual hardship occasioned by a
denial ofjudicial review).
The City of Waco ("Waco") filed a complaint against the Texas
Natural Resource Convention Commission ("TNRCC") in the District
Court of Travis County. Waco asserted that the TNRCC worsened the
impairment of the North Bosque River by granting new applications
for additional discharges of waste into the already polluted river
without developing the Total Maximum Daily Load ("TMDL") plan.
Waco argued that the TNRCC's discretionary "interim policy" of
granting permits was at odds with state law requiring that a sufficient
allocation be available for the water to receive the additional loading
and still meet state water quality standards. Before Waco filed a
complaint, the TNRCC submitted the TMDL plan based on outdated
and flawed information.
Waco wanted a declaration that the TNRCC would not issue any
more permits for new confined animal feeding operation permits
("CAFO") until the it promulgated legally binding regulations to
implement TMDLs. The TNRCC argued that Waco's suit was not ripe.
The district court agreed with the TNRCC in determining the case
was not ripe and dismissed the suit. Waco appealed to the Court of
Appeals of Texas. The court of appeals held that the Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act ("UDJA") provided that Waco's claim was fit
for judicial review. In addition, Waco would suffer hardship if judicial
review was not granted. The court concluded the case was ripe and
remanded to the trial court.
During the 1980s, the dairy industry greatly expanded in the North
Bosque River watershed in Waco, Texas. As a result of this growth, the
waste produced by the dairy operations greatly impaired the water
quality of the river. The primary source of the pollution was
phosphorous, a nutrient in animal waste.
The Clean Water Act required TNRCC to identify which of the
state's navigable waters were impaired by pollutants, and to develop a
TMDL plan for assimilation of pollutants present in the water. More
than three years after the TNRCC identified the North Bosque as
impaired, it still had not developed the TMDL plan. TNRCC required
new dairy operations to obtain CAFOs.
In its analysis, the court of appeals stated one must look at whether
the facts demonstrate the presence of "ripening seeds of a
controversy." Here, Waco contended that section 122.4(i) of the Code
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of Federal Regulations, which is incorporated into state law, prohibits
the TNRCC from issuing new CAFO permits until it develops
compliance schedules and pollutant load allocations. The statute
states that no permit may be issued to a new source or a new
discharger if the discharge from its construction or operation will
cause or contribute to the violation of water quality standards.
On the other hand, the TNRCC argued that the statute merely
limits ability to issue permits that would violate water standards, and
this depends on the permit. Thus, the claim was not ripe until the
TNRCC actually approved a permit.
The court reasoned that the controversy as to whether the statute
operated to prohibit TNRCC from approving new discharge permits
until it adopted pollution reduction measures presented a legal
inquiry.
The court concluded that there were two requirements in order to
determine if a case is ripe. First, the issues must be fit for judicial
review. Second, there must be hardship occasioned to the party by the
court's denial ofjudicial review.
The court found that Waco met the fitness requirement. Waco
filed under the UDJA, which stated that parties are not confined to
review of agency rules, but a claimant can obtain a declaration of its
rights under a statute. Under the UDJA, Waco had to demonstrate
that a justiciable controversy existed and the controversy would be
resolved by declaration. In this situation, there was a controversy
between Waco and the TNRCC regarding the effect of section 122.4(i)
of the statute, and a declaration by the court would resolve this
controversy.
The court further concluded that Waco fulfilled the hardship
requirement, the second prong of the ripeness standard. Waco met
the hardship standard because the waters would become much more
polluted if Waco was forced to wait until TNRCC granted another
permit in order to challenge it.
The court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for a
determination on the issues.
Natalie Lucas
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UTAH
Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 42 P.3d 379 (Utah 2002)
(reversing summary judgment because a question of material fact
remained regarding whether defendant's actions in the management
of flood waters could be characterized so as to qualify for immunity
under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act).
Pigs Gun Club, Inc. ("PGC") brought suit against Sanpete County
("County") for their alleged negligence and strict liability in
maintaining an elevated road resulting in flood damage to PGC's real
property, as well as an inverse condemnation action. The
Sanpete
County District Court found (1) there were no undisputed facts; (2)
the County's decisions constituted the "management of flood water,"
which were "discretionary functions"; and (3) that the flooding was the
result of a "latent defect" in the lane. As such, the court granted the
County's motion for summary judgment on the negligence claim
under the Utah Governmental Immunities Act ("Act"). In addition,
the trial court dismissed PGC's claims for strict liability and inverse
condemnation as barred by the Act, and dismissed several named
plaintiffs for failure to file notice of claim. PGC appealed and the
Supreme Court of Utah reversed the summary judgment motion and
remanded to the trial court to determine whether the County's actions
in managing flood waters could be characterized as qualifying for
immunity under the Act.
PGC owned property adjacent to the Sevier River in Sanpete
County, Utah. Fayette River Lane crossed the river between PGC's
property and Yuba Reservoir, into which the river flows. Prior to a
flood, which washed out the lane in 1983, floodwaters washed over the
lane when the capacity of an underlying culvert was exceeded, sparing
PGC's lands from damaging floods. The County repaired the lane
after the 1983 flood, which increased the height of the lane and the
underlying earthen structure and prevented overflow, and allegedly
resulted in flood damage to PGC's lands. Following a second flood in
1995, PGC requested that the County breach the lane in order to
prevent continued flooding and to allow the current floodwaters to
recede into the reservoir. Although the county refused to breach the
lane, the floodwater itself caused a breach, and the water receded.
The county rebuilt the lane, allegedly causing further flood damage to
PGC's lands. Subsequently, PGC filed suit alleging that the County was
negligent and subject to strict liability for its maintenance of the lane
and that the resulting flood constituted a taking of PGC's land without
just compensation.
Upon review of the summary judgment motion, the supreme court
found that the Act required a three-part test to determine whether
immunity has been waived for a particular action. The court must

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

determine (1) whether the activity is a government function for which
the legislature has granted blanket immunity; (2) whether another
section of the Act waived the blanket immunity; and (3) whether the
Act contains an exception to the waiver resulting in retention of
immunity. Further, the court determined that the test must be applied
to the three separate activities of the defendant, the rebuilding of a
higher lane prior to 1995, the refusal to breach the lane upon flooding
in 1995, and the subsequent reconstruction of the lane. The court
found that while all three activities satisfied the first two prongs of the
test, satisfaction of the final prong turned on whether the County's
actions could be categorized as the management of floodwater, a
discretionary function, or a latent defect.
At the trial court, PGC presented deposition testimony from
several county officials who opposed the motion for summary
judgment. While the trial court did not find the official's testimony
compelling, upon review the supreme court determined that the
testimony was sufficient to raise a dispute over whether the purpose of
the county's activities was for flood control. The court further found
that the trial court failed to address defendant's second ground for
retaining immunity, the exercise of a discretionary function. Finally,
the court found that under Utah law, the existence of a latent defect is
a question for the fact finder to answer. Consequently, in determining
that questions of material fact remained, the court reversed the trial
court's granting of summary judgment and remanded for further
consideration. Additionally, the court found that the language of the
Act did not prohibit claims for strict liability, and reversed the
dismissal.
Inverse condemnation requires that a plaintiffs property interest
be taken or damaged for a public use. The court, in reversing the
summary judgment motion, determined that a factual dispute existed
as to whether the damage was the result of a public use, as required by
Utah precedent, and remanded for reconsideration.
As to the
dismissal of several named plaintiffs, the court affirmed the lower
decision, stating that timely notification under the Act requires the
name of each plaintiff to appear on the notice, not merely constructive
notice of a general claim.
Chris Cummins
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WASHINGTON
Dep't of Ecology v. Acquavella, 51 P. 3d 800 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that an earlier adjudication of water rights resulting in a
decree was a general adjudication of all the water rights within the
river basin and the plaintiff was therefore precluded from asserting a
water right that their predecessors failed to assert at that time).
Acquavella, U.S. Timberlands Yakima L.L.C. ("Timberlands")
asserted a claim for water rights that the Washington Department of
Ecology ("Ecology") denied because the rights were not asserted
earlier in a 1921 water adjudication. The Superior Court of Yakima
County affirmed this denial of water rights and Timberlands appealed.
The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court and the
Ecology's denial of Timberlands' asserted rights, holding that
Timberlands was precluded from asserting water rights that their
predecessors failed to assert in the 1921 adjudication resulting in the
Amosso Decree.
In 1917, Washington enacted a state Water Code that declared all
waters within the state to be the property of the public, with the
exception of then existing rights. The code also provided that any
future rights would only be obtained through appropriation, in the
manner provided by the Revised Code of Washington ("RCW"). The
RCW described the Washington state water permit system. Prior to
1917, the Washington legislature had not addressed water rights, and
the courts recognized water rights under both the riparian and prior
appropriation systems. In 1985, the Supreme Court of Washington
decided in Department of Ecology v. Abbott, that riparian owners should
have been given an adequate time to learn about the 1917 Water
Code, and determined that such time was fifteen years. Therefore,
water diversions after 1932 required a state permit.
In 1921, the state hydraulic engineer set in motion the Amosso
adjudication to determine the water rights to the Teanaway River.
Timberlands argued that this adjudication did not encompass all rights
to Teanaway water, but instead covered only lands then under
irrigation. The superior court rejected this argument because the
language of the Amosso referee's report and the subsequent decree
both indicated that more than that was at stake. In fact, the decree's
ownership list included one of Timberlands' predecessors, Cascade
Lumber, but did not have a recorded right to divert at the ten points
that Timberlands asserted in this adjudication. The superior court
held, and the court of appeals here affirmed, the Amosso decree was
representative of a general adjudication and it therefore barred
Timberlands from asserting a water right not earlier asserted or
recognized in the 1921 adjudication. Section 90.03.220 of the RCW
memorializes the application of resjudicata to water adjudications.
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Timberlands also argued that all adjudications prior to 1979 were
not general adjudications encompassing the total water rights to a
stream. Timberlands based this argument on a 1979 addition to the
Water Code that stated water rights subject to determination
proceedings described in RCW sections 90.03.110 through 90.03.240
include all rights to the use of water. Timberlands argued that prior to
this addition, adjudications did not include all water rights in a stream,
and therefore its predecessor was not required to assert their rights in
the 1921 adjudication. The superior court quickly disregarded this
argument because the process of adjudication has remained
substantially the same since the 1917 Water Code was put into effect,
and the 1979 changes served merely as clarification. The court of
appeals found no error in the superior court's disposition of this
argument.
Timberlands next argued that the superior court wrongly denied
them an exception to the application of res judicata because of the
great injustice they would suffer. Timberlands based this claim on its
continuous use of water and that of its predecessors, along with the
necessity of the water for their timber management operations. The
court of appeals however, recognized the limited nature of the
exceptions to res judicata and held that the superior court properly
applied resjudicata to the current adjudication of water rights.
Timberlands also maintained that its predecessor revived a water
right by exercising riparian rights between 1921 and 1932. The court
of appeals held here that though Cascade Lumber, and later Boise
Cascade, used water during those years, perfecting a water right by
such use was impossible because the 1921 adjudication settled all
rights in the Teanaway River. At that time, the adjudication reserved
any unasserted rights to the public and precluded adverse possession
claims against the state.
Timberlands' final two claims addressed the fairness of the
disposition of the case. First, the court of appeals held that there was
not a violation of due process because Timberlands' predecessor
received notice of the original adjudication in 1921. Second, the court
of appeals held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion
when it refused to exercise its equitable powers to confirm
Timberlands' water right. Though Timberlands used water from the
Teanaway River in the past, the actual parties to the 1921 adjudication
had a right to rely on that decree. Furthermore, failure of a
predecessor to assert a water right, for whatever reason, does not
indicate fraud, concealment, or bad faith, the normal causes for
equitable relief. Timberlands' predecessor may have had an existing
vested right to the waters of the Teanaway River that would have been
recognized by the 1921 adjudication, but they failed to assert it.
Erika Delaney-Lew
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Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille County v. Dep't of Ecology, 51
P.3d 744 (Wash. 2002) (holding (1) the Washington surface water
statute requires application of water to a beneficial use prior to
granting an application for change in point of diversion; (2) the
Washington Department of Ecology may make tentative
determinations of water rights; (3) a public interest standard may not
be used as ajustification to deny an application for change in point of
diversion; and (4) the Washington Department of Ecology may
condition a water quality certification on instream flow requirements
under the Clean Water Act).
Public Utility District No. 1 ("District") applied to change the
points of diversion for its 1907 and 1980 water rights to the original
point of diversion for the 1907 right, roughly 7,500 feet downstream,
in order to build a hydropower project. The Washington Department
of Ecology ("Ecology") denied both applications. Ecology denied the
application under the 1907 right because of nonuse since 1956, and
because a change in the diversion contradicted public interest.
Ecology denied the 1980 right application on the grounds that (1) a
change in diversion cannot be granted when an inchoate right is at
issue; (2) the utility relinquished its right because of failure to pay
licensing fees; and (3) the change would be contrary to public interest.
The District appealed Ecology's decisions to the Washington
Pollution Control Hearing Board ("Board"), which found (1) Ecology
possessed necessary authority to condition the grant of a water quality
certification on the maintenance of instream flows, even in conflict
with existing water rights; (2) the Washington surface water statute
("WSWS") was inapplicable to inchoate rights, and thus Ecology
possessed authority to deny the 1980 right diversion; (3) Ecology could
consider public interest when considering applications for a change in
point of diversion; (4) Ecology and the board could make tentative
decisions on the validity of water rights when reviewing change
applications; (5) the District's 1980 right had not been relinquished
for failure to pay licensing fees; and (6) the facts presented did not
merit summary judgment for Ecology on the issue of abandonment of
the 1907 right.
Ecology and the District petitioned for review of the board's
decisions in Pend Oreille County Superior Court. The superior court
consolidated the petitions and the Washington Supreme Court
granted review. The court affirmed all of the summary judgment
decisions, except the grant of authority to Ecology allowing a public
interest standard to deny an application for change in point diversion.
Upon review, the court first addressed the disputed points of the
WSWS, affirming the grant of summary judgment to Ecology. The
court held that WSWS required beneficial use of water prior to
granting a permit to change the point of diversion. The court found
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the District's argument, that the second sentence of WSWS allows a
change in the point of diversion prior to the establishment of a
beneficial use, incorrect because the legislature explicitly addressed
undetermined rights. The legislature confirmed that no other change
could be made of water without first applying it to a beneficial use.
Next, the court addressed Ecology's ability to make tentative
determinations regarding water rights. The District argued that
Ecology lacked the authority to adjudicate water rights and determine
abandonment. The court held that the permit process required
Ecology to tentatively determine whether a right existed before
allowing changes in the point of diversion, though the determination
could not be considered final.
The court reversed the Board's grant of summary judgment
allowing Ecology to use a public interest standard to deny the district's
application under the WSWS. The Board believed that the surface
water statute required Ecology to weigh public interest when
considering applications to change diversion points. The court held
that legislative intent underlying the WSWS clearly disallowed Ecology
from using a public interest standard to deny applications.
The court next considered the issue of abandonment of the
District's 1907 water right. Contrary to Ecology's claim, the District
continually attempted to develop a hydropower project, indicating
continual use. This evidence of continual planning for development
overcame Ecology's claim of abandonment, and the court affirmed the
Board's decision that Ecology improperly denied the application on
these grounds.
The court affirmed summary judgment for the District on the issue
of statutory forfeiture of the District's 1980 right. The court held that
the Board correctly found for the District on this issue, because
legislative forfeiture of water rights could not apply to inchoate rights.
In addition, the court found forfeiture contradicted the intent of the
legislature, which specifically included provisions for late payments of
licensing fees.
Finally, the court upheld summary judgment affirming Ecology's
authority to set minimum flow requirements on the water quality
certification for Sullivan Creek. The District's project required a
license from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which
necessitated a state water quality certification. The court held that
section 303 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") granted Ecology the
authority to undertake any necessary action in order to comply with
the Act. In addition, the court found that the state's antidegradation
policy prevented any potential degradation of existing beneficial uses.
Regulations of the United States Environmental Protection Agency
also prohibited any activity even partially eliminating an existing
beneficial use. The instream flow requirements protected existing
beneficial uses, including fish spawning, recreation and commerce.
The court dismissed the District's argument that the CWA pertained to
water quality as opposed to quantity, holding that depletion of a water
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body could destroy all beneficial uses, and thus constituted pollution.
The court determined that the legislature expressly protected water
quantity in addition to quality, through the CWA's broad definition of
pollution which hedges against physical alterations of water
endangering beneficial use.
JaredEllis

WEST VIRGINIA
Monongahela Power Co. v. Office of Water Res., 567 S.E. 2d 629 (W.
Va. 2002) (holding impaired water reports submitted to the
Environmental Protection Agency are not reviewable by the state
environmental quality board or by the state circuit courts).
Monongahela Power filed an appeal with the State Environmental
Quality Board ("Board") to challenge the West Virginia Department of
Environmental Protection's ("DEP") decision to withdraw its Waste
Load Allocations ("WLAs"). The Board affirmed the DEP's withdrawal
of the WLAs. Then, Monongahela Power appealed to the Circuit
Court of Kanawha County. The circuit court stated the Board did not
have jurisdiction to hear permit appeals, and reversed the Board's
decision. The circuit court ordered removal of the Upper Blackwater
River from the 1996 and 1998 section 303(d) lists, and prohibited the
river to be listed on future 303(d) lists until the DEP established
sufficient evidence to support its listing. In addition, the circuit court
determined that DEP was not required to implement the Total
Maximum Daily Load ("TMDL") calculations that the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") established. In addition, the court ordered
the DEP to eliminate the "Waterbodies with Biological Impairment"
category on the 1998 303(d) list.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that neither
the Board nor the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear appeals of the
303(d) list, or to review the TMDL list. The court stated the 303(d)
lists and TMDL reports are reviewable only in the United States
District Court. In addition, the court determined the circuit court
exceeded its authority in ordering the DEP to remove the river from its
current and future 303(d) lists, to disregard the TMDL list issued by
the EPA, to restore Monongahela Power its waste allocation permits,
and to eliminate the "Waterbodies with Biological Impairment"
category. The court ordered the DEP to update and revise the TMDL
list and to stay the pending permits.
Pursuant to the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), the DEP submitted a
record of streams that did not meet water quality standards, known as
a 303(d) list, for the EPA to review. For every stream on this list, the
DEP was also required to submit a TMDL, which calculates the level of
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pollutants that can enter the stream.
In 1996, the DEP listed the Upper Blackwater River as an impaired
stream on its 303(d) list due to the river's low oxygen levels. Yet, the
DEP stated it did not have the financial resources or expertise to
compose the TMDL list, so the EPA prepared a draft TMDL list for the
DEP. As a result of the EPA's TMDL list and recommendations, the
DEP withdrew and denied renewal of the WLAs and National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System Permits to Monongahela Power and
several other companies.
In the court's analysis, it reasoned that 303(d) lists were
recommendations, rather than orders. The 303(d) lists have no force
and effect until the administrator of the EPA approves them.
Therefore, the DEP's 303 (d) list was not appealable to the Board.
Furthermore, the court determined that a state circuit court did
not have jurisdiction to review an order of the EPA. A circuit court
cannot usurp the EPA's decision to have Upper Blackwater on 303(d)
lists. The circuit court did not have the authority to review the list or
to order a category to be removed from the list. For the same reasons,
both the Board and circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the
TMDL calculations, and the circuit court erred in ruling that the DEP
is not required to implement the TMDL calculations.
Despite these errors, the court concluded there was sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the TMDL list was flawed. The court
stated the DEP was required to correct the TMDL list as soon as it
could afford to do so, and stay any pending permits until the TMDL
was revised and updated. The court determined there was no
evidence of anything in the CWA that prevented a state from revising
the list and re-submitting it to the EPA. The court determined that
EPA decisions concerning 303(d) lists and TMDLs are reviewable in
the United States District Court.
Natalie Lucas

